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NOTE:  All names have been changed to protect the anonymity of my 
informants. Ages are given here ca. 2014.
Alazar:  a 30-year-old ex-military refugee, originally from Asmara, my 
main contact in Eritrean informal networks in Rome.
Senay:  Alazar’s friend and age-mate, my host in a Roman squat.
Kibreab:  my main informant in a Roman shantytown inhabited by 
Eritreans in transit to other destinations.
Ogbazgi:  a 25-year-old refugee living in Sicily whom I met in Ethiopia 
on the occasion of his marriage. I also visited his family in May 
Nefas, a village in the southern region of Eritrea.
Gabriel:  my 28-year-old main informant in Milan, who facilitated my 
stay at his aunt’s place in Asmara.
Ester:  the head of the family who hosted me in Asmara.
Salam:  Ester’s youngest daughter, who shared her room with me 
during my stay in Asmara.
Johanna:  Salam’s friend and neighbor, who became one of my main 
informants in Eritrea.
Lwam:  Gabriel’s younger sister, my main interpreter during my home 
visits in Asmara.
Minia:  Alazar’s mother. I met with her family in Asmara and then in 
Ethiopia after their escape from the country.
Sister 
Kudussan:
 an Eritrean nun who had lived in Addis Ababa for more than 
three decades, where her small convent was a meeting place for 
young Eritrean refugees.
Hagos:  a 30-year-old refugee from Mai Nefas and main spokesperson 
among the group of Catholic refugees I met in Addis Ababa
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Violetta:  my flat mate in Addis Ababa.
Adonay:  a 28-year-old refugee student at Addis Ababa University.
Jeremiah:  a 40-year-old translator and informant in the Adi Harush camp 
in Ethiopia.
Noah:  a 25-year-old Kunama translator and informant in the camp of 
Shimelba.
Tsegay:  the middleman I interviewed in Addis Ababa, who became a 
people smuggler to earn a living and pay for the migration of 
his siblings.
Maria:  my 28-year-old host in Khartoum. I lived with her and her 
8-year-old daughter, Anna, for over a month.




It was 2016. Surrounded by the perpetual noise and relentless coming and going 
of Termini Station in Rome, my friend Alazar and I were drinking coffee at our 
usual meeting point.
“My brother is saying that I should join him in Canada . . . ,” Alazar said.
“How is that possible?” I answered, surprised.
“My brother said not to worry . . . that he will find a way for me,” Alazar replied 
quietly.
Alazar, whom I have known since he sought asylum in Italy in 2008, had finally 
found a job in a local restaurant and seemed to be feeling quite at home in Rome. 
After surviving a war when he was only eighteen, enduring a troublesome Medi-
terranean crossing, and spending a few years of unstable existence between Italy 
and the few countries in which he had sought asylum afterwards, Alazar had 
finally found some stability, I thought. He had a full international protection, a 
lot of friends and spoke some Italian. Apparently, however, he was not yet at his 
final destination as far as his relatives were concerned. Life was not easy for Alazar 
and many of the other Eritrean refugees I knew in the city. They often lived in 
poor housing and had few, irregular jobs. But I nonetheless had trouble under-
standing how Alazar’s brother could even think that moving to Canada, probably 
through an incredibly dangerous and expensive crossing of the Mexico-U.S. and 
then the U.S.-Canada borders, could be a good idea. Why gamble resources, time 
and energy again for an unsure outcome?
Such situations were not new to me. The restless search for a suitable final 
home in spite of all obstacles characterized the trajectories of most of the Eritre-
ans I met during my research across Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Italy. The 
dream of fulfilling family expectations and finding not only a safe haven but some 
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degree of socioeconomic and existential stability at one’s next destination was 
typical of the stories I collected. My Eritrean interlocutors felt that migration, no 
matter how risky, was their best option if they were to change their lives and those 
of their families. Their resources, time, and energy were all invested in this, the big 
gamble of the protagonists of this book, in which the stakes are incredibly high 
and the outcome extremely uncertain.
Through the hardships of the national service in Eritrea and the adversities 
of exile in refugee camps and peripheral neighborhoods in Sudan, Ethiopia, and 
Italy, The Big Gamble investigates migrants’ and their families’ fears, dreams and 
stratagems in navigating the opportunities and constraints produced by national 
migration policies and the international asylum regime. Besides describing their 
experience of deprivation and violence, I reconstruct the choices faced by my 
research participants at each stage of their migration. In each site, I account 
not only for the importance of socioeconomic resources for geographic mobil-
ity, but also for the role of shared moralities (that is to say, shared conceptions 
of what is moral and immoral), transnational expectations and imagination in 
the decision whether to stay put or move on. In each site, I illustrate the cumu-
lative impact of previous emotional and material investments to reach the 
desired destination.
In a nutshell, The Big Gamble seeks to show the space of refugees’ agency—to 
explore the paradox of choice for those who are defined by the lack of it. In so 
doing, I break with long-standing assumptions, criticized but never really over-
come, that reduce the explanations of refugee movements to push factors and con-
fine the debate about them to the paradigm of emergency and exceptionality. By 
considering the role of aspirations in the context of chronic crisis, the influence 
of families on refugees’ decision-making long after they left home and the emic 
perception of risk in dangerous border-crossings, this book shows the relevance 
of concepts developed in broader migration studies for the theoretical interpreta-
tion of refugee movements. In particular, building on long-standing debates on 
imaginaries, culture of migration and transnational moral economies, the idea of 
cosmologies of destinations, explained below, is for me a way to understand the 
interplay of mobility and immobility by analyzing how shared moral norms, per-
sonal aspirations, and collective emotions shape refugees’ choices for mobility and 
their directions.
After introducing the idea of cosmologies of destinations and placing it within 
the larger debate over mobility and immobility, this introduction briefly revisits 
the history of refugee and forced migration studies and shows the theoretical as 
well as political importance of blurring the boundaries between research on forced 
and voluntary migrations. Then, it explains the significance of the Eritrean case in 
today’s scenario and provides a historical overview of the country. Finally, I pres-
ent the main features of my multi-sited ethnography across four countries and a 
summary of the book chapters. 
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MODERN C OSMOLO GIES
Since starting to work with Eritreans in 2008, I have come to realize how the 
desired outcomes of their migration trajectories are patterned along a geographic 
hierarchy, with Canada, the United States, and the Scandinavian countries at the 
top and Eritrea at the bottom. In the middle, countries like Ethiopia, Sudan, and 
even Italy were perceived only as transit places, unsuitable for long-term settle-
ment. Although individual preferences, family connections, rumors about recent 
policy changes, and other contingent circumstances could orient choices of a final 
destination—“Is it better to go to Sweden, Norway, or Switzerland?”—Eritrean 
refugees I encountered seemed to share common perceptions about the levels of 
safety, individual freedom, and labor market opportunities in different countries 
both among themselves and with their relatives around the globe. Far from being 
simply a configuration of geographic imaginaries, this hierarchy—which I define 
as a cosmology of destinations—also reflects a pathway of moral achievements 
and recognitions. Migrants’ journeys are constructed as more or less successful, 
depending on the final country of settlement.
In anthropology, cosmologies are conventionally defined as widespread repre-
sentations of the world as a hierarchically ordered whole.1 Traditionally pertaining 
to the vocabulary of religion studies, cosmologies have progressively come to refer 
more generally to systems of classification and their related moral and emotional 
attitudes. Although for a time, this concept has been regarded as an outdated and 
ethnocentric notion, it is nevertheless an important heuristic tool for linking rep-
resentations of reality with perceptions of morality and prescribed actions.2 The 
concept of cosmologies has recently been used, for instance, to talk about social 
security conceptions in South Africa (“cosmologies of welfare”),3 to refer to the 
capitalist system and its encompassing narrative,4 and to denote the system of reli-
gious values underpinning the economic transactions involved in irregular migra-
tion from Fouzhou in China (“cosmologies of credit”).5 Cosmologies are crucial 
in Liisa Malkki’s Purity and Exile, a founding text in refugee studies. Malkki illus-
trates how the mythico-historical reinterpretation of the Burundian genocide—a 
cosmology in its own right—shaped refugees’ understanding of daily life in the 
camps and oriented their interactions with locals. Hutu refugees regarded inter-
marriage with locals and residence outside the camp, in particular, as threats to 
the purity of their identity.6
Whereas Malkki’s Purity and Exile examines the cosmological beliefs of a lim-
ited number of refugees living in a confined camp, The Big Gamble aims to make 
sense of transnationally diffused worldviews among migrants in transit, their 
families back home, and their relatives and friends in the diaspora. Their views 
emerge not only from a national history of the Eritrean people as colonial subjects, 
war martyrs, and sacrificial migrants, but also from the wider effects of global 
cultural circulation on local cultures of migration, imaginaries and aspirations. 
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These concepts have previously been examined in the context of voluntary labor 
migration, but rarely in that of refugee flows from areas of chronic crisis. However, 
as described by Alessandro Monsutti in the context of Azhara migration from 
Afghanistan, long-term violence and related disruption of livelihoods often lead 
communities to reorganize, not only practically, but also morally and symbolically, 
around geographic mobility as the only significant means to survive.7 The social 
expectations related to migration can be no less widespread in communities that 
have experienced a long-term outflow of refugees than in those of labor migrants.
Concepts such as aspirations, cultures of migration, and imaginaries crucially 
relate to the idea of cosmologies of destinations. However, there are some dif-
ferences among them. Aspirations have become an especially crucial concept in 
migration studies thanks to the work of Jørgen Carling, Hein de Haas, and Ellen 
Bal and Roos Willems, among others.8 The analysis of migration aspirations gener-
ally defined as “the conviction that leaving would be better than staying” has con-
tributed to overcoming the simplistic understanding of migration as economically 
driven. Specifically, as argued by Jørgen Carling and Francis Collins, “unlike alter-
native terms, such as ‘intention’, ‘plan’ and ‘wish’, ‘aspiration’ marks an intersection 
of personal, collective and normative dimensions.”9 As such I consider aspirations 
as a crucial manifestation of the socially shared and individually incorporated set 
of images, norms, and symbols that I call “cosmology of destinations.”
A culture of migration designates a widespread societal orientation to geo-
graphic mobility.10 The idea of a cosmology of destinations adds more specific-
ity, implying that mobility desires can be differentially addressed to specific loca-
tions, historically, culturally, and economically linked to the contexts of departure. 
These locations are typically ordered along a hierarchy of preferences, which are 
by no means fixed. Their order continually shifts, owing to feedback mechanisms 
between individuals living in different countries as well as popular images, which 
are at the same time rooted in specific historical experiences. In this sense the con-
cept of cosmologies of destinations resounds with one of the geographic imaginar-
ies that, as several scholars notice, often tend to be hierarchically ordered accord-
ing to a wide range of social, historical, and economic factors.11
However, if imaginaries are mostly representational systems, cosmologies are 
by definition symbolic, and moral constructions. They are not only sets of images, 
but include emotional attitudes and moral orientations, which encompass those 
who are on the move as well as those who stay put. More specifically, within a 
vision of a hierarchically ordered world, the desire to move to another location 
that is deemed safer and more conducive to socioeconomic—and existential—sta-
bility, also implies a specific moral understanding of what it means to remain stuck 
in one’s own place. Although moralities and emotions have certainly been touched 
upon by those studying migration imaginaries, they are not explicitly connected 
to the concept of imaginaries. The idea of cosmologies of destinations instead pro-
vides a frame in which the symbolic, emotional, and moral dimensions of migra-
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tion can be systematically interpreted. This allows me to account for the role of 
community pressures and the moral obligations as well as the emotions involved 
in migrating no matter the cost.
While systematically linking images of the outside world—and different desti-
nations within it—with the subjects’ perception of their own position, the concept 
of cosmologies of destinations thus enables me to analyze different dimensions 
of mobility and immobility. Besides physical “stuckedness,” I unfold the different 
meanings of mobility and immobility from my informants’ point of view—that is, 
their protracted and reproduced sense of being trapped at different stages of their 
trajectories. Without reconstructing the worldview that defines Italy exclusively as 
a transit country, for instance, it would not have been possible for me to under-
stand why Alazar was still perceived by his family as “being stuck” in Rome. This is 
only one of the many different instances of being and feeling immobile that I docu-
ment throughout the book.
BEING MOBILE IN AN IMMOBILE WORLD
Immobility has in the past few years become central to the debate on migration.12 
While scholars usually consider sedentary populations as the norm and simply 
focus their attention on migrants, some have argued that immobility and its fac-
tors must also be analyzed. Individuals often aspire to migrate, but are prevented 
from doing so by restrictive immigration and emigration policies, the devastating 
effects of wars,13 or the disempowering effects of poverty.14 Limitations of mobility 
are reproduced along the complex trajectories of refugees and migrants, who may 
get stuck in transit, stranded at the edges of Europe, at the Mexico–U.S. border, or 
in between the European legal and jurisdictional boundaries of the asylum regime, 
trapped in locations from which is hard to move either ahead or back.15 Protracted 
displacement—defined as the lack of prospects of return to the homeland, reset-
tlement in third countries, and local integration for those who are in extended 
exile—has become the most typical and intractable issue of today’s refugee sce-
nario. Protracted displacement has become normalized for 78 percent of all refu-
gees—15.9 million people—leading to decades spent in first countries of refuge.16
The analysis of such involuntary immobility is crucial in the study of what is 
normally defined as “forced migration.” Refugees’ access to mobility is not only 
stratified along socioeconomic, age, and gender lines—as discussed, for example, 
by Nicholas van Hear and S. C. Lubkemann17—but also depends on the availabil-
ity of transnational kinship and community networks and the ability to mobilize 
them. While exploring the structural circumstances that reproduce my informants’ 
immobility along the Eritrea–Europe corridor, the analysis points to the paradox 
first made explicit by Lubkemann’s work: mobility, even in highly constrained cir-
cumstances, represents an expression of agency, of capability to act upon one’s own 
situation. Involuntary immobility is rather the condition in which the powerless 
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and most vulnerable end up being—repeatedly—trapped, whether in their own 
home countries or in transit after crossing their national borders.
However, immobility is far more than a physical condition.18 As scholars have 
pointed out, using terms such as “waithood,” “existential immobility,” “chronic 
crisis,” and “stuckedness,” people are stuck not only because they are not able to 
migrate, but because they cannot reach a socioeconomically recognized position. 
They are unable to become the men and the women they wish to be and to grasp 
the future they aspire to for themselves and their families. This feeling of immo-
bility is widespread among youth living in a context of protracted crisis all across 
Africa. Achille Mbembe,19 James Ferguson,20 Alcinda Honwana,21 and Henrik 
Vigh,22 among others, have documented in various ways in which young Africans’ 
aspirations are often frustrated by the structural incapability of postcolonial Afri-
can economies to accommodate a new labor force, by the wider effects of corrupt 
political establishments, the failures of developmental measures, recurrent con-
flicts, and deteriorating climatic conditions. Although specific in many regards, 
Eritrean migration also represents the response to similar frustrated aspirations—
especially among the youth—in a context of chronic crisis, stagnant economy, and 
political stasis. Such a context where different aspects of being forced and being 
willing to move—or to stay—continuously intertwine, defies the boundaries of 
forced and voluntary migration. 
REFUGEE AND FORCED MIGR ATION STUDIES:  ON 
BLURRING THE B OUNDARIES BET WEEN T YPOLO GIES
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention (1951) defines a refugee as someone who 
“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country.”23 In spite of later modifications 
of the Convention and the establishment of a set of juridical tools aimed to protect 
refugees and expand the Geneva definition—such as the Organization of African 
Union (OAU) Convention (1969) and the Cartagena Protocol (1984), not to men-
tion national legislation and, in the European Union, the regulations established 
since the early 1990s24—the 1951 Convention is still the most widely recognized 
one. In fact, it is the text of refugee law on which most national and international 
legislation is based.25
This juridical framework shaped the early development of refugee studies as a 
discipline. Refugees have long been analyzed as an intrinsically different category 
from voluntary “economic” migrants. In 1973, for instance, E. F. Kunz claimed that 
refugees’ migration is triggered by push factors alone, with a complete absence of 
pull factors.26 B. N. Stein has similarly argued that the refugee constitutes a dis-
tinct social type, and that the main common characteristics of the “refugee expe-
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rience”—that is, loss of social ties and trauma—can be delineated.27 The refugee 
condition has been regarded as exceptional in the migration scenario, as well 
as the responses required. Even today, refugee policies still have an emergency, 
humanitarian character that does not reflect the systematic and structural nature 
of refugee problems.28 This is reflected in a theoretical segregation of the field of 
refugee studies from the broader debate of migration studies.
However, the contemporary asylum/migration scenario has dramatically 
changed in the past sixty years and calls for new interpretative tools. At the 
end of World War II, beneficiaries of international protection were perceived 
to be from Europe and victims of the recently ended war and of national eth-
nic cleansing. More than sixty years later, the world refugee population mainly 
originates from Africa, Asia, and South and Central American countries.29 Most 
refugees come from countries marked by chronic low-intensity conflict, state 
fragility, livelihood disruption, human-rights violations, and protracted socio-
economic crisis, such as Afghanistan, El Salvador, Eritrea, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, Myanmar, and Somalia.30 Moreover, refugees are not alone in their danger-
ous journeys. Many migrants, hardly definable as refugees in a conventional 
sense, are ready to take enormous risks to reach Europe or other developed 
countries. Whatever the reason for leaving their country, conventional refu-
gees and other categories of migrants may accumulate the same vulnerabilities 
and share a similar need for protection. The multiple, interlinked motivations 
that push migrants and refugees to embark on high-risk journeys are reflected 
in concepts like “the asylum-migration nexus”31 and mixed-migration flows.32 
This points to the difficulty in distinguishing between refugees and purely “eco-
nomic” migrants, since causes of forced mobility, such as wars and human rights 
abuse, are often linked to failed development and poverty. This has led to a reex-
amination of previous categories that were crucial to the birth and development 
of refugee studies as a discipline.33
It is no surprise, then, that the international asylum discourse has progressively 
multiplied labels for vulnerable individuals in need of protection, variously called 
IDPs (internally displaced people), environmental refugees, cultural refugees, 
gender-based persecuted refugees, and so forth. Some academics have proposed 
new categories such as “survival migration”34 and “crisis migration,”35 which may 
be more inclusive than previous ones. 
As the legal and humanitarian regime concerning asylum was looking for more 
encompassing definitions and new grounds to provide protection, another cat-
egory, that of the “forced migrant,” has become prominent in the academic debate 
since the mid-1990s. This has come to include and replace the label “refugee” in 
the literature. The definition of forced migration, although far from well delimited 
and clear, mainly refers to all people who leave their homes owing to forces beyond 
their control. It includes legal categories such as IDPs, environmental refugees, 
and other less well defined populations of migrants.36
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However, the shift from refugee studies to forced-migration studies has not 
corresponded either to a substantial shift in the theoretical development of the 
field or in the global political agenda. The change has, rather, been a superficial, 
nominal one. Even today, in the literature and especially in policy documents of 
humanitarian agencies, it is not rare to encounter the commonsense assumptions 
that “refugees have no choice but to leave,” “forced migration is a reaction to a sud-
den threat,” “political refugees are intrinsically different from economic migrants,” 
and so forth. Even the most recent international policy developments, represented 
by the Global Compact on Migration37 and the Global Compact on Refugees 
(2018),38 adopt a binary approach (migrants vs. refugees) that does not address the 
asylum-migration nexus. As a result, in spite of their structural existence and their 
repeated patterns, refugee movements keep being defined as emergencies, excep-
tions in migration scenarios.39
In sum, although the category of forced migration has its own merits, including 
that of showing the limits of previous definitions, it does not seem to be a solution 
in itself, inasmuch as it reproduces a binary distinction between those who can and 
those who cannot choose. Such clear-cut distinctions have been widely criticized 
in the past decade by scholars from different disciplines, such as law, anthropol-
ogy, political science, and sociology.40 Marta Bivand Erdal and Ceri Oeppen argue, 
for instance, that although the forced/voluntary dichotomy may serve migration-
management purposes, it does not reflect the complex reality of migration deci-
sions.41 To define a migration flow as forced does not clarify under what circum-
stances it takes place, or how it is distinguishable—if at all—from other kinds of 
migration, and to what extent constraints, personal agency and enabling resources 
interact to produce mobility. Finally, this dichotomy between forced and voluntary 
migration tends to reproduce limited access to protection rights for some groups, 
who are deemed to originate from safe areas or not to fit the label.
However, when stating the continuity between forced and voluntary migration 
and the space for choice in migration dynamics, researchers may face a major ethi-
cal dilemma. On the one hand, we are afraid to undermine the system of categories 
that protect research participants. On the other hand, we feel the need, as Thomas 
Faist puts it, “to challenge the power of categorization which oppresses the sub-
jects we talk about.”42 The more the distinction between economic migrants and 
refugees gets blurred; the higher the risk of moral and political claims for interna-
tional protection losing momentum and cogency. The cynical but not implausible 
question could then be, if refugees are not fundamentally different from voluntary 
migrants, why should an international legal system to safeguard them be main-
tained at all? In the European political arena (and Europe is not an exceptional 
case), xenophobic declarations are popular, and fears focused on migrant popula-
tions orient the political agendas of leading parties. It is therefore understandable 
that providing scientific foundations for such an argument is a cause of concern 
for academics, myself among them.
Introduction    9
Presenting my work to a diverse audience of students, practitioners, and refu-
gees, I found out how unsettling the statement “economic migrants and refugees 
are not categories apart” can be. In one occasion, one refugee auditor exclaimed 
that while I was talking, “people who need protection and have the right to be 
saved” were dying at sea. Others, mainly practitioners, told me that I should not 
mix “bogus refugees” with “real ones.” The former felt that my argument was ques-
tioning refugees’ entitlement to be protected and welcomed in Europe; the latter 
felt that I had perhaps missed the point, and that the people I was talking about 
had in fact no entitlement to international protection. These comments shocked 
me: Was I saying that my Eritrean informants, my friends, in fact, had no proper 
right to obtain asylum in Europe? Although I felt that some of my critics’ asso-
ciations of ideas were off-target, their comments made me think of the potential 
implications of my own argument.
For me, rejecting the dichotomy between forced and voluntary migration 
means contesting the exclusion and illegalization that inevitably derives from a 
stereotyped understanding of reality. Instead, the focus on mobility and immo-
bility in their manifold aspects across borders enables the researcher to untangle 
factors underpinning migration pathways. It allows us to go beyond deperson-
alized accounts of forced migration, whether humanitarian or security-oriented, 
and to provide insights into how gender, age, class, cultural, and social background 
influence not only the possibilities but also the desire to be mobile and the expe-
rience of being immobile. Together with scholars such as Faist, Erdal and Oep-
pen, and Sandro Mezzadra,43 I believe that the debate on refugees and migration 
calls for creative solutions to interpret mobility going beyond the categorization 
of forced and voluntary. There is a need to think out of policy-driven categories, 
to portray real stories in their complexity, to account for vulnerability as much as 
for capabilities, aspirations, and desires in migrants’ struggles for mobility. These 
struggles over mobility reflect more or less implicit political contestations about 
the nature and the fairness of borders, migration regulations, and related distribu-
tion of rights.
WHY ERITREA?
Although specific in many regards, Eritrean migration is a typical response to the 
constraints and opportunities produced by the contemporary asylum regime in its 
interaction with national migration policies. Its analysis can illuminate the effect 
of this system on the daily lives of millions of refugees, as well as its consequences 
on their mobility choices. At the same time, Eritrean pathways respond to a dis-
tinctive structure of opportunity. Emigration is severely restrained by the Eritrean 
government, which grants its citizens passports only after they have done their 
national service. However, even those who are legally permitted to leave the coun-
try often cannot move to their preferred destination. Visas to study, work, or visit 
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Western countries are extremely hard to obtain for those coming from developing 
countries, and even more so for those who originate from a refugee-producing 
country like Eritrea. Western embassies tend to believe that Eritreans applying for 
temporary visas are unlikely to return home on expiry of their permission of stay. 
Those who manage to leave Eritrea, with or without authorization, usually end 
up in Sudan or Ethiopia, with limited possibilities for legal and socioeconomic 
integration there.
Since resettlement rates are extremely low—less than 1 percent of the refu-
gee population worldwide—and work and study visas are hard to obtain, most 
Eritreans, like most refugees in the first countries they reach—usually low-income 
nations—live in encampments with few prospects of long-term solutions. Those 
who do reach developed countries usually have wider prospects to study, work, 
and enjoy a decent life—although other forms of deprivation may be present.44 
The repeated migration attempts I document in the book mirror the contradiction 
between the immobility of substantive rights and the physical mobility required 
to gain access to them.45 It is important to note that, although things could quickly 
change, Eritreans, unlike other nationalities, have high rates of recognition as 
“legitimate” refugees in Europe. As Erdal and Oeppen point out, it is impor-
tant also when analyzing forced migration to keep in mind “the anticipation” by 
migrants “of the particular labelling by immigrant authorities in Europe.”46 This 
is crucial, inasmuch as it provides them with some prospects of access to legal 
and social protection once arrived in Europe, unlike those migrants whose asy-
lum applications are typically rejected based on the fact they come from what are 
deemed “safe areas.”47
Eritreans were one of the main national groups of the 2015–16 European refu-
gee crisis. UNHCR estimates that the number of Eritrean refugees, asylum seek-
ers, and other categories of concern was over half a million at the end of 2017, 
making Eritrea the ninth-greatest source of refugees worldwide, with one of the 
relatively most numerous diasporas in the world.48 Although statistics on the 
Eritrean population are largely unreliable and out of date, it is safe to say that 
there are at least a million and a half Eritreans who live outside their country, out 
of a total population of fewer than five million.
Aside from its timeliness and statistical significance, the theoretical relevance 
of this case has primarily to do with the state of chronic emergency that char-
acterizes not only Eritrea but most “refugee-producing countries.” In spite of its 
contemporary momentum, migration from Eritrea is much more than a simple 
reaction to an individual life threat. Rather, it is a historically developed com-
munal strategy against hardships. As such, it represents a key case to understand 
how concepts, such as aspirations, imaginaries and transnational moralities, 
originally elaborated in the study of labor migration can apply to the research on 
refugee movements.
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A History of Migration
Geographic mobility is ancestral history in the Horn of Africa. Different ethnic 
groups have long moved from one area to the other in search of better pastures for 
their animals, to find better lands to cultivate, to escape violence, to take control of 
the resources and the people of other regions. For some ethnic groups, especially 
pastoralists, systematic and periodic geographic mobility has been a normal part 
of their social organization and livelihood strategy in facing harsh climatic condi-
tions. However, it was at the end of Italian colonization that Eritreans systemati-
cally started traveling across national and international borders. 
The history of Eritrea is not a unitary tale of a people on a delimited territory. 
As revealed by archaeological findings at the ancient Red Sea port of Adulis in 
the northeast of the country, the Eritrean coast was part of the kingdom of Axum, 
which flourished from 100 to 800 CE. The Axumites spoke a Semitic language, 
adopted Christianity, and had a sophisticated political system and trading rela-
tionships with India, China, the Black Sea region, and Spain.49 When the coast 
was invaded by Arab expansion in the eighth century, the kingdom of Axum was 
cut off from trade and its decline became inevitable. After the fall of Axum, the 
region became politically fragmented: people from Sudan and Egypt occupied 
the coast and the western lowlands, while in the highlands mostly Tigrinya and 
Amhara local rulers based in different regions competed for power until the nine-
teenth century.50
Although the Eritrean highlands have often in the course of history been 
a partly independent province, they have historically been linked to the Ethio-
pian highlands. Alemseged Abbay speaks of a trans-Mereb identity (the river 
Mereb marked the Eritrean and Ethiopian border in colonial times) founded on 
precolonial institutions,51 which would have included the Coptic Church and its 
monastic culture, the linguistic roots of the Amharic and Tigrinya languages in 
the Geʽez script, the land tenure system, and the feudal political order of the sev-
eral regional kingdoms. The self-designation “Habesha,” used both by Tigrinya-
speaking Eritreans and the inhabitants of the Ethiopian side of the plateau, such 
as Tygraians, Amhara, and Oromo, is evidence of this ethnic, cultural, social, and 
political connection.52
Eritrean and Ethiopian Tigrinya speakers and the Amhara (Coptic Christian 
Amharic speakers), who inhabit the more southern Ethiopian highlands, have 
historically been the dominant political groups of the area.53 In Eritrea, lowland-
ers are usually Muslim nomadic pastoralists (with several exceptions among the 
Kunamas and the Bilen groups, who are agriculturalists and often non-Coptic 
Christians). They belong to different ethnic minorities (see “Eritrea at a glance”).
The history of Eritrea as one country begins with Italian colonization (1889–
1941).54 Italian occupation lasted for almost fifty years and had a profound impact 
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Eritrea at a Glance
Population: The United Nations estimate is five million, but Fusari 2011 suggests 
3.2 million, taking into account the emigration rate and decreased fertility since 
the 1980s. The only available census dates from 1993. 
Geographic features: The southern and central regions of Eritrea are dominated by 
Ethiopian north-south trending highlands, which descend on the east to the coast-
al desert plain, on the northwest to hilly terrain, and on the southwest to plains.
Climate: Eritrea consists of a hot, dry strip of desert along the Red Sea coast, 
cooler and wetter central highlands (rain falls mostly between June and Septem-
ber), and semiarid western hills and lowlands.
Capital: Asmara, recently listed as a UNESCO World Heritage site.
Main religions: Muslim (47%), Christian Orthodox (39%), Roman Catholic (5%), 
Evangelical Protestant (1%), vernacular religions (2%), other Christians (4%). 
There are groups of Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses and other Christians in 
the country, but they are not institutionally recognized.
Main ethnic groups: Tigrinya (50%), Tigre (27%), Saho (5%), Afar (5%), Hidareb 
(4%), Kunama (3%), Bilen (2%), Nara (2%), Rashaida (1%). 
These percentages are provided by the Eritrean government (www.eritrea.be/old/
eritrea-people.htm). 
Languages: Tigrinya and Tigre are the main spoken languages in the country. 
Like Amharic (the main spoken language in Ethiopia), they derive from ancient 
Ge’ez. Arabic and English are also widely spoken. Ethnic minority languages are 
also studied in school and widely spoken.
Essential timeline:
• 1000 BCE: Semitic peoples from the South Arabian kingdom of Saba’ 
(Sheba) migrate across the Red Sea, absorbing the Cushitic inhabitants of 
the Eritrean coast and adjacent highlands.
• 100 to 800 CE: Emergence and fall of the Axum empire, a strong trading 
and political power that developed around the port of Adulis. Christian-
ity becomes the area’s main religion around 300 CE. 
•  9th–19th centuries: Arabs invade the coast. Solomonic dynasties rule in 
the Ethiopian highlands, with Eritrea the northern province of their king-
dom. The western lowlands are controlled by Sudanese empires and the 
eastern lowlands mostly by Afar rulers. From the 16th to 19th centuries, 
the coastline around Massawa was part of the Ottoman empire. 
•  1869–1944: Italian colonization. The Genoa-based Rubattino shipping 
company buys the bay of Assab from the local Afar sultan and Italians 
progressively expand their control as far as the Mereb River. 
•  1941–52: After Italian defeat in World War II, Eritrea becomes a British 
protectorate.
•  1952–62: Ethiopia and Eritrea are federated but maintain a degree of 
political and administrative independence.
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country, where they were given land confiscated from the local population; cities, 
roads, and other infrastructure were built and several industries were established 
around the region. The colonial rulers imposed a hierarchical system that system-
atically limited the rights of the indigenous population. Under racial laws passed 
in 1935, indigenous Eritreans were allowed to study only up to fourth grade. At 
the same time, new modes of production, the introduction of modern technology 
in agriculture, and the construction of urban centers deeply influenced the tradi-
tional social structure of Eritrean society. Local imaginaries, aesthetic tastes, and 
cultural models were also significantly shaped in those years, with long-standing 
implications for contemporary politics, Eritrean people’s horizons of meaning, 
and migration pathways.56
In 1941, Eritrea then became a British protectorate. The British dismantled 
industries and infrastructure such as the Asmara-Massawa Cableway, built by the 
Italians, as war compensation. They also lifted the ban on higher education for 
indigenes and allowed the growth of a free press and political parties. This was a 
period of lively political activism, from which the protagonists and ideas of the 
later independent Eritrea sprang.57
Starting in the 1950s, many Eritreans who had been working for Italians moved 
to Addis Ababa. Others, mostly female domestic workers, followed their employ-
ers back to Italy. Still others, mostly Muslims, left for the Arab world (mainly 
•  1961–62: Following forcible annexation of Eritrea to Ethiopia under the 
emperor Haile Selassie, a liberation struggle starts in the lowlands.
•  1974: Haile Selassie is overthrown in Ethiopia by Menghistu Haile 
Mariam, who establishes the Derg regime. 
•  1983: Conflict between the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the 
Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF). The EPLF defeats the ELF and 
becomes the only militant Eritrean front.
•  1991: De facto independence. EPLF and TPLF (the Ethiopian Tigray 
People Liberation Front) enters Addis Abba and overthrows Menghistu’s 
government. The EPLF becomes the Party for Freedom, Democracy and 
Justice (PFDJ), which has ruled Ethiopia since then. 
•  1998–2000: Conflict with Ethiopia, allegedly for disagreement on border 
demarcation around the village of Badme. 
•  2000: The Algiers agreement. A period of “no peace, no war” between the 
two countries begins. Diplomatic and trade relations are blocked. 
•  2018: Peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopia recognizes 
that Badme belongs to Eritrea, and the newly established Ethiopian prime 
minister, Abyi Ahmed, pays the first Ethiopian diplomatic visit to Eritrea 
in eighteen years.
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Sudan, Egypt, and Gulf countries) to work and pursue further education.58 Then, 
with the beginning of the thirty-year-long war against Ethiopian rule, Eritrean 
international migration skyrocketed.
In 1952, Eritrea was then federated to Ethiopia, but kept most of its political, 
administrative, and judicial autonomy. In 1961, however, the emperor of Ethiopia 
dissolved the Eritrean parliament and unilaterally annexed Eritrea. Hamid Idris 
Awate, a former ascaro (indigenous soldier in the Italian army), fired the first 
shot against Ethiopian occupation in the western lowlands on September 1, 1961, 
launching the country’s long independence struggle.
The seeds of crisis: the independence struggle and “no peace–no war”
The Eritrean independence struggle has complicated historical roots in ethnic 
conflicts, regional instability, and political claims, which have been thoroughly 
investigated by several historians.59 In fifty years of Italian colonization, Eritreans 
had developed a separate political identity from their Ethiopian cousins. More-
over, Muslims, traditionally marginalized by Christian highlanders, interpreted 
the annexation to Christian Orthodox Ethiopian rule as a new attempt to subor-
dinate them. It was mostly owing to them that the independence struggle started. 
The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), initially constituted by Muslim lowlanders, 
began the rebellion in the western plains, triggering retaliation by the imperial 
army against civilians in those areas.60 This led thousands to cross the border with 
Sudan in search of refuge.61 In 1974, the Derg, a military regime led by Menghistu 
Haile Mariam, overthrew the Ethiopian emperor and the war spread to the high-
lands and the cities. Thousands were killed and more were displaced throughout 
Africa, the Middle East, Europe and the United States, creating the bulk of the 
numerous, worldwide population of Eritrean origin that was a crucial ally for the 
liberation fronts in the war and for the government subsequently.62 In that period, 
moreover, the original liberation front—the ELF (the Eritrea Liberation Front)—
and a newly emerged Eritrean People Liberation front (EPLF) came into conflict 
(1982), which resulted in further displacement.
In 1991, the military regime in Ethiopia was defeated by an alliance of Ethiopian 
and Eritrean liberation fronts and Eritrea gained its de facto independence under 
the rule of the EPLF. Since then EPLF cadres have ruled the country through the 
PFDJ (People’s Front for Democracy and Justice) party. Initially enjoying wide-
spread support among the population and the Eritrean diaspora, this regime was 
praised by the international community for its progressive agenda on social and 
economic development and gender equality. Some Eritreans who had fled decided 
to return home, and the fragile economy of the country seemed to benefit from 
government intervention and foreign investment. 
This illusion lasted only until 1998, when a new conflict broke out with Ethio-
pia. Allegedly, the war was triggered by an issue of border demarcation around 
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the small town of Badme, but the reasons behind it are far more complicated and 
range from the control over the ports to deep-rooted ambitions in regional poli-
tics.63 Around a hundred thousand Eritrean and Ethiopian soldiers died, and hun-
dreds of thousands of people were displaced. At least seventy thousand Eritreans 
were expelled from Ethiopia in 1998, and thousands of Ethiopians were forcibly 
returned from Eritrea.
The conflict officially ended in 2000, when the two countries agreed to a cease-
fire. The UN Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) ruled that Eritrea 
had a legitimate claim to Badme, and that Ethiopia should withdraw its troops 
from the town, but Ethiopia never respected this decision. Although the war had 
ended, hostilities continued. Diplomatic and trade relationships ceased, with neg-
ative consequences for both countries. Ethiopia lost cheap access to the sea, and 
Eritrea lost its natural trading partner. Moreover, Eritrea has progressively become 
isolated on the international scene, owing partly to bad relations with all its neigh-
bors and partly to a deep-rooted mistrust of the international community.64
Eritrea’s economic and political efforts at self-reliance since its independence 
have reflected a wary anti-colonialist mentality, reinforced by the fact that whereas 
Ethiopia’s noncompliance with the UN recommendation over the border issue was 
not followed by international measures, Eritrea has been a target of UN sanctions 
since 2008. Although these sanctions have mainly been an embargo of weapons 
and freezing the financial assets of the Eritrean leadership, these measures argu-
ably had a widespread negative effect on the Eritrean economy, discouraging 
investors, increasing the diplomatic isolation of the country, and thus indirectly 
worsening the living conditions of the population.
Twenty years of cold war and isolation have recently been interrupted by a 
drastic change in regional politics. In July 2018, following a shift of power in the 
Ethiopian leadership, the newly appointed Ethiopian prime minister Abyi Ahmed 
withdrew Ethiopian troops from Badme. This has led to the peace agreement 
between the two countries and the reopening of the border between them. Since 
then, families who had been separated for decades have able to meet again, and 
trade and diplomatic relations have resumed, decreasing the cost of living and 
leading to renewed hope among Eritreans at home, as well as fear among those 
who sought asylum in Ethiopia, who wonder about their safety. The short- and 
long-term implications of this radical change are still hard to forecast.
Whether it is simply revealing its true nature, as some believe, or reacting to the 
constant threat from Eritrea’s more populous and powerful Ethiopian neighbor, 
the repressive attitude of the PFDJ has remained unchanged since 1998. Eritrea 
has not had free elections since its independence, the Constitution has never been 
ratified, and all of the PFDJ’s political opponents have been eliminated as sup-
porters of the Ethiopian enemy.65 There is no free press, and religious and cul-
tural liberties have been severely curtailed. Parallel to this political atmosphere, 
development efforts have mostly fallen on the shoulders of young citizens, who are 
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obliged to work for years in different sectors of public interest—education, health 
service, defense—with little or no pay. This is the background of the stories I tell 
in this book.
A MOBILE ETHNO GR APHY: 
THE ERITREA–EUROPE C ORRID OR
As a twenty-three-year-old student at University of Siena, I met Alazar, an Eritrean 
who had been rescued from sea in November 2008, at a temporary asylum center 
in the nearby tourist town of Follonica on the Tuscan coast. My classmates and I 
visited the center twice a week for three months, and as a result of the friendship 
that developed between us, the stories of Alazar and the other young Eritreans I 
met in the center became part of my life.
When I began researching Eritrean migration in 2012, Alazar became my point 
of reference for the community of refugees living in Rome, who wanted to move 
on. In June–December that year, living in squats typical of those inhabited by many 
Eritreans, I explored the contradictions of their daily lives and also paid regular 
visits to other informants I had come to know in Genoa and Milan. Most of my 
research subjects in Italy were Christian Tigrinya men (some of them Catholics, 
others Orthodox) in their late twenties, who had come to Europe by crossing the 
Mediterranean.
At the beginning of 2013, to explore the conditions underpinning my infor-
mants’ decision to leave home, I asked them for contacts among their families in 
Eritrea. For three months, I subsequently shared the everyday life of a family in 
Asmara, hanging out with young men and women I met there and visiting the 
families of other informants in the Eritrean capital, as well as in rural areas.
As many of the young people I encountered in Eritrea wanted to escape to 
Ethiopia, I continued my fieldwork there from September 2013 to March 2014. 
I was familiar with the country, since I had lived there for four months in 2011, 
and I already had some local contacts among local humanitarian workers, Italian 
diplomatic officers, Eritrean families, and relatives of my friends in Italy. Through 
these already established and newly emerging relationships, I conducted ethno-
graphic research in refugee camps in Tigray (northern Ethiopia) and lived with 
a young Eritrean doctor, Violetta, in a neighborhood of Addis Ababa with a high 
concentration of Eritrean refugees. It happened to be the period of the year when 
most of our neighbors were planning their departure via Khartoum to Libya.
Khartoum then became the last site of my fieldwork (March–April 2014). 
There I lived with Maria, a young Eritrean and her eight-year-old child, Anna, in 
a shared house with four other Eritrean refugee families. While hanging out with 
her refugee friends from Asmara, I came in touch with a middleman facilitating 
illicit border crossings through the Sahara and his colleagues. This enabled me 
to explore the hidden world of smugglers from an inside perspective. Being in 
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Khartoum also allowed me to catch up with other informants whom I had met 
in Eritrea and Ethiopia. The main locations where I conducted my research are 
shown in map 2.
Multi-sited ethnography seemed to me an obvious choice to investigate mobil-
ity practices and related transnational societal spaces.66 My mobility was the result 
of a cumulative, open-ended research design—one that was continuously con-
structed with my informants, depending on contingent field circumstances. I pro-
gressively extended my fieldwork boundaries to the main nodes of the migration 
corridor connecting Eritrea with Europe. I could not include Libya owing both 
to time and energy constraints and to the extremely unsafe conditions there in 
the period in which the research took place. This corridor connecting Italy with 
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea can be seen not only as a geographic route but also as 
an imaginative pathway for families, friends, and co-nationals living in different 
locations, who exchange expectations, aspirations, desires, and ideas using media, 
internet, and mobile communication.67 The observation sites I chose along the way 
were not only key locations to explore migration, but also fields of social relation-
MAP OF FIELDWORK LOCATIONS (2012-2014)
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Map 2. Fieldwork locations (Designed by Sarah Anschütz)
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ships that I navigated along with young refugees and their families and friends. The 
observation of specific sites was as important as grasping the interactions between 
them, and within them, at different but interdependent points of the migration 
corridor.68 Sharing my informants’ everyday life in their home country as well as in 
exile allowed me to appreciate the role of interpersonal micro-dynamics—such as 
family ties, peer pressure, and social expectations—in producing and reproducing 
refugees’ movements.
In my research, multi-sited ethnography did not mean only conducting partici-
pant observation in different countries and at different sites within the same coun-
try, but also simultaneously engaging with diverse social and ethnic networks in 
different sites within the same country. In Eritrea, I did research in several towns 
and cities; in Ethiopia, I resided in Addis Ababa and visited the camps of Tigray; 
in Sudan, I lived in Khartoum; in Italy, I conducted participant observation in 
Rome, Milan, and Genoa. This plurality of sites included an even larger variety of 
informants, gatekeepers, and subjects of research. Several networks of religious, 
ethnic, geographic, and family affiliations gave me access to different perspectives 
and diverse experiences of living in the same place and connected me with other 
cultural environments, which I would have not been able to explore if I had only 
stuck to one gatekeeper or a “clique.” Although most of my observations pertain to 
Tigrinya Eritreans, the dominant and most numerous ethnic group in Eritrea, the 
multiplicity of sites and networks I navigated allowed me to meet Eritreans from 
minority backgrounds (Saho and Kunamas, for instance) and from rural areas. 
Moreover, during my research I would often hang out with locals—Sudanese in 
Khartoum, Ethiopians in Addis Ababa. The interactions that I involuntarily cre-
ated between locals and refugees worked as sorts of experiments—I put in touch 
two worlds that rarely interface. This enabled me to observe how trust and distrust 
among locals and refugees play out in real encounters and how conflictual these 
relationships can be.
The above considerations show that my presence in the field was far from being 
a neutral one. My relationships with informants were characterized by reciprocal 
emotional engagement, prolonged involvement in each other’s lives well after the 
formal end of the research—sometimes, even despite me. Friendship, care, unpar-
alleled expectations, love, and disappointment were all ingredients of my fieldwork 
in ways that I could not anticipate at its outset. This allowed me to gain insights 
that would have been hard to attain otherwise, but that also exposed me to ethical 
dilemmas. Throughout the book, I mention these aspects when they are relevant 
for the interpretation of my observations, but I have restricted discussion of the 
main methodological and ethical challenges of my fieldwork to the Appendix.
Although I did not “follow people” in a literal sense, the very fact that I was mov-
ing within the same geographic and imaginative space as my informants enabled 
me to come across the same individuals at different stages of their migration 
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met in Eritrea; likewise in Sudan and in Italy. Moreover, even after the end of my 
fieldwork, my informants and I have kept in touch, and many of them contacted 
me when they reached Italy to ask for help or simply to let me know that they had 
arrived in Europe safely. Sometimes they preceded me and sometimes I preceded 
them in the corridor, but my informants and I were following the same steps of the 
journey. Following a corridor rather than a group of people enables a researcher 
to see who, at each step, can move on and who has to wait or simply stay. This 
allows one to account not only for differentials in capabilities (based on access to 
legal migra tion, economic resources, and social networks), but also for their will 
to do so or not, in the presence of incredible risks. Within the current debate about 
mobility and immobility, this is a crucial option for advancing the state of the art 
on these underinvestigated issues.69
The Eritrea-Ethiopia-Sudan-Libya-Italy corridor’s existence should not be con-
sidered permanent, but fluctuating on the basis of policy changes, border control 
practices, and geopolitical arrangements in the countries of transit, origin, and 
destination.70 Moreover, this corridor is only one of the many possible pathways 
taken by Eritreans to find a new home. The route through Egypt to Israel, for 
example, used to be extremely popular until 2013. It is estimated that close to forty 
thousand Eritreans reached Israel by way of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula between 2006 
and 2012. Then, in 2012, Israel implemented a series of border controls and pro-
gressively restrictive measures on illicit migration and resident asylum seekers that 
practically stopped arrivals.71 Other Eritreans moved on to other less predictable 
destinations, such as Uganda, Angola, and South Sudan (until civil war broke out 
there in December 2013). Still others have reached countries in the Middle East, 
such as Dubai, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, which have been historic destinations of 
the diaspora since the 1960s.72 The fact that I encountered only a few Muslims dur-
ing my research may also reflect the historic trend of Muslim Eritrean minorities’ 
migrating to the Middle East rather than to Europe. It is important to take these 
considerations into account so as not to generalize about the migration practices 
of an extremely diverse population of migrants from Eritrea.
At this point, it is important to advance a few epistemological considerations 
that have oriented the analysis of my data. In interpreting my observations and 
my informants’ narratives, I considered what Frank Salamone, following Georges 
Condominas,73 calls the preterrain, that is to say, the preexisting structural rela-
tionships that underlie, and possibly shape, research settings and interactions. For 
Salamone’s study in Nigeria, the preterrain consisted of colonial-related inequali-
ties in power distribution. In my case study, not only postcolonial relationships, 
but also the social dynamics produced by the international asylum regime had 
to be taken into account. Doing research with asylum seekers and refugees, in 
particular, has meant entering into a shifting constellation of roles where refugees, 
framed (or framing themselves) as victims, right holders, and resource recipients, 
interact with border guards, asylum practitioners, and resource providers.74 In this 
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game I could often be identified with the latter group. This was especially—but 
by no means exclusively—the case in highly controlled research settings such as 
refugee camps, where I was doing on-the-spot interviews with informants I had 
just met, with whom I had not been able to build reciprocal trust.
Attention to structural circumstances and power dynamics of the field have 
informed not only the analysis of my data, but also the way I reached out to my 
informants in the field. I have systematically tried to navigate the informal net-
works of my Eritrean informants to meet other informants and access the field, 
although several choices have been constrained by circumstances beyond my con-
trol. Although I also interviewed humanitarian workers, diplomatic and govern-
ment officers, and local NGO staff, I rarely relied on them for access to the field 
or to introduce me to refugees and locals. This has facilitated a closer, less insti-
tutional relationship with many of my informants and has enabled me to observe 
refugees’ attitudes both “onstage” and off.75
This book gradually moves from the alleys and sitting rooms inhabited by Eritreans 
in their home country via Ethiopian tent camps and lively neighborhoods in Addis 
Ababa and Khartoum to the crowded squats some of them occupy in Rome. From 
Eritrea, through Ethiopia, Sudan, and Italy, the first three chapters geographically 
follow my informants’ main pathways to reconstruct the bundle of desires, fears, 
and pressures that push them across borders in spite of mounting risks. 
Chapter 1 investigates the aspirations of young men and women trapped in the 
hardships of national service in contemporary Eritrea. Drawing on ethnographic 
research in urban and rural areas, the chapter illustrates how, in a context of 
chronic crisis, emigration has become normalized even in its most dangerous and 
tragic aspects. Many young Eritreans and their families tend to perceive migration 
at all cost as the only alternative to a life “without a future.” While investigating 
the daily struggle of young men and women to escape social, generational, and 
geographic immobility, this chapter also accounts for the importance of aspira-
tions and imaginaries in young Eritreans’ desire to move elsewhere. By elaborating 
on the concept of cosmologies of destinations, this chapter describes widespread 
hierarchies of preferred destinations ordered along the perceived possibility of 
achieving freedom, stability, and self-realization there.
Based on participant observation in Ethiopian camps, Addis Ababa and Khar-
toum, chapter 2 illustrates why most Eritrean refugees are determined to move 
onward. Eritreans face several challenges in their first countries of asylum, rang-
ing from their limited freedom of mobility outside camps to the lack of oppor-
tunities in local labor markets. However, their desire to move on does not only 
emerge from this disadvantaged socioeconomic context. Collectively shared and 
transnationally diffused sets of memories, norms, and images also define Ethio-
pia and Sudan as undesirable destinations. While describing how the desire for 
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migration is continually reproduced in camps and shared accommodations in cit-
ies, the chapter accounts for the matrix of socioeconomic and cultural conditions 
that stratify possibilities and aspirations for geographic mobility. Most refugees 
were stuck in spite of their will to move on, and some chose to stay put, awaiting 
eventual return to Eritrea.
Chapter 3 investigates the reasons why many Eritrean refugees try to move 
north from Italy. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork with refugees in Rome, 
Milan, and Genoa, as well as with their families in Eritrea, this chapter shows the 
role of family expectations, peer pressure, and individual aspirations in Eritreans’ 
repeated attempts to seek asylum in northern European countries in spite of policy 
obstacles. Preexisting aspirations to further mobility are reinforced and kept alive 
for Eritreans living in buildings illicitly occupied in Rome in a context of substan-
tive deprivation and marginality. It is argued that refugees’ decision making has to 
be studied in a larger transnational frame, which includes families back home, as 
well as relatives and friends in northern Europe.
Chapter 4 explores the roles, social mechanisms, and emic moralities involved 
in illicit border crossings, perceived by the main protagonists as legitimate ways 
to attain freedom. Building on refugees’ narratives and on ethnographic research 
with two smugglers in Ethiopia and in Sudan, the chapter describes the complex 
world of the professionals of illicit migration and the moral and social embedded-
ness of their business in these refugees’ communities. The chapter then goes on 
to illustrate the complex of affection, economic interest, and desire for mobility 
among transnational refugee couples. Partly emerging from the reproduction of 
traditional marital arrangements and partly from business opportunities, transna-
tional marriages are mostly perceived as legitimate mechanisms to help compatri-
ots pursue further mobility.
Chapter 5 revisits migrants’ complex trajectories and illustrates how they, like 
gamblers, become at each stage more likely to bet their resources and lives in 
onward migration. It brings together the findings and observations made in the 
previous chapters to develop an analytical framework of Eritrean refugees’ mobil-
ity. Borrowing the concept of entrapment from gambling studies, this chapter 
shows that in Eritreans’ migratory decisions, as a sequential process, each stage is 
marked by a cumulative set of psychological and social pressures to make a further 
move, even at the price of risking everything yet again. In fact, every stage makes 
interrupting the journey more difficult for both structural and symbolic reasons. 
The concept of entrapment not only helps us understand what immobility means 
from a cognitive point of view, but contributes to the analysis of high-risk step-
wise migration. This analytical framework promises to feed into a more refined 
understanding of the motivations of high-risk migrants, which have, until now, 
been studied without the sequential nature of their movements being considered.
In the Conclusion, after summarizing the main findings of my case study, I 
outline its implications for the general debate on refugee studies. I argue that the 
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concept of cosmologies of destinations is a promising tool for analyzing underin-
vestigated aspects of migration dynamics from areas of protracted crisis. Then I 
reconnect the notion of cosmologies of destinations with the other main theoreti-
cal contributions of my ethnography to the literature. In particular, I focus on the 
following major issues: the importance of moral, imaginative, and social aspects 
in the analysis of refugee movements; the dialectic relation between mobility and 
immobility and its manifold meanings; the normative aspect of unauthorized 
migration, in particular the unwritten moralities that underpin it; and the idea of 
entrapment and the cumulative aspect of migrants’ high-risk journeys.
The methodological Appendix revisits the main challenges of the research, 
reflecting on the difficulties in gaining access to refugees and their living environ-
ments, and in building mutual trust, as well as managing the expectations emerg-
ing from complex and unbalanced fieldwork relationships. Drawing from field 
experiences, the Appendix elaborates on the researcher’s positionality in terms 
of gender, age, and sexuality, narrating significant episodes of conducting covert 
research in an illiberal political environment, avoiding authorities’ scrutiny in ref-
ugee camps, and deconstructing refugees’ self-representations. Finally, it discusses 
ethical issues concerning the researcher’s accountability to his/her informants, as 
well as the moral and political role of research in the larger debate on asylum.
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When Migration Becomes the Norm
Ingredients of an Ordinary Crisis
Refugee flows do not always originate in areas of violent crisis. They are some-
times, indeed frequently, rooted in countries marked by decades of social, politi-
cal, and economic deprivation. In these contexts, migration is rarely a traumatic 
novelty, but rather a multigenerational experience and an everyday reality. Geo-
graphic mobility is the norm, not only because it is recurrent in people’s lives, but 
also because it assumes a crucial symbolic, moral, and socioeconomic role in the 
organization of society. Eritrea is one of these cases.
The study of voluntary migration has usually documented the socioeco-
nomic and cultural transformation produced by long-term migration under 
the heading of “culture of migration.” However, scholars have rarely considered 
how migration can become a normalized experience even in areas from which 
refugees originate. By “normalized,” I do not mean to say that it is not tragic or 
problematic. Instead, I want to point to the abilities of individuals, groups, and 
communities living in chronic crisis to reorganize their living by imagining and 
pursuing a possibility of life elsewhere. Following Henrik Vigh’s definition of 
“crisis as a context”—that is to say “a terrain of action and meaning rather than 
an aberration,”1 I describe the process of routinization of suffering, hardships, 
and risks among my informants. At the same time, I account for their ongoing 
efforts to make sense of their everyday lives by imagining the outside world as a 
place of hope and achievements. 
26    When Migration Becomes the Norm
In contexts such as the Eritrean one, marked by a stagnant economy, politi-
cal stasis, it is crucial not only to account for the everyday violence experienced 
by different individuals in the past and in the present, but also for their dreams, 
desires, and aspirations for the future. Since the lack of positive motivations to 
leave the homeland has been considered one of the defining features of refugees 
compared with voluntary migrants, the cultural and moral mechanisms under-
pinning their migration have typically been neglected by scholars. However, these 
aspects, I argue, are crucial for understanding mobility from areas of protracted 
crisis. Drawing from my ethnographic fieldwork in Eritrea, this chapter shows 
how conventional push factors are tangled with social, moral, and symbolic fea-
tures that encourage and direct emigration. Here I develop the idea of cosmolo-
gies of destinations, not only as socially shared geographic imaginaries, but also 
as a set of moral obligations and expectations that tie migrants to their immobile 
kinship circles.
A L AND OF MART YRS AND MIGR ANT S
When I visited Eritrea in 2013, the visual references to war were still omnipresent 
in the landscape. Rusty old tanks lay overturned on the side of the road or in the 
middle of dry, stony fields. The massive deforestation carried out in the 1980s has 
left hills naked, with a few sporadic trees. People in the countryside still were hold-
ing old Kalashnikovs to shoot hyenas or to fire a few shots during marriage celebra-
tions. As a reminder of the defeat of the Derg and the magnitude of the struggle, 
old Ethiopian warplanes were parked in the middle of Asmara’s public gardens.
Thirty years of war have had a huge impact on the country and its inhabitants. 
Not only has Eritrea arguably never fully recovered, but its people still painfully 
feel their private losses. All the families I met during my fieldwork had to face the 
death of at least one beloved family member during the struggle, as well as the 
absence abroad of many others. “In every Eritrean family, there has been at least 
one martyr and one migrant,” Eritreans told me whenever I asked if they had rela-
tives elsewhere in the world. The Eritrean family who welcomed me for over two 
months in Asmara was no exception.
When I decided to move to Eritrea after having conducted research in Italy for 
several months, I asked to my Eritrean friends and informants if they could give 
me contacts among their families or friends there. Some of them were reluctant to 
do so,2 but others did not hesitate to help me. Twenty-eight-year-old Gabriel was 
incredulous—likely thinking why does this girl want to go to a place from which 
I did my best to escape?—but suggested that I could be his family’s guest in Asmara. 
Gabriel had been my guide for a few months in Porta Venezia, the neighborhood 
historically inhabited by Eritreans in Milan. When Gabriel phoned Ester, his aunt 
in Eritrea from a call center in Porta Venezia, she seemed initially worried to have 
a stranger in her place, but I was ultimately welcomed.
Figure 1. Mixed traffic in Asmara (photo by the author, 2013)
Figure 2. Road in Asmara (photo by the author, 2013)
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Asmara is not one of the chaotic capitals typical of developing countries today. 
It has around three-quarters of a million inhabitants. Cars are not very numer-
ous and streets are not very noisy. Old red buses run alongside well-dressed 
people walking along the tidy central avenue of the city center—Godena Har-
net (or Freedom Avenue)—and drink macchiato in the famous cafés around the 
majestic cathedral built during Italian colonization. Little of the everyday hardship 
of the country and its people can be guessed at first sight. Moving to the peripher-
ies of the city where Ester’s house was located, however, those material and inner 
hardships were more evident. As in many other neighborhoods, our district of 
Petrosia was experiencing continuous power cuts and water shortages. Early in 
the morning, a long queue of women wrapped in their nezelas (traditional cotton 
shawls) and young boys and girls would stand with big bright blue barrels and 
rusty metal ones waiting for the municipal water truck.
Five residents occupied the house where I spent almost three months: Ester, 
the fifty-year-old head of the family; her late husband’s father, Baba; her younger 
sister, Saba; her twenty-four-year-old daughter, Salam; and Lwam, Gabriel’s 
sister, who had come to Asmara to do the compulsory military training of Min-
istry of Agriculture employees. My everyday life in Asmara was divided between 
the time I spent at home chatting with Baba, Saba, and Ester, and home vis-
its to other informants’ families. The rest of day I hung out with Salam, Lwam, 
their friends, and other young Eritreans. Getting to know them and their stories, 
I soon realized the extent of the impact of war and displacement on their inti-
mate family history.
Ester had moved to Ethiopia to attend school as a teenager, but after twenty 
years there, she, her husband, their three kids, and the grandfather were forcibly 
returned to Eritrea at the start of the 1998–2000 war.3 Most of Ester’s siblings had 
also been migrants. Her older brother had gone to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s; Saba 
had worked in the Gulf for ten years before returning in the late 1990s to take care 
of Ester and her displaced family. Ester’s older sister had migrated to Ethiopia 
and from there to Germany, where she still lived with her children. Some among 
Ester’s siblings had instead remained to fight for national independence. “We were 
so hungry and our bare feet were bleeding, but we had to walk across the moun-
tain to escape our enemies!” Candle, Ester’s sister, and ex-tegadelit (female parti-
san), told us once during a visit. Their eldest brother had died in the war.
Displacement due to war characterized not only the family’s past—it was an 
ordinary aspect of my hosts’ present as well. Ester’s son had escaped a few years 
before to Angola. Her nephew, my friend Gabriel, was already in Milan. Salam and 
Lwam were constantly planning their departures. This was common among the 
families I met in Asmara and in villages. Their sons aged twenty and older were 
often outside the country.
The ghost of war was an omnipresent feature of my informants’ daily lives. The 
whole population is often required to engage in periodic military training, like the 
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course Lwam was doing during my stay in the country. Rifles had been distrib-
uted to all able-bodied citizens a month before I arrived. Elderly people were also 
required to take up arms again, triggering a sense of endless war, lack of prospects, 
and continuous repetition of past struggles. “They gave me a rifle at my age! Can 
you imagine?” a sixty-five-year-old refugee in Addis Ababa told me. “I was in the 
independence struggle in the 1970s, and now I have to carry a rifle again. There is 
no peace in our country.”
The identity of Eritreans as a people and as a nation is built around war and 
displacement.4 Martyrs and migrants are national symbols, publicly celebrated 
in memorial days, popular songs, and governmental pronouncements. In propa-
ganda, Eritrea as a nation was made possible through the sacrifices of the Eritrean 
freedom fighters who gave their lives for independence—the martyrs—and the 
sacrifices of Eritreans in diaspora who selflessly supported the struggle from afar.5
But not all migrants are good ones in the public narrative. Whereas the gov-
ernment celebrates previous generations of refugees as national heroes, current 
refugees have generally been defined by national media, the president and his sup-
porters, as “economic migrants,” “traitors,” and “deserters.” From the perspective 
of the regime, most refugees nowadays are evading their duty to serve the nation 
(i.e., do national service), and if caught, they are severely punished as traitors.6 
Fugitives picked up by the army may be jailed, sent to a training center, or even 
executed, much depending on whether one is a civilian, student, or soldier.7 There 
can also be consequences for the families, who often have to pay a very high fine 
for every child who leaves the country.8
Not everyone who left did so without permission, but at the time of my research, 
exit from Eritrea was mostly achievable through irregular means. Leaving the 
country illegally was a political act, “voting with one’s feet” against the policies of 
the government and evading one’s duty to defend the homeland. Although people 
might not have migrated because they were political opponents of the regime, the 
very reason of having escaped made them such. Moreover, crossing the border 
into Ethiopia and seeking asylum there amounted to siding with the nation’s his-
torical enemy. Returning to Eritrea was and still is extremely unsafe for all of them.
This is why the current exodus is publicly sanctioned and references to it are 
largely absent from public space and popular culture in spite of its magnitude and 
relevance. In past many famous songs, such as “Zemen”—“time,” in Tigrinya—by 
the widely celebrated singer Yemanie Baria, evoked the experience of exile and 
migration, but today’s songs rarely address these issues, unless they are released by 
musicians who already live abroad. The same goes for novels, movies, and plays.9
In the Eritrean “culture of migration,” the regime ambivalently promotes migra-
tion and, at the same time, forbids it.10 Emigration is pervasive and systematic, as 
in other regions of intense out-migration, but the professionals who facilitated it 
are hidden. The migration industry and desire for mobility, which in other con-
texts are manifest and widely marketed, remain underground in Eritrea. Most of 
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my informants in Eritrea, especially the young ones, knew the escape routes, how 
much money was needed, and sometimes the names of the smugglers, but this 
information remained highly confidential.
SACRIFICE AND OPPORTUNIT Y:  THE T WO FACES 
OF MIGR ATION 
In the ambivalent symbolic, social, and economic organization of Eritrean society, 
migration is both a sacrifice and an opportunity. The two faces of migration, are 
manifest in both the external and domestic landscape of Eritrea. Desirable houses 
in well-to-do areas of Asmara like Tiravolo and Indabonda are known to belong to 
wealthy Eritreans who have been living abroad since the 1970s. Other residential 
areas, built in the past twenty years are called Endo German (Germans’ houses) 
and Enda America (Americans’ houses), referring to the country of residence of 
the Eritrean owners. In Massawa, a popular beach holiday destination for return-
ees, imposing villas, originally built by Italian colonialists, lie deserted for most 
of the year except for the black crows cawing loudly on the rooftops, until their 
owners come back for the summer break. Even in villages, hudmos—traditional 
huts made of stones—stand alongside more modern-looking constructions owned 
by the families of those who have emigrated. The village of Barur, which I visited 
in May 2013, is an example of how migration abroad has changed the traditional 
landscape of some rural areas.
Located thirty kilometers away from Asmara, more than 2,500 meters above sea 
level, Barur has traditionally survived on subsistence farming. In the past decade, 
many inhabitants of the village have migrated to Israel. Since then, families known 
by other villagers to be mesakin—unfortunate and poor—have been able to build 
houses, indicating their new social status. A woman from the village noted, for 
example, “There was a family in the village that had nothing, absolutely nothing. 
Two twins were even brought up by the nuns because they could not feed them. 
Then the eldest son was able to migrate to Israel. Now they have built a house that 
is worth at least two million nakfa [about 33,000 euros, or U.S.$37,000]!”11
While walking on the streets of Barur, the distinction between those families 
who had members abroad and those who did not was evident. The former had 
houses with corrugated iron roofs and whitewashed cinder block walls; the lat-
ter had traditional stone houses with thatched roofs. The cinder block houses 
were looked upon as a demonstration of wealth and success due to emigration 
and were objects of desire for neighbors and relatives.12 The subtext of this land-
scape of “remittance architecture” is, however, deeply ambivalent.13 The newly 
built houses not only indicate success, relative wealth, and ongoing transna-
tional connections between migrants and their families, but also absence and 
family fragmentation.14
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Photographs in the houses also told an ambivalent tale: the celebration of the 
migrant and the mourning of his/her absence. The sitting rooms of the Eritreans 
families I visited were a mosaic of colorful religious images, certificates of mili-
tary distinction, and family pictures. Often many of those portrayed there had 
left the country.15 The triumphant pictures of the young graduate son with his 
black mortarboard and new diploma before emigrating would be side by side 
with framed official acknowledgements of those who died during or bravely 
participated in the independence struggle. Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mary, or St. 
Michael with his sword unsheathed against the devil would surround the images 
of the absent ones, watching over them. These decorations certainly tell intimate 
tales of separation, and also suggest how migration has become a legitimate—at 
times encouraged—way to achieve respect from one’s own family and the com-
munity at large.
Migration has historically been a well-established, socially legitimated strategy 
for support of those left behind. Uncles, aunts, or other relatives who lived abroad 
helped kin when things were going wrong in Eritrea during the war. For many of 
my informants, “the uncle abroad” was almost a legendary character, to whom 
they had addressed letters during their childhood asking for dolls or toys. Often 
“the uncle abroad” was more educated and seen as someone who had experience 
of the world. When he came back to visit the family, big parties were organized 
in his honor. This is the cultural environment in which young Eritreans grew up 
learning the value of migration.
With the current lack of economic opportunities in the country, having or 
not having relatives abroad is a critical element in the socioeconomic stratifica-
tion of the Eritrean population. Sometimes, it is the only defense against starva-
tion. As locals told me in Barur, malnourished children receiving assistance from 
a humanitarian program mostly came from local families who did not have any 
close relatives abroad. Even when families are better equipped to survive, remit-
tances are extremely valuable, given the gap between the average salary and the 
increasingly high cost of living owing to inflation and the weakness of Eritrean 
economy.16 Although scarce and not detailed, the available data show the Eritrean 
economy to be heavily dependent on private transfers.17 At the national as well as 
household levels, emigration provides the basic resources for the survival of fami-
lies and of the country itself.
Engraved in the landscape as well as in domestic space, emigration in 
its positive and tragic aspects is not only normalized as an everyday reality 
and crucial resource of Eritreans’ daily lives. It has also become normative. As 
widely documented in other regions characterized by protracted political stagna-
tion and economic uncertainties,18 emigration may become the norm, that is to say, 
expected by families and the community at large. This was illustrated for me by my 
encounter with Alazar’s mother, Minia, and the other members of his family.
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THE L AST SON LEFT BEHIND
Minia’s family was a prime example of the diasporic engagement of Eritreans. 
Most of her siblings were scattered around Europe and the Middle East. Two 
of her sons were in Israel, one was in Italy, and another in Sweden. When I 
met Minia, she still her twenty-five-year-old son Robel and her sixteen-year-old 
daughter Lula living at home with her and her husband, but by the time I left the 
country, the two had already fled to Ethiopia. Minia and Alem followed them 
two months later.
Sitting on the small stool in front of the stove preparing traditional coffee, 
Minia asked me how Alazar was doing. I was glad to tell her that he had finally 
found a good job as a barman in Rome; he had many friends, and was generous 
with everyone. Minia’s big brown eyes lit up with pride:
I have no words to describe what Alazar is for me. When he was a child he used to 
ask me for some food from the doorstep of the house. But often there was not enough 
food. Then a gesture of my hand was sufficient, and he would run off without saying 
anything. Alazar has always been strong, but he was not good at school. He was only 
sixteen when he went to defend our country. He was wounded then and imprisoned 
in a camp in Ethiopia for years. We thought he was dead . . . but then he came back 
to us.
Looking at Robel sitting on the sofa, she exclaimed: “Alazar is different from 
this one . . . that has no salary and is still at home with us!” Robel laughed, a bit 
embarrassed.
Compared to Alazar, who had had to cope with poverty since he was a little boy 
and had been a soldier and a prisoner of war, Robel was still a bit spoiled. Later, 
when Lwam, my translator for the occasion, and I were walking away from the 
house, she commented that Robel must have felt very ashamed for being the only 
one left in the house, unable to help his family.
As Robel’s subtle stigmatization illustrates, migration has become especially 
expected of young men, since the ability to support one’s parents and provide 
for one’s wife and children is the most basic element of Eritrean masculinity and 
adulthood.19 However, young women may also feel the pressure to leave Eritrea so 
as to provide for their families. Lwam, for example, felt extremely responsible for 
her parents, who were farmers in the south of Eritrea and had suffered through 
recurring droughts. Since her brother in Italy had been unable to support the fam-
ily back home, she was determined to take his place and make her father’s dream 
to see Massawa come true. “My father has never even seen the sea,” she said. “Can 
you imagine? Everyone comes from abroad to see Massawa, but my family has 
never been there. When I have some money, I’ll take him there. You can be sure 
of that.”
Mainly due to the constraints produced by the indeterminate national service, 
which I describe in detail in the next section, achieving a recognized social status 
When Migration Becomes the Norm    33
becomes impossible for most young men and women unless they leave the coun-
try. As widely highlighted by scholars of Eritrea, abiding by the government rules 
not only implies economic dependency on others, but also a life of “social liminal-
ity.20 Since national service, which is intended to be a sort of initiation period nec-
essary to join the national community and reach adulthood, has been indefinitely 
prolonged, young people are prevented from becoming adults in both symbolic 
and practical ways. Most of them are trapped in a state of perennial adolescence.21
Their forced permanent adolescence can also be negatively sanctioned as a fail-
ure by families and peers and turns into a condition of “social death.” Conven-
tionally used to define the status of slaves as those who do not belong to a com-
munity,22 the descriptive “social death” is also the condition of those individuals 
who break a taboo and are therefore condemned to social exclusion, sometimes 
even to physical death.23 In migration studies, it more generally refers to those 
who are excluded/or who risk being excluded because of the impossibility of ful-
filling the social expectations—concerning remittances24 or the passage to adult-
hood25—of their community back home. Migration thus becomes a necessary pas-
sage to overcome this condition of social liminality and to gain the appreciation 
of one’s own family and friends. As I show in the following chapters, the desire for 
positive social status with the family and community left behind is also crucial for 
understanding my informants’ motivation to keep moving after having reached 
Ethiopia, Sudan, or Italy, and for those who had arrived to support the migration 
of their kin.
Family expectations certainly mirror an economic strategy of survival,26 but it 
would not be correct to reduce them to economic interests. Parents’ encourage-
ment to migrate are also animated by the desire to see their children settled in 
a better and safer place. Eritrea is perceived as a place without a future, and the 
outside world is represented one of happiness and stability. Families share with 
their young members hierarchies of possible destinations—cosmologies of desti-
nations—classified according to the deemed availability of economic and educa-
tional opportunities and freedom. At the time I met Minia, for example, she did 
not really need more money. Three of her sons were already abroad and regularly 
remitting enough to ensure a good standard of life to those left behind. However, 
Minia firmly believed that Eritrea could not guarantee a future to young people. 
In particular, she did not want her only daughter to go through the challenging 
experience of training in the Sa’wa military camp (see later).
Although parents usually believed that life abroad would be good for their chil-
dren, they were also aware that migration can have tragic consequences.27 Given 
this tension, the decision to flee or to stay was mostly left to their sons and daugh-
ters. Indeed, families were often unaware of their sons’ and daughters’ migratory 
plans. Most of them come to know about their children’s flight after it has already 
happened, by receiving a call from their son/daughter or from a relative abroad.28 
Except in a few cases, migration from Eritrea is young people’s business. As 
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UNHCR data show, most part of those who leave the country today are young 
(sometimes very young) men and, to a lesser extent, women.29 This is because the 
young are those of whom the Eritrean state has demanded the most sacrifices over 
the past twenty years.
C ONSCRIPTED FOREVER 
Self-sufficiency, defending Eritrea against Ethiopian invasion, and making it a 
modern country are among the main official justifications for the mass mobiliza-
tion of the population aged over eighteen in the military and in the execution of 
public tasks.30 This mobilization has mainly been enacted by modifying the origi-
nal terms of national service. According to 1995 proclamation, national service 
was to be for eighteen months in all: six months of military training and one year 
of “active military service and development tasks in military forces for a total of 18 
months” (Proclamation of National Service No. 82/1995, art. 8).31 All citizens had 
to serve, except for people with serious disabilities and those who fought in the 
liberation struggle.
From 1994 to 1998, this was the case, but when the 1998–2000 border con-
flict started, the population was massively drafted into the army. At this point, 
the draft was often voluntary, since many Eritreans, animated by patriotic 
feelings, were willing to fight to defend the country. However, when the war 
ended, the expected demobilization never occurred. On the contrary, in 2002, 
the so-called Warsay-Yekealo campaign was launched. This campaign targeted 
young people on the basis that they (the inheritors, or warsay) should learn the 
attributes of self-sacrifice and resistance of older generations of freedom fight-
ers (yekealo) to use them in the development of the country. In practice this 
meant that national service became open-ended, and that education has been 
increasingly militarized.
Since 2002, in fact, after having reached eleventh grade, all boys and girls have 
had to do their last year of school in the Sa’wa military camp. Although its infra-
structure has been improved over the years, Sa’wa is known for being a hard place. 
My young informants told me about the harsh climate, the strict training sessions, 
and the inadequate food and facilities.32 During this year, they both attend regu-
lar classes and undergo military training.33 At the end of this last year, all stu-
dents take a matriculation exam. If they pass, they are allowed into a university 
or professional curriculum, according to the marks they obtained during the 
exam; if they do not pass, they start their national service. Located in the dry 
hot region of Sahel, the traditional stronghold of the EPLF during the struggle, 
Sa’wa has been developed, not only to provide military training, but also to teach 
younger generations the values of national companionship in spite of ethnic and 
religious differences.34
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Figure 3. Students celebrating Independence day (May 24) before their departure for Sa’wa 
(photo by the author, 2013)
In the early 2000s, following student protests, the internationally recognized 
University of Asmara was closed down and regional colleges were established in 
which students have to observe strict military discipline under soldiers’ control.35 
Successful matriculants are admitted to one of these. 
Those who do not pass the matriculation exam usually become soldiers or join 
specific ministries to carry out lower tasks. As soldiers, young men, and to a lesser 
extent women, are sent to Barentu, Assab, Tsorona, and other more remote areas, 
usually to patrol the border or to build roads, dams, and other infrastructure of 
public interest for little remuneration: a common soldier used to earn 400 nakfa a 
month—about U.S.$8.
Once college students finish their education, they are assigned to a specific 
ministry and start their year of “community service,” for which they used to 
receive 175 nakfa (less than $4) per month. After that year, they start working for 
a salary in the ministry to which they have been assigned. Salaries used to range 
from 450 to 800 nakfa per month (–$9-16). Doctors exceptionally earn 1,500 nakfa 
a month (about $30). Given that rents and food and commodity prices are increas-
ing exponentially, it was extremely hard for people to survive on such low salaries. 
Although educated Eritreans are mostly employed in administration, education, 
and the health sector and other services, the majority have never been released 
from military duties.36
Figure 4. Young conscripts headed for the Independence Day parade (photo by the 
author, 2013)
Figure 5. Independence Day parade in Asmara (photo by the author, 2013)
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The indefinite extension of national service has now been in force for almost 
two decades. Among the many social and economic pitfalls, this measure has pro-
duced generations of young men and women who do not have the freedom to 
work, to earn a decent salary, or to enjoy a family life.
TR APPED AT HOME:  THE LIVES OF YOUNG 
ERITREANS BET WEEN NATIONAL SERVICE 
AND SO CIAL IMMOBILIT Y
In the house I lived in, twenty-four-year-old Salam and I shared a double bed, and 
I often lay there writing up my notes, waiting for her to finish her prayers or to 
come back home from a date with her boyfriend, Gaim. Once, it was already late at 
night and I was dozing on the bed when Salam walked into our bedroom in tears:
Me: “What happened, Salam sukhor? Are you okay?”
Salam: “It was so bad, Milena. The police took Gaim.”
Me: “They took him?
Salam: “Yes. We were waiting for the taxi . . . you know there, on the way to the 
shouq. The police came and asked for his papers. He did not have them . . . they 
took him away.”
When Salam’s boyfriend got caught, she started calling people who might be able 
to help get Gaim out of prison. She was worried he was going to be sent back to 
his military placement, very far away from Asmara. “If you have contacts, you can 
pay and then they will set him free,” Salam told me. “If you don’t have contacts, 
you cannot do anything. . . . They are too stupid. . . . There is no freedom in this 
country. It is not possible to live here.”
Gaim was a deserter. Like many other young people in Eritrea, he had decided 
to stay away from his assigned employment in a faraway military location in the 
north of the country. Since he did not have his menqasaqasi (documents), the 
police had arrested him, but he came from a wealthy family and had some good 
contacts in the right places. Not long after the above-mentioned episode, he was 
let out of jail and apparently released from national service too.
Obtaining a release not only means freedom from indefinite national service 
but also has many other implications. Unreleased citizens cannot obtain passports 
and thus cannot travel; their salaries are (even) lower than those of released citi-
zens; they cannot obtain a license and open a private business; finally, graduates 
are not given their official transcripts, which would allow them to use their quali-
fications abroad. Holding or not holding a release paper is one of the main factors 
(together with remittances from abroad) influencing the socioeconomic stratifica-
tion of the Eritrean population.37
Obtaining a release is not easy. Rules are not clear and often change. In general, 
one can obtain this document only if one can be shown to be suffering from a 
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severe sickness. The chances of release were significantly higher for a woman than 
for a man. Women can obtain a release if they get married, have children, or have 
extremely worrying family problems. But some ministries are known for being 
stricter than others. Young women who worked for the ministries of Health or 
Education, like our neighbor and friend Johanna, were extremely unlucky. The 
chronic shortage of teachers and health professionals in the country has made 
release mostly unattainable for women working in these fields. During one of the 
many evenings that Lwam, Johanna and I spent chatting in the darkness of the 
house (there were regular electrical blackouts), they explained that each case could 
be different depending on the supervisors and the ministry. For example, Lwam, 
who had worked for the Ministry of Agriculture for three years, was applying for a 
military release from her regional administration. She was planning to claim that 
her free work outside the ministry was vital for her family’s survival. The claim 
seemed a bit weak to me, since this condition was shared by most Eritreans I knew. 
Lwam was confident, however, and a year later, she actually obtained her papers 
and legally left the country.
For men, a release is so difficult to obtain that it had become the subject of 
much sarcasm among my informants.38 In the villages that I visited in the south-
ern highlands, I was told that some sixty-five-year-old men were still serving in 
the military. In Asmara, I met only two young men who had been released from 
national service: one suffered from a serious form of mental retardation; the other 
was Salam’s boyfriend, who, after having been incarcerated, was released from 
the military owing to high-level contacts in the army. “Nothing is impossible if 
people have good contacts and money,” one of our common friends commented 
when I reported what happened to Salam’s boyfriend. I was told many stories 
of young men who managed to avoid the military service because the parents 
had close contacts within the PFDJ party, or because they had a relative with an 
important position in a ministry. All the others had to take informal jobs while 
dodging the draft.
Since the cost of living is extremely high in relation to the average government 
salary, the young people I met in Asmara had second, and sometimes third, more 
profitable jobs. Our neighbor Johanna taught in a public school, for example, but 
also privately tutored children on the side in order to make some money. Her 
younger brother, Paolos, should have been teaching in a technical school far from 
Asmara, but he was working as a truck driver while keeping an informal agree-
ment with his supervisor at the school. 
Johanna and Paolos are good examples of those who remain stuck at home 
despite their desire to leave it. In spite of long years of service and a difficult family 
situation—their mother had died and they rarely saw their distant father—they 
could not get a release from the Ministry of Education. Neither could they leave 
the country, given their limited economic resources. Johanna dreamt of pursuing 
her passion for painting in an art school in Italy, but could not get her relatives to 
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pay for her. Her brother was also desperately trying to leave the country, but could 
not afford a safe and reliable getaway. He had already tried to escape the country 
three times. As a result, he had been caught and imprisoned for more than a year—
an experience he did not want to talk about with anyone. As they did not have 
any other option, Johanna and Paolos did their best to put up with their everyday 
economic constraints and public duties as agelgalitat (conscripts), by playing small 
tricks on the system, or simply by working very hard.
Johanna and Paolos are “displaced in place.” As Stephen C. Lubkemann 
observes,39 the ability to move is stratified according to individuals’ and fami-
lies’ socioeconomic resources, educational background, and physical capabilities. 
Johanna and her brother were well informed and fit enough to cross the border, 
but could not afford a safe way to do it (see “The Cost of Safety” text box at the 
end of this chapter). Conventional categories of refugee studies are overturned 
here: refugees are usually defined by their lack of choices, but cases like Johanna’s 
illustrate that the ones who have no choice are those who stay behind. From this 
perspective, becoming a refugee is not an involuntary act, but a demonstration of 
individual possibilities.
However, staying can also be a matter of choice. Loyalty to the political project 
of the government and the strong commitment to develop their country have cer-
tainly led some Eritreans, even those who had been serving the nation for decades 
in return for insignificant salaries, to stay put. In fact, the tension between their 
migration and their duties to the nation was often present in the narratives of the 
young Eritreans I met. Brought up as patriots, young Eritreans often view migra-
tion through the same categories as government discourse.40 In a way, my inter-
locutors often felt that migration was a sort of treason. Even for Johanna, migrat-
ing would have conflicted with the patriotic values that her father and her mother, 
both ex-guerrilla, had taught her.
No matter the reason for which young Eritreans I met were still in the country, 
their life was full of hardships. Johanna and her brother were lucky enough, like 
many of those living in urban areas, educated and employed as civilians by the 
ministries, to find time and space for other income-generating activities. Other 
conscripts especially those who serve as soldiers in remote areas, can only choose 
between corvée labor for the state or a life on the run.
EVERYDAY FUGITIVES
Desertion is extremely widespread in Eritrea.41 Sometimes individuals decide to 
evade their assigned job out of necessity. Married men, who have the responsibil-
ity to support their families, may desert to earn more. Others, usually young men 
and women, often choose to desert hoping to find a way out of the country, even 
if this may take years. Still others, especially young women, decide to hide from 
the system—dropping out of school, Sa’wa military camp, and national service 
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all together—until they are automatically released by getting married and having 
children. It goes without saying that these tactics of evasion have an impact on 
wider societal dynamics, such as the rate of female education and the availability 
of labor, as well as on the everyday world of families and individuals constantly 
living in a state of existential suspension and anxiety.
Deserters have a hard time dealing with continual controls and round-ups (gef-
fas in Tigrinya). As often reported, the ordinary quiet of Godena Harnet, the main 
central avenue in Asmara, was often shaken by the tumult of soldiers checking the 
documents of all young people sitting in cafés or walking in the streets.42 Those 
found without papers could go to prison, as in the case of Salam’s boyfriend, or 
were sent back to their military placement to be punished there.
Geffas were also common in the villages I visited in 2013. “Last time soldiers 
came to our village, they could not find the young people,” one of my informants 
in Mai Nefas reported. “So they took the elders and made them march in bare feet 
to punish their connivance with their draft-dodging sons.” According to my infor-
mants there, villagers had a complex system of information sharing via contacts in 
the police, which gave them notice that soldiers were coming.
Like the young black drug dealers studied by Alice Goffman in a Philadelphia 
ghetto,43 Eritrean koblali (a negative word referring to draft-dodgers in Tigrinya) 
develop “an art of running.” They learn how to live unpredictable lives always 
on the run, periodically escaping geffas, avoiding soldiers, not sleeping at home, 
suspecting neighbors and fellow villagers of being spies for the government. For 
many, this becomes a way of life. Some draft-dodge only for a few months, but 
others do it for years, and evasion becomes the norm. While dodging soldiers, 
many deserters date their girlfriends, work, get married, bring up their children, 
and start new businesses. One of my informants had been a draft-dodger for more 
than seven years before being caught while trying to escape the country.
Eritrean draft-dodgers live in constant fear of being caught, David Bozzini 
emphasizes,44 but it was the normality of living as a deserter that amazed me. By 
“normality,” I do not mean to say that their lives were simple. The very possibility 
to feel at home was crumbling due to the fact that they often had to sleep outside 
their home, and that their families were covering for them. However, many young 
people I met seemed to see living their lives as fugitives as something “normal,” 
and as Salam put it once, “people can get used to the most terrible things.” For 
example, Robel, Alazar’s brother, had been absent from his teaching post for over 
five months, yet he often risked meeting me in the center of the city, walking with 
me through streets frequented by police. Likewise, Salam’s boyfriend used to hang 
out with her in city center and go out almost every evening in busy bars. The 
night Salam came home in tears, they had, in fact, been close to the center. What 
appeared to me as a situation of extreme risk, crisis and hardship had become the 
normal background for their daily activities. Aren’t they worried about going to jail? 
I always used to wonder to myself. When I asked people, they usually answered 
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with a bitter smile and no clear explanation, but once Salam replied in a way that 
threw some light on my question:
They [young people] have no other way. They escape for a while, then the police 
catch them and they go to prison. Then, when they are out, they will once again try 
to escape from the military. What can they do? Anyway, to be in this country is like 
being in a prison. We call it “free prison” because it is like a big prison from which 
nobody can easily leave.
Salam’s representation of Eritrea as a big prison symbolizes well the different 
aspects of immobility experienced by young Eritreans. First, her words suggest that 
staying in or out of prison was not so different from young Eritreans’ point of view: 
neither prisoners in a jail nor young Eritreans outside the prison have a future. 
Both are condemned to live in an eternal present where the past is continuously 
reproduced without any significant prospect of change. This was not only because 
the whole country was stuck in an endless repetition of the past and its tokens—
the struggle for independence, its martyrs and its heroes—but also because young 
Eritreans are stuck in a condition of generational and social liminality.45
The whole country was perceived as a huge prison: it is hard to escape, and 
individuals have no control over their lives. Young people felt locked away from 
the outside world, seen as the site of happiness and possibilities. The risk of being 
sent to prison was thus no scarier than the certainty of remaining stuck in a tem-
poral, geographic, social, economic, and existential state of immobility. Against 
the risk of being “the living dead,” a person had no other alternative than to try to 
escape as many times as possible. Desertion is in fact one of the tactics to resist the 
forced stasis and try to advance one’s life, to reinstate a kind of normal course of 
“social becoming” even in a context of chronic uncertainties. 
EVEN DESERTERS MARRY:  ORDINARY STORIES FROM 
THE C OUNTRYSIDE
This forced social and existential immobility is even more striking for Eritreans in 
the countryside. While many young men in the city manage to keep their formal 
employment while also having more profitable jobs, individuals from rural back-
grounds are usually sent far away from their villages to remote military outposts. 
This prevents them from accomplishing their familiar duties, ranging from plow-
ing the land to providing for their elders and forming new families. This was the 
case for many young men I met in a group of villages in the southern highlands. 
Many of my friends and informants in Italy—mostly the Catholic ones in Rome 
and Genoa—were originally from that area. Ogbazgi, in particular, a twenty-five-
year-old refugee living in Sicily at the time, was from Mai Nefas.
Like most other families in the village, Ogbazgi’s family were farmers. Their 
hudmo—a typical stone house—was set in a landscape of huge, smooth, round 
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rocks, surrounded by tall cactuses half-eaten by local camels put out to pasture. 
When I went to visit them, Ogbazgi’s seventy-eight-year-old father, Abraha, wel-
comed me with a toothless smile. Although thin as a matchstick, he was strong and 
agile, and still able to work in the fields for an entire day. Ogbazgi’s youngest sister 
was sitting in front of the coal stove preparing coffee and eggs. The other members 
of the family were not around: Abraha’s sons were abroad and his daughters had 
married and were living elsewhere in the country. The eldest brother, Tewodoros, 
was the only one left, but he was out in the fields. That was the period of trans-
humance and plowing in the nearby lowlands, where it is rainy between Novem-
ber and March, while the highlands remain dry and dusty. Abraha told me that 
Tewodoros had been a soldier for more than seven years. The ministry sent him 
to Assab, “a very bad place” according to Abraha. It was too hot there, and soldiers 
were not given enough food and water. They did not hear from Tewodoros for 
five years, but finally he had recently managed to return home and had married a 
young woman from a nearby village.
In the evening, Tewodoros came to see me to give me the video recording of his 
marriage to pass on to Ogbazgi. After congratulating him on his wedding, I asked 
him about his plans for the future. Smiling like a child who has just done something 
naughty, he told me he would not go back to the army any time soon. Being the 
eldest son and the only one left in the country, he bore the responsibility to help 
his old father with the crops and to support his new family. At the age of thirty-
two, national service having delayed him in all main steps toward male adulthood, 
draft-dodging was his only way to become a respected son and a husband.
However, perpetual desertion does not free young Eritreans from a stressful 
life of suspicion and unpredictability. Many men whom I met in Mai Nefas did 
not sleep at home, fearing that soldiers would come at night to capture them. 
While deserting might allow them to get married and meet some of the traditional 
expectations, life would remain a matter of subsistence—a life “without future” 
as my informants put it. This “lack of future” in my informants’ view not only 
stems from the limitations to their personal freedom and the lack of long-term 
prospects in the country, but also from the perception that a better life is possible 
elsewhere. Not unlike many other young Africans, most boys and girls I met dur-
ing my fieldwork expressed the desire to leave the country in order to be part of 
“modernity”—which they see as a bundle of freedom, possibilities, and consum-
eristic wealth, seemingly so far from daily life in Eritrea.
STRIVING FOR MODERNIT Y
Most explanations of Eritrean migration have mainly focused on conditions of 
structural oppression hindering the ability of young people to fulfil traditional 
sociocultural expectations.46 The complexity of Eritreans’ aspirations to migration 
has remained hidden by the static portrait of a closed traditional society. However, 
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this image is far from reality on the ground. The appeal of “modernity” is, here as 
elsewhere, crucial in understanding how young Eritrean men and women perceive 
their own situation and how they project their futures into specific destinations 
in the “outside world.” Eritrea is often compared with North Korea in journal-
istic accounts, and people themselves feel locked away from the real flow of life, 
but contacts and interactions with the outside world are numerous. Social remit-
tances, cultural products from abroad and images spread through the media shape 
young Eritreans’ “global subjectivities”.47
As widely highlighted in the literature on the topic, modernity is far from being 
a clearly defined concept, but it may mean different things for different actors in 
different places. The many dimensions of modernity—colonial, postcolonial, neo-
liberal, developmental, consumeristic, gender progressive, democratic—are often 
mixed in social imaginaries and personal aspirations.48 The modernity inspir-
ing my informants’ dreams reflected an intricate bundle of colonial stereotypes, 
postcolonial development ambitions, consumeristic images, gender models, and 
democratic aspirations, locally experienced, imagined, and reinterpreted. In my 
informants’ eyes, the possibility of belonging to a modern world meant many dif-
ferent things. It not only represented the chance to access material development 
and the availability of more or less technological, luxurious or basic consumer 
products. “Modernity” for them also meant living in a place where they could 
enjoy personal freedom, social rights, and enhanced status in their families. The 
pursuit of the “modern world” in its material, social, and moral attributes was one 
of the important ingredients in my informants’ hierarchical categorization of their 
most desired migration destinations.
Concerned as I was about rendering an accurate image of my informants as 
legitimate refugees, I often wondered whether portraying their desires for “moder-
nity” might have undermined their claims for safe refuge in Europe. Finally, dis-
satisfied with simplistic accounts reducing refugee flows to their structural factors, 
I decided that there was no reason to deny prospective refugees’ “capacity to aspire.” 
Although oppressed, my Eritrean informants could envisage better futures outside 
their home country—unlike “the poor” portrayed in Arjun Appadurai’s book The 
Future as Cultural Fact.49 Aspirations to modernity (conventionally considered pull 
factors) are, I argue, crucial not only for the study of voluntary migration but also 
for understanding of the trajectories of those who come to be labeled refugees.50
As a matter of fact, Eritreans are immersed in global modern culture as much 
as most other peoples in the world. “Global modern culture” here does not neces-
sarily mean capitalist Western culture, even if consumerism is a big part of it.51 It 
rather consists of a plurality of mediascapes from different parts of the world that 
are received, absorbed, and manipulated in a variety of ways.52 Mobile phones, 
international TV channels, and the internet (widely uncensored) are available to 
Eritreans, although information and communications technology infrastructure is 
often poor. Almost all the houses I visited had a television set. Even in the poorest 
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neighborhoods, satellite dishes spring up like mushrooms from the roofs of the 
houses. Bollywood movies, Arabic shows, and American and Turkish TV series 
are among the most popular cultural products, along with the national news and 
local music. In Ester’s house, for instance, whenever electricity was available in the 
evening, the women would gather in the living room to watch a Turkish family 
saga called Jemilah. Later at night, Salam would follow some American series, and 
Ester, if free in the afternoon, would watch news on ERITV or other international 
channels, such as MMC (Dubai), Al Jazeera (Qatar), or the BBC (UK).53
Salam, as well as most my other young informants in the country, was active on 
the internet and social networks. While sitting close to Salam in busy internet cafés 
in the center, I could glance at her friends’ Facebook profiles. The pictures of her 
male friends in the United States and Europe showed them in suits or fashionable 
clothes, leaning on flashy cars; her female friends would be smiling in their bikinis 
from swimming pools, while others hugged their new friends in luxurious shop-
ping malls in Dubai. Along with religious representations, spiritual proverbs, and 
family images from their past, what Eritreans abroad mostly share are sanitized 
images of their new life. These widespread images of the outside world were a con-
stant reminder to those still stuck in Eritrea of the life they could have if they left.
Often the many dimensions of my young informants’ unsatisfied desire for 
modernity were crystallized in a lack of “things”. Issues like the lack of fuel, elec-
tricity, technological facilities, good clothes continually came up whenever my 
informants described why life in Eritrea was unbearable. These “things” were 
much more than material objects; they symbolized their feeling of being trapped. 
My informants’ lives in Eritrea were continually compared with lives outside the 
country as depicted by returnees and in electronic images. Eritrea was perceived as 
an unchanging land, stuck in the past. The First World was the future. 
PRICKLY PEARS AND RO OTED TREES:  MOVERS AND 
THEIR LEFT-BEHIND C OUNTERPART S
It was a beautiful, starlit night, made all the more noticeable by the complete elec-
trical blackout in Asmara. Lwam, Johanna, and I were sitting in a taxi going to a bar 
in town. The taxi driver was keen to chat with us and explained to me: “Eritrean 
people can be divided into beles and shibaha: beles [prickly pears] are those from 
abroad who come to Eritrea on holiday, spend their money in clubs and hook up 
with beautiful Eritrean girls; shibaha [a kind of tree] are those who have never left; 
they are always here no matter what.” The taxi driver was laughing but Johanna did 
not find his explanation funny: “I get very angry if someone calls me shibaha,” she 
commented. “It is not my fault if I am stuck here and I can’t leave this country!”
The Eritrean rainy season lasts from July to September. The land, usually arid, 
deserted and stony, becomes covered with shiny, green grass. Thorny cactuses pro-
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duce glossy red prickly pears—the beles—blanketing the valleys with red, to the 
delight of children and the elderly. The rainy season is not only the period of the 
year when the country revives, but also the time when Eritreans from abroad come 
back to their home country. Their presence represents a moment of rebirth for 
Eritrean society. Families can embrace their sons who live abroad; old friends who 
live in different parts of the world can meet again; girls wear their best dresses, 
hoping to meet the love of their lives. Their presence also shakes the stagnant local 
economy: emigrants import foreign currency, spend their money in clubs and res-
taurants, and bring gifts to their families and friends.54
In the eyes of the locals, beles are rich, well dressed, and free to travel. Girls like 
to imagine what their lives would look like if they married a beles. Mothers keep 
the best picture of their daughter in case a beles asks about the possibility of mar-
riage. Boys dream about the cars they will be able to buy if they manage to work 
abroad.55 “When my friends come back from abroad, they invite everyone to din-
ner and spend more money than I earn in a month,” Salam once told me while we 
were sitting in our pajamas in front of an episode of Pretty Little Liars. “I’m twenty-
five and I still live at home with my mom. I can’t even help her as I would like to. I 
have to leave.” Most of Salam’s friends had already left the country; some of them 
were in Dubai, others in Kampala, Uganda, and still others in Europe. She could 
not wait to join them, even though she knew that it would be difficult at first. Her 
friends had told her that she would be lonely and have to work hard. However, her 
life had to change; staying put was not an option.
Yet, migration was not a leap into the void for Salam, or for most of my infor-
mants. Many young women and men I spoke to had quite a clear idea about their 
desired final destination. This is not to say that everyone who leaves Eritrea knows 
where he/she will end up and may not change his/her mind.56 However, as a result 
of TV news, transnational contacts with friends and family connections, young 
Eritreans commonly imagine different destinations as hierarchically ordered along 
more or less objective assumptions about work possibilities, social and political 
freedom and attractiveness of their inhabitants. Their cosmologies of destinations 
were subjective, since they reflected personal aspirations, but, at the same time, 
they were fairly standard across young people and their families. They represent the 
shared imaginary and moral contexts in which migration is fostered and pursued.
THE FIRST AND FIFTH WORLDS:  C OSMOLO GIES
I heard one of the clearest cosmological formulations from a taxi driver in 
Asmara. While he was driving me, he started complaining about the situation in 
Eritrea, saying:
Italy, Europe, and America are the First World. India and South Africa are the second 
world; the Middle East is the Third World. . . . Eritrea is the Fifth World! In the First 
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World people are brilliant. It does not happen that there is shortage of electricity, or 
no water supply. They have good public management. Here in Eritrea we do not have 
fuel, no water, no electricity, even though we have the resources! . . . but the govern-
ment is corrupt and there is no positive result for the people. . . . It’s so bad. But if I go 
to Switzerland, Sweden, Norway—they even give me money to support myself. . . . 
That is First World! 
Although this hierarchy of countries was the taxi driver’s own categorization, his 
words express ideas widely shared among Eritreans. There are good, developed, civ-
ilized countries and bad, underdeveloped, corrupt countries. Most notably, desires 
and aspirations of freedom and self-realization are typically related to the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and Europe (Italy was probably included in the First 
World by the taxi driver only out of respect for me). Eritrea belongs to the group 
of hopeless countries. These worlds are inhabited by people who are given specific, 
essentialized attributes (the inhabitants of the First World are “brilliant”), and each 
of them presents well-known opportunities and difficulties as regards the climate, 
legal context, labor market, and so on.57 Moreover, this hierarchy entails a temporal 
dimension, which is crucial for interpreting the way Eritreans see migration. The 
First World represents the future, while the Fifth World represents the past.
Other scholars have noticed how migration aspirations are often associated 
with a hierarchical vision of the world. Erind Pajo’s work on Albanian interna-
tional migration, for instance, documents his informants’ hierarchical world 
visions and their aspirations to migrate to certain places.58 In his investigation of 
urban youth in Bissau, Henrik Vigh also talks about “an understanding of a world 
order consisting of societies with different technological capacities and levels of 
mastery over physical and social environment, as well as the spaces and social 
options which are open or closed to persons of different social categories within 
it.”59 Not unlike young Eritreans whom I encountered, Vigh’s informants constantly 
felt “humiliated” in what they perceive as a developmental void of their home and 
imagine the positive prospects awaiting them in certain destinations imagined as 
more developed, more technological, more modern. As James Ferguson noticed, 
these categorizations reflect the developmental model, which since the 1970s has 
distinguished among so-called First, Second, Third, and Fourth worlds, in a sort 
of spatial and temporal scale of progress.60
But there is more to it. Eritreans’ hierarchical cosmology includes cultural 
assumptions and moral norms about places and people inhabiting these worlds. 
While people in the First World are perceived as progressive, free, and respon-
sible,61 there is general distrust and suspicion of Ethiopians and Sudanese. These 
assumptions about different nationalities indicate that cosmological views are not 
only the result of the developmental discourse. Rather, they stem from historically 
stratified conceptions, which have been variably documented in the literature on 
Eritrea,62 and ongoing cultural circulation among left-behind Eritreans and those 
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living in different parts of the world. Precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial expe-
riences, such as deep-rooted interethnic relations, Italian racial discrimination,63 
and the 1998–2000 war with Ethiopia feed into common stereotypes about places 
and their inhabitants. Besides these collectively stratified historical experiences, 
information, images, and values absorbed through the media and continually 
exchanged with friends abroad, as noted above, contributed to shaping my infor-
mants’ expectations of suitable future destinations.
Cosmologies of destinations, thus, could be considered as simultaneously long-
standing and flexible constructions. Although some assumptions may be resistant 
to reality checks due to the unparalleled nature of transnational communication 
and its related moral obligations, they can also shift due to changes in the objective 
structure of opportunity or to the power of media images and rumors. For exam-
ple, Salam thought that migration to Europe was not such a good idea anymore: 
“Now everyone knows that Europe is finished. It is better to go to Dubai, where 
there is a good international community and you do not need a visa to enter. If you 
know somebody who can find work for you, you are fine. In Africa, there is work, 
in Europe, there is crisis, they also said it on TV.” Salam portrayed Eritrea as the 
bottom of possible choices, and Canada as the most desirable final destination; but 
other African countries were described as possible good places to live. Through 
her friends, Salam had gathered a very specific idea of alternative destinations, 
together with their pros and cons: “In Juba [the capital of South Sudan], if you 
have some money to start an activity, you can make a lot of money. A friend of 
mine has opened a supermarket there . . . but it is not safe there and it is too hot. 
In Kampala, instead, the climate is good and the people look beautiful with their 
dark and shiny skin—men look also handsome –you can enroll as a refugee there 
and wait for resettlement to Canada.”
Salam’s words represent an interesting instance of how imaginaries of possible 
destinations can quickly shift and over the long term produce a change in the 
moral expectations shared by migrants and families. However, I would argue that 
if ideas about destinations may be easily transformed by rumors and widespread 
images, it takes longer to influence the moral expectations connected to these des-
tinations. To put it differently, potential and current migrants may be relatively 
fast to pick new information up and adapt to new obstacles and opportunities, but 
societal and family expectations of what migration to certain countries entails in 
terms of family status are more resistant to change. I return to this point in follow-
ing chapters. This is where the concept of cosmologies may be more suitable than 
imaginaries, as it encompasses not only the symbolic, but also the deep-rooted 
moral aspects that produce and reproduce migration.
The combination of different memories, images, and rumors has produced 
multifaceted hierarchies of destinations, which cannot be reduced to one single 
dimension. The most salient axes for analyzing my informants’ cosmological beliefs 
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The cost of safety: how to escape Eritrea
The safest way to leave Eritrea is by obtaining release from national service. Pass-
ports and exit visas can be bought for 400,000 nakfa (around U.S.$7,000), with 
half of the money going to the broker and half to a Ministry of Emigration of-
ficial. However, money is not enough. According to Valentina (May 2013), it was 
crucial to good strong contacts in the Ministry of the Emigration and perhaps to 
know someone able to facilitate departure from the airport. 
The second safest way to leave the country costs 300,000/200,000 nakfa 
(about U.S.$5,500–3,500). This is a direct journey. Escapees are picked up in 
Asmara by ministerial land cruisers and are directly dropped off in Khartoum. 
These kinds of journeys are managed by people who work in security, who have 
all the permits to cross freely to Sudan without anyone asking them for further 
explanations. This was considered a comfortable journey, but, according to Val-
entina, there had been frauds. 
For 150,000/180,000 nakfa (around U.S.$3,000), it is possible to exit the coun-
try by car, but the journey is not direct. From Asmara customers are driven to 
Tesseney; from Tesseney a second vehicle takes them to Kassala in eastern Sudan 
(see map 1). For this kind of journey, it is necessary to bribe the general at the 
check point with 60,000 nakfa per car, while 60,000 goes to the driver and the 
remainder to the smuggler. From Kassala, customers are driven to Khartoum. 
This was the option that Valentina considered most convenient for her. Michael, 
who arranged this service, told me that it included a seven-hour walk across the 
Eritrean-Sudanese border.
Tsegay was able to provide passage from Eritrea to Ethiopia for U.S.$1,800, 
plus a commission of U.S.$300 for himself. The customer has to get from Asmara 
to Mendefera, where he/she is met by the pilot (guide). Some pilots can drive 
customers to Adi Quala, others accompany them by bus. From the town of Adi 
Quala, it takes about half a day’s walk to cross the border. Pilots usually leave from 
Tigrayan camps and pick up the customers in Mendefera.
The price from a border town, such as Tesseney, Sa’wa—on the Sudanese bor-
der—or Adi Quala, Tsorona—on the Ethiopian side, is significantly lower. How-
ever, prices vary significantly depending on the route, the origin, the destination, 
the relationship between the customer and the pilot, the size of the group led over 
the border, the season, the specific agreement with the middleman, and so on. 
Michael told me that for 60,000 nakfa (about $1,200), he could facilitate border 
crossing on foot from Tesseney to the Wodi Sherife or Shegerab refugee camps 
in Sudan. This usually took a full day’s walking. Sister Leterberhan had heard 
that the trip on foot from Adi Quala cost around 70,000 nakfa. Another man 
I interviewed in Ethiopia told me he paid 80,000 nakfa from Adi Quala. Sister 
Leterberhan told me that she could have got a good deal from Decamhare for her 
nephew for 10,000 nakfa (about $200). To get to border towns is not easy, since 
there is no free movement inside the country and there are many checkpoints, 
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especially on some roads and at some times of the year, and doing so without 
documents can imply higher risks. 
Rashaida smugglers in Massawa charged 70,000 nakfa (about $1,400) to con-
vey migrants along the coast into Sudan. According to Sister Leterberhan, this 
kind of journey had been dramatically cheaper in 2010—45,000 nakfa, she said—
and was very popular until the government started patrolling that side of the 
border more closely.
Finally, it is possible to travel by sea from Massawa or Assab to the coast of 
Yemen for 30,000/40,000 nakfa (about $700) per person. 
Would-be migrants can also cross the border by themselves provided they 
know the way, but this was less common among my informants.
Note: These prices are highly volatile and continuously change according 
to the demand of movement, the offer of services and the circumstances of the 
journey (more or less control, more or less danger). These prices are updated to 
2015. I collected this information all along my research, but my main informants 
on this topic were: (a) Valentina, a 25-year-old woman who had been trying to 
leave the country for long time; (b) Sister Leterberhan who was closely in touch 
with young people in different parts of Eritrea; (c) Michael, the smuggler I met in 
Khartoum; and (d) Tsegay, the smuggler I met in Addis Ababa. While in Ethiopia 
and Sudan, I also collected private accounts from escapees.
might be the following: freedom / lack of it; access to resources / lack of resources; 
social fairness / corruption; moral righteousness / moral decay. These dimensions 
were variously reproduced by my informants, depending on their gender, politi-
cal attitudes, and age, to mention only the most important factors. I encountered 
several other parallel and related dichotomies such as clean/dirty, personal free-
dom / social and religious restrictions. For instance, reaching Europe did not have 
the same value for my young male and female informants. By accessing freedom 
and a better-paid job through migration, young men mostly aspired to become 
breadwinners, get married, and help their families back home. My young female 
informants—mostly highly educated and from urban backgrounds—did not only 
want to migrate to Europe to support their families. They were also searching for 
the social freedom to pursue their dreams. Not satisfied with the traditional con-
ception of women as wives and mothers and rejecting the model of female free-
dom fighters promoted by government propaganda, they were looking for new 
ways of realizing their modern womanhood.64
The above considerations show that shared hierarchies of destinations assume 
different subjective meanings, gender implications, and generational values. What 
is crucial to highlight now is that these symbolic and moral structures deeply 





Diverse Responses to Protracted Displacement 
in Ethiopia and Sudan
Refugees’ onward movement from the first country of asylum in Africa toward 
further destinations has been a continuous concern for the UNHCR and the 
international community for at least the past ten years.1 However, relatively little 
research has been done into the reasons for and dynamics of refugees’ movements 
onward from their first country of asylum in Africa. Most of the literature is based 
on interviews with asylum seekers in Europe who were asked to recount their 
journeys, but there are two main difficulties with this approach.2 First, it does not 
permit us to account for the many factors that underpin mobility and immobility, 
being based solely on the narratives of those who succeeded in moving. Second, it 
does not allow us to move beyond refugees’ self-representations and to reconstruct 
the sociocultural milieus where decisions to move are taken. Also, the few studies 
conducted in transit countries—usually policy-oriented reports—do not clarify 
the moral, symbolic, and imaginative dimensions of migrants’ choices. As a result, 
it is generally acknowledged that secondary movements are coping strategies to 
attain long-term durable solutions, given a paucity of prospects for protection and 
assistance in the first country of asylum. This is certainly true, but there is more 
to it.
No doubt, refugees have to face many challenges in the first safe country where 
they are given protection. Their freedom of movement and their rights to work 
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and study are often strictly limited, which in turn limits their chances of long-
term legal integration. Yet these structural limitations are not enough to explain 
why different refugee populations inhabiting the same structural and legal envi-
ronment adopt different migratory attitudes. What differentiates the mobile ones 
from those who stay put? Is mobility just a question of access to social and eco-
nomic resources, or does it also emerge from specific aspirations and moral obli-
gations? How does the aspiration to live elsewhere become a concrete decision to 
move regardless of the risks? By confronting the desires and daily struggles of dif-
ferent groups of Eritreans in Ethiopia and Sudan, this chapter examines the roles 
of imagination, emotions, and shared moralities (i.e., ideas about what is moral 
and immoral, fair and unfair, desirable and undesirable) in relation to mobility 
and immobility in refugee settings.3
First, I compare mobile and immobile refugees whom I met in camps in north-
ern Ethiopia. While accounting for the gap in socioeconomic resources that dif-
ferentiate those who can move from those who cannot move, I also point to the 
role of different migratory aspirations. Not unlike my informants in Eritrea, those 
willing to undertake high-risk migration seemed to share a hierarchy of possi-
ble destinations, but others preferred to wait in refugee camps until they could 
return to their homeland. Second, I describe the daily challenges of urban refugees 
in Addis Ababa and Khartoum and show how emotional pressure to leave at all 
costs led many of my informants, even the most indecisive, to take the decision to 
move onward.
THE RUSH TO DEPARTURE 
December was a month of preparation and departures in the camps. Many were 
waiting for the end of European winter. Several houses in the peripheral areas of 
the camps had been left deserted, and those refugees left behind were relocating 
toward the center of the settlement close to the hospital, schools, and places of 
entertainment. Reaching Khartoum in January–February was believed to be ideal 
for organizing the next step of the journey. Among my informants in the camp, 
several were negotiating with their relatives abroad to make sure they would sup-
port their journeys; others were asking around the camp to find the cheapest and 
most trusted middleman. At night big trucks destined to be loaded with migrants 
traversed the dusty roads of the Adi Harush and Mai Aini refugee camps.4
Shimelba, Mai Aini, Adi Harush, and Hitstats are the four main camps where 
Eritreans end up in Ethiopia after crossing the troubled, heavily militarized border 
(map 4). After a few months in Addis Ababa trying to get permission, ARRA, the 
government Agency for Refugees and Returnees Affairs, finally authorized me to 
visit these camps around the area of Shire. Juggling between my previously estab-
lished informal contacts among Eritreans in the camps and the need to comply 
Figure 6. Shimelba, the oldest Eritrean refugee camp in Ethiopia (photo by the author, 2013)
Figure 7. A barbershop in Hintsats camp (photo by the author, 2013)
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with the formal requirements of ARRA (see Appendix), I spent a month observing, 
interviewing, and sharing some of the daily life of the refugees in the four camps.5
Located in an extremely hot, dry, and remote region, these camps were certainly 
challenging environments for settlement, but they were not necessarily worse off 
than the surrounding areas. Living conditions, infrastructure, and service could 
vary significantly among the camps, depending on the number of agencies active 
in the camp, humanitarian investments, and the date the camp had been estab-
lished.6 However, these camps, veritably big towns,7 were usually relatively well 
served in terms of schooling and health status and health provisions and were 
blossoming with small business (informal banks, food stores, hairdressers) and 
recreational activities (cinemas, bars, and restaurants) established by refugees 
themselves. Safety was also not an issue there.8 Yet the inhabitants of these camps, 
with the exception of those in Shimelba, strongly desired to move on to other des-
tinations—mostly in Europe, the United States or Canada.9
The insufficiency of the rations, lack of monetary assistance, and the exhausting 
search for firewood were constant challenges there.10 The crucial problem, however, 
was getting out of the camps and working. They had to seek permission to exit the 
camp, and employment was in any case limited and mostly irregular.11 Many engaged 
in different livelihood activities, such as breeding animals, farming the land, work-
ing as daily laborers in the camp surroundings, setting up small businesses, and 
serving humanitarian organizations as interpreters, community workers, or teach-
ers. However, what they earned only covered basic subsistence and did not allow 
them to help their families back home; nor did it provide them with the means to 
construct a viable future for themselves and their children outside the camp.
“What is the difference between dying slowly here in camps,” said Jacob, a 
twenty-six-year-old engineering graduate in Adi Harush. “Or dying while cross-
ing the sea? If we have to die, it is better to do it trying to reach Europe rather than 
wasting time here far away from our homes and without the possibility of con-
structing a future!” As the camp population mostly consisted of young, entrepre-
neurial men,12 sometimes with university-level educations, it is easy to understand 
how, in their eyes, a life in the camp was untenable.
Refugees there felt stuck in a condition of social liminality—unable to fulfil 
family obligations as well as cut off from a recognized social status among their 
peers, families, and the society at large. Jacob’s association of a life in camp with a 
“slow death” reflects the concept of social death discussed in chapter 1 with respect 
to my informants who felt left behind in Eritrea. Not unlike them, my respondents 
in the camps perceived themselves as immobile in time and space, caught in a 
meaningless loop of daily activities and constraints, which did not allow them to 
help their families, become adults, and realize their dreams.
As local integration is restricted, and repatriation sounds to the majority like a 
remote and unappealing solution, most individuals in the camps strongly desire 
to be included in a resettlement program. But this option is only for a few. In 2013, 
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Figure 8. Cinema in Adi Harush camp (photo by the author, 2013)
Figure 9. Hintsats, the most recently established camp (photo by the author, 2013)
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according to the UNHCR officers I interviewed in Shire, only 850 individuals were 
resettled—less than 1 percent of the Eritrean refugees in the country. This is in line 
with international resettlement rates.13 Refugees are usually referred for resettle-
ment only if they had been in the camp for over ten years or if they can be included 
in the category of especially vulnerable cases according to UNHCR guidelines.14 
Given these poor odds, many refugees were planning to resort to smugglers with 
the financial backing of relatives in the diaspora. Without their resources, migra-
tion to Europe is mostly unattainable.15 Relatives’ help is secured by transnational 
moral economies, which prescribe that those who are abroad support their left-
behind kin. Migration is one of the main cases in which this support is required, 
and the determination of young Eritreans to move no matter the risks compels 
even unwilling helpers to comply with it. The availability of transnational family 
networks is thus crucial to understand who can and who cannot move from the 
first country of asylum. The large Eritrean diaspora explains why Eritreans have 
been able to migrate more than other refugee groups.
Many resided in camps only for the time needed to organize their trips to Libya. 
Almost all of the respondents in the small survey (of twenty-six households) I 
conducted in Adi Harush to investigate secondary movement expressed a desire 
to migrate onward.16 The others simply seemed too helpless to express an opinion 
at all. Those who mentioned the United States and Canada were usually men and 
women who hoped to get there through some kind of family reunification visa 
or resettlement. The ones who answered Europe—usually young single men set 
to depart soon—mainly referred to Norway and Sweden as intended final des-
tinations.17 These were perceived as particularly favorable for refugees in terms 
of social assistance and prospects for employment. Southern European countries, 
like Italy, were never mentioned and nobody seemed to consider a life anywhere in 
Ethiopia, even outside the camp, as a possible long-term solution.
Although most people I met seemed to aim to move on as soon as possible, 
strategies could also differ depending on the gender of my interviewees. Female-
headed households often included more than one family, as women tended to assist 
each other in childcare and to share the few resources they had. These women had 
often given birth either shortly before or shortly after arriving in the camp. They 
were usually waiting for reunification with their husbands who had left the camp 
trying to reach Europe. It was a common strategy among refugee families to diver-
sify migration options.18
Not unlike my young informants in Eritrea, the young refugees whom I inter-
viewed in camps shared a hierarchical vision of the world. Their desires to move 
to some countries instead of others mirrored their classification of places and their 
inhabitants along a ladder of legal stability, developmental achievements, moral 
worth, and socioeconomic prospects. Rather than seeing them in the context of a 
generalized “culture of migration,” we can better understand their aspirations by 
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referring to the idea of cosmologies of destinations, which allows us to consider 
the specific imaginaries and moral prescriptions attached to different destinations. 
The desire for mobility did not target the “West” in general, but rather specific 
locations within it.
Onward migration was an omnipresent topic of discussion and a pervasive 
practice in the camps. The households of young male refugees in particular seemed 
characterized by a continually shifting population. In Abraha’s hut, for example, 
everyone wanted to leave soon. One of my refugee friends in Addis Ababa had 
given me Abraha’s phone number and asked him to take care of me during my stay. 
After a tour of the camp facilities, he took me to his mud house. His housemates 
were four men in their late twenties and early thirties, coming from Segeneiti, a 
Catholic town in southern Eritrea. One of them was lying in the bed trembling 
with high fever due to malaria—which was endemic in the camps—but the other 
three spent some time chatting with me.
Mascio was around thirty years old. He had been in Sudan before and then tried 
to reach Israel, but on the border he was caught by Egyptian police and impris-
oned for four months before being sent to Ethiopia. When I met him, he told me 
that he was tired of waiting in the camp: after a year and seven months there, it was 
time for him to try his luck again. This time he wanted to reach Europe. Jeremy, the 
other housemate, had a sister and a brother in Norway. He was waiting for them to 
send him money to cross the Mediterranean, and in the meantime he was breed-
ing a small family of goats, which kept peeking through the front door. Abraha 
had relatives abroad, too: a brother in Canada who was going to sponsor him and 
a sister who had just moved from Italy to Switzerland in search for better oppor-
tunities. After being in the camp for over a year, Abraha did not seem willing to 
wait longer for his siblings to take action. A few months later I discovered that he 
had started his journey to Norway through Sudan. The stories of Mascio, Jeremy, 
and Abraha mirrored a widespread determination to move regardless of the risks. 
Often this determination emerged from a deeply felt obligation to left-behind kin 
who were waiting for their economic support. 
Movements out of the camp were continual, but this does not mean that many 
individuals had not been in the camps for very long time. In Shimelba, the oldest 
Eritrean camp in Ethiopia, I met men and women who had been living there for 
over ten years, hoping to be resettled for lack of alternatives. Also in Adi Harush 
I met many refugees who had been there since the establishment of the camp in 
2010. Of the 26 households I interviewed, three said they could not go anywhere, 
because they did not have relatives abroad to pay for their journey. Their liveli-
hood strategies in the camp were evidently different from those who were not 
planning to stay long. They strove to be self-reliant. One of them, for example, was 
raising chickens to sell to the local market to support his young wife and baby; 
another family had set up a tea shop in the camp. Many of them were from poor 
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rural areas in southern Eritrea, not far from the Ethiopian border. It is likely that 
their journeys to Ethiopia had not been very expensive.
This brings back the issue of forced immobility. Lacking resources, longtime 
residents in camps, the most deprived of all, could not even afford to live in Addis 
Ababa. They had no other choice but to hope that a resettlement officer would 
consider their cases. Having been obliged to flee Eritrea, they were now obliged 
to stay in Ethiopia, forming “trapped populations.”19 However, not everybody had 
been obliged to remain. Some had chosen to do so.
THOSE WHO CHO OSE TO STAY:  THE CASE 
OF THE KUNAMAS
Most scholars emphasize how legal constraints, deprivation, and limited social 
resources lead to immobility among refugee and migrant populations. However, 
even in the most extreme situations, such as those of refugees in camps, one should 
not simply assume that everyone would like to migrate on. Sometimes, immobility 
can be a choice, reflecting personal aspirations and communal moral values. In 
the context of Eritrean migration, the Kunama ethnic minority from Shimelba is a 
significant counterpart to those who would do anything to move on.
In 2006, the United States offered to resettle around 6,000 Eritreans from 
Shimelba. The Kunama ethnic minority was the target group. Ethnically perse-
cuted in Eritrea,20 they closely fit the definition of refugees according to the 1951 
Geneva Convention. However, something completely unforeseen happened: more 
than half of the Kunamas—2,800 out of 4,000—refused to be resettled, declar-
ing that they preferred to stay in the camp, waiting to go home as soon as Eritrea 
became a peaceful place again. Eritreans from other ethnic backgrounds—mostly 
Tigrinya, the largest ethnic group in Eritrea—started to be resettled instead. When 
I reached the camp in December 2013, the population of the camp (about six thou-
sand) consisted mainly of Kunamas who had refused resettlement, recent arriv-
als, and a small number of Tigrinyas whose resettlement cases had been rejected 
or delayed.
I was quite puzzled when I found out about the rate of refusals among the 
Kunama refugees. Hitherto I had only met Eritreans—mostly Christian Tigrin-
yas—who were trying their best to get out of Ethiopia and in the absence of a 
resettlement case or a family visa, they were ready to embark on dangerous border 
crossings. Why, then, did Kunamas refuse the opportunity to be resettled? My 
encounters with refugees, NGO workers, and UNHCR officers in Shimelba helped 
me to figure out some of the main factors behind this unprecedented response.
My Kunama translator for the occasion was Noah, the twenty-six-year-old son 
of Bartholomeus, an evangelical preacher.21 His religious activity as well as his 
refusal to give up his land to Tigrinya settlers had made him and his family a target 
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of Eritrean authorities. Noah’s mother was the only member of the family who had 
stayed back home, and Noah and his brother were both in the camp waiting for 
resettlement. They, unlike other Kunamas, believed that resettlement to the United 
States was the best option. This had put them in conflict with other members of the 
community who discouraged resettlement. Their huts had been set on fire more 
than once, and the father always secretly traveled from Shire, Shimelba, and Addis 
Ababa so as not to become an easy target or endanger his family.
Among those who opposed Kunamas’ resettlement in the camp, there was the 
Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Eritrean Kunamas (DMLEK), an 
opposition front active in Shimelba since the early 2000s. DMLEK had depended 
on the population of the camp for taxes and recruits, and group resettlement was 
a serious threat to its existence. Its militants had therefore spread the rumor that 
those going to the United States would be badly treated and sold as slaves. To 
reinforce the fear of America, the 1970s TV series Roots—narrating the misad-
ventures of Kunta Kinte, an African slave in America—was screened in the camp. 
Moreover, Kjetil Tronvoll and Daniel Mekonnen, who were present in the camp in 
2008, reported on DMLEK’s recurrent threats.22
DMLEK was evidently not alone in fiercely opposing the Kunamas’ reset-
tlement, however. While doing my fieldwork in Shimelba, I was secretively 
informed by some of my informants that I should be careful about inquiring 
too deeply into the resettlement issues. According to them, some local officers 
were selling the identities of Kunama refugees accepted for resettlement to 
Ethiopian nationals.
Aside from the above pressures, other sources reported that Kunamas were 
scared of resettlement because of their unfamiliarity with urban living. The 
department responsible for cultural training in the resettlement program since 
2007, noted that many Kunamas were “not familiar with most modern ameni-
ties, they have a fear of the apartments in which they’ll live in the United States. 
Most specifically, they have a fear of fires in these apartments.” Last, but not least, 
many of the Kunamas had left loved ones in Eritrea, and going to the United States 
would put an insurmountable distance between them. Resettlement was perceived 
as treason to their family members and community traditions. Old people were 
usually more determined in their decision to stay, and their younger relatives did 
not want to leave them behind.
Nana, an old Kunama lady whom I met in Shimelba, told me she had no inter-
est in going to the United States, shaking her head. She and her family came from 
Bimbinna, a conglomerate of villages on the southern side of the Gash River. They 
had fled to Ethiopia in 2000 because of the war, she said, but her sisters had stayed 
behind. She was receiving remittances from her two sons in the United States, but 
she was not interested in going there. Many other Kunamas repeatedly said they 
did not want to resettle because part of their family was still in Eritrea. This was 
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especially the case for those who reached Ethiopia in 2000 and had since then 
started to rebuild their lives in the camp.23
Older Kunamas’ attitudes to migration were embedded in a completely 
different cosmology of destinations to that of the refugees I had met before. 
The United States was not considered an attractive place, but rather a place 
to be scared of, precisely because of its modernity and distance from the cultural 
and material world with which Kunamas were familiar. The return to the homeland, 
on the other hand, was portrayed as the only desirable way ahead. The homeland 
was the repository of positive values, and return there was felt as a moral obligation.
Besides having less historical exposure to international migration in compari-
son with the urbanized Tigrinya population, Kunamas tended to have a stronger 
relationship with the land, like most indigenous people around the world.24 As the 
Kunama scholar Alexander Naty has showed, Kunamas’ religious and cultural life 
is rooted in the landscape of southwestern Eritrea.25 Without falling into unneces-
sary cultural reifications or wanting to fix people’s identity in a specific place, it 
seems undeniable that the strong relationship between people and their land is 
also crucial in analyzing their aspirations to migrate elsewhere.26
Just as the Hutus studied by Liisa Malkki in Tanzanian refugee camps rejected 
local integration to preserve their long-term dream of returning to Burundi,27 
Kunamas also refused resettlement in order not to give up their imagined future 
Figure 10. Kunama refugees threshing teff (Eragrostis abyssinica) in Shimelba camp (photo 
by the author, 2013)
62    Hypermobile and Immobile
at home. Not unlike the Hutus, they felt that migration would contribute to the 
loss of their “identity,” the bundle of memories, practices, and relationships that 
connected them with the natural landscape and social fabric of their homeland. 
However, things had started changing for them too.
SONS AGAINST FATHERS:  EMERGING 
GENER ATIONAL DIVIDES 
Although most Kunamas had refused to resettle in 2008, I quickly realized while 
in the camp that many had changed their minds. Those Kunamas who were only 
children at the time of the group resettlement proposal were now young men and 
women eager to move to the United States in spite of their parents’ opinions. How-
ever, resettlement is a family process, and these generational differences were gen-
erating many tensions within families. Often young Kunamas remained stuck in 
the camp because their cases had been frozen because one of their parents having 
refused the resettlement in the first place.
A tall, shy-looking young boy sat down close to me while I was interviewing 
a group of Kunama men. I did not even notice him until Noah said, “Why don’t 
you talk to him? His story is interesting; you should listen to him.” Jambo lived in 
a poor hut with his three sisters, his aunt, her boyfriend, and her children. Jambo’s 
mother had died, and he did not have a good relationship with his father, so the 
aunt had taken care of him since childhood. She came to greet us holding and 
nursing her baby. We sat in front of the hut, and Jambo started telling me how 
eager he was to go to the United States. The problem was that his aunt and his 
father had refused resettlement at first and their family case had been archived as 
a rejection. Even though Jambo was now nineteen, his case was linked with his 
father’s case, who was still determined not to leave the camp.
Jambo’s story was not an exception in the camp; rather it was the instance of 
a common conundrum, which the UNHCR resettlement unit had a hard time 
solving. In UNHCR’s perspective, family unity is a principle to be protected—the 
opportunity for resettlement should not become the cause of family disintegra-
tion. For this reason, the group resettlement in 2008 was organized through fam-
ily cases. However, the refusal to resettle as well as different positions inside the 
nuclear family had not been anticipated in UNHCR operations, and even now, 
many cases remain frozen.
Aside from their practical—and tragic—implications, Kunamas’ shifting atti-
tudes to resettlement can be interpreted as an instance of how migration pro-
gressively comes to be seen as an appropriate livelihood strategy in a community 
with little previous experience of it. Due both to exposure to processes of cultural 
circulation and progressive estrangement from the homeland, young Kunamas 
were gradually developing a preference for migrating on rather than waiting for an 
unlikely return back home. The feedback of the pioneers who accepted the reset-
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tlement, the impact of their remittances in the lives of those left in the camp, and 
the wider exposure of the young generations to Western lifestyles had inevitably 
transformed the projects of many. Instead of going back to a home that they have 
almost forgotten or never even seen, most young Kunamas are now searching for 
a home elsewhere. Unlike their Tigrinya counterparts, however, those Kunamas I 
encountered were not ready to pursue migration at all costs.
I often asked those among the Kunamas who were interested in migration if 
they had ever thought about reaching Europe irregularly. Their usual reaction was 
a bewildered look, as if I had asked something ridiculous. “It is illegal, we cannot 
do it,” one of them told me. Another man in his thirties, who had been telling me 
how desperate he was to leave the camp, said: “It is very dangerous! Don’t you 
know that people die in these journeys?” These answers were surprising to me, 
since for the other Eritreans, illicit migration was almost a given. No matter the 
dangers or the legal implications, other Eritrean refugees living in similar condi-
tions as the Kunamas in Shimelba were ready to run all risks to reach Europe. 
Irregular—undocumented—onward migration28 was common, almost the norm 
in all the camps, with the exception of Shimelba. What determined such a differ-
ence between these groups?
Part of the answer lies in the different structure of opportunities available to 
Kunamas. While Tigrinyas had a well-established network of relatives abroad to 
support their journeys, and a large number of friends and acquaintances along the 
way to Europe, Kunamas’ family and ethnic networks were less developed in the 
Figure 11. Resettlement board in Shimelba (photo by the author, 2013)
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diaspora.29 Moreover, only a few Kunamas had the financial means to move for-
ward by themselves, and they were not familiar with the idea of doing so. It seemed 
that, in spite of the emergence of a new desire to migrate among the younger gen-
erations, mobility at all costs had not (yet) become the norm for them, unlike for 
other Eritreans I had previously met. Perhaps mobility based on a cosmology of 
destinations may emerge as a second phase after the diffusion of a more general 
culture of migration. While in the latter, mobility is a widespread orientation, it 
is not yet perceived as a moral duty. My research in urban areas of the Ethiopian 
and Sudanese capitals aimed at exploring the normative aspect of mobility among 
those who are determined to leave at all costs.
SEEKING WAYS OUT FROM ADDIS 
ABABA AND KHARTOUM
Refugees in Ethiopia and Sudan—the main recipient countries up today—officially 
have no freedom of movement or right to work outside the camps, but there are 
large urban refugee populations in both Addis Ababa and Khartoum.30 According 
to official UNHCR statistics, there were 3,500 Eritreans in Addis Ababa in 2014.31 
Roughly 2,500 participated in the Ethiopian government “out-of-camp” scheme, 
many of them students at Ethiopian universities.32 Besides these registered urban 
refugees, there were also many other Eritrean refugees living in the city. Some, 
after six months in the camp, could obtain permission to stay in Addis to follow 
up on their visa application, while others had short-term permission to visit their 
relatives. Many simply stayed in the city without permission.33
The situation in Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, is similar. Since the late 1970s, 
Khartoum has hosted a substantial population of both Ethiopians and Eritreans 
(around 33,000 in 1981 according to Ahmed Karadawi).34 According to official 
UNHCR statistics, there were around 20,000 Eritrean refugees in Khartoum in 
2014.35 The actual number is probably much higher, considering the number of 
individuals who do not register with UNHCR or the Sudanese government’s Com-
missioner of Refugees (COR).36 A continuous flow of people leave Sudanese camps 
to settle in the city on their own—either to work or to look for migration oppor-
tunities. Unlike Ethiopia, Sudan does not have any out-of-camp policy and the 
only refugees allowed to live outside the camp are those who are vulnerable and 
included in the UNHCR protection program. All the others who live in the city 
usually have no legal right to reside there.
Although in Khartoum as well as in Addis Ababa I interviewed a wide variety 
of stakeholders, ranging from diplomatic officers to United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees and the International Organisation of Migration work-
ers, I spent most of my time hanging out with Eritreans in different settings of 
the two cities. My first contact in Addis Ababa was with an Eritrean nun I had 
known since my first visit in the country in 2011. Originally from the village of 
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Mai Nefas, Sister Kudussan had been living in Addis Ababa for over twenty years. 
Unable to return home because of wars and diplomatic tension, she was stuck in 
a country she had had been brought up to hate. She managed a convent and its 
associated breeding farm on the periphery of the city. When I went to meet her, 
I soon realized that her convent had become a meeting point for young, usu-
ally Catholic, refugees from Mai Nefas and the surrounding villages. Many of 
them were waiting for their family reunification visas so as to be reunited with 
their husbands or wives. The convent thus became one of the main places where 
I could meet young refugees and participate with them in religious festivities or 
simple coffee ceremonies.
In parallel, I used to hang out with a group of Eritrean students from the 
University of Addis Ababa. Most of them in their late twenties or early thirties 
saw few prospects of remaining in the country. Their Ethiopian degree was 
in fact not enough to allow them access to the regular labor market. Among 
them was Adonay, a twenty-eight-year-old philosophy student, whose story I 
tell later.
In January—after my research in the camps—I moved to Mebrat Haile, one of 
the neighborhoods most inhabited by Eritreans in Addis, with Violetta, who had 
been a practicing physician in Eritrea before escaping with her uncle, Gaim, to 
Ethiopia. Overwhelmed by the work conditions, Violetta had managed to con-
vince her uncle, who was a soldier in the border area, to escape. She was hoping to 
get a sponsor visa from a relative in Canada. When I met her in November, she was 
twenty-seven and living with her uncle in a one-room flat in Mebrat Haile. Her 
uncle was soon to leave for Khartoum, however, and she was happy to share the 
rent with me for a few months. Violetta became not just my flat mate but a valuable 
informant and a friend. Smart and fluent in English, Violetta was my translator in 
several occasions (see Appendix).
Our neighborhood was filled with Eritrean refugees. Many of them just man-
aged small internet points or pool rooms; others were just living there waiting for 
the opportunity to move on. Our time was marked by house visits to our neigh-
bors and friends. Many people I knew lived there: Alazar’s family had recently 
moved there, other friends and relatives of those I had met in Eritrea and Italy 
were also staying there. Even members of some of the families I had met in Adi 
Harush waved to me on the streets.
In March, many of my informants from Eritrea and Ethiopia moved to Khartoum, 
and I decided to follow them. For example, Hagos, the spokesman for the group 
of Eritrean refugees at Sister Kudussan’s convent, moved with his cousin to Aljiraf, 
a neighborhood in Khartoum traditionally populated by Eritreans. Lwam had left 
and reached Sudan in that period, and Violetta’s uncle was there working as a badjaj 
(three-wheel taxi) driver. However, not all of them seemed keen to meet me again. 
Lwam did not contact me and I did not manage to meet Violetta’s uncle, despite my 
efforts to do so. I believe that the reason why they avoided meeting me was not per-
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sonal antipathy, but rather the fear that I might somehow disturb their plans to move 
on. Lwam, for example, contacted me only when she had safely reached Germany. 
Maybe they thought that, being in touch with their families, I might reveal their plan 
to leave the country to their relatives and make them worry. Maybe they believed that 
I would have tried to persuade them not to undertake that journey.
In Khartoum, I lived with Maria, a twenty-eight-year-old Eritrean and her 
eight-year-old child, Anna, in a house shared with other four Eritrean families 
in the Jabah area in March–April 2014. Violetta had explained to Maria that I was 
a researcher, asking if she could help me to settle in the city. She guaranteed that 
I was a decent flatmate with no special expectations and that I could help with 
the house expenses, so Maria generously accepted me. Maria had lived for several 
years in Addis Ababa before recently moving to Khartoum. As she told me, one 
of the main reasons she had left Ethiopia was because Anna’s father was cheating 
on her. Her departure to Khartoum, however, was only thought as a temporary 
step on the path to further destinations. I spent most of my time with Maria, her 
neighbors and friends from Asmara.
Along with Eritreans, in both cities I had friends among the locals who helped 
me with the practicalities of life in a new country. I often tended to mix my 
Eritrean and local networks while going out in the evening or spending some 
leisure time together. This was for me a natural way of dealing with people who 
were close to me, but often these interactions gave rise to conflicts that I did 
not at first anticipate. The interactions between refugees and locals that I cre-
Figure 12. Mebrat Haile: an Eritrean neighborhood in Addis Ababa (photo by the author, 2014)
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ated with my presence in the field, however, allowed me to grasp some of deep-
rooted mistrust and prejudices that separate Eritrean refugees from Sudanese 
and Ethiopians.
Although Khartoum and Addis Ababa present different challenges and 
opportunities for Eritrean refugees, in both places I found a constant desire to 
move on among my informants. As I show in the following section, this desire to 
move onwards is certainly the result of both the limited access to the local labor 
market, and the need to attain some kind of legal existential stability. However, 
the drive to migrate further also emerges from deep-rooted moral obligations 
toward left-behind family members and the imaginaries surrounding destina-
tion countries. These are continually reproduced in the relatively segregated 
places inhabited by Eritrean refugees in these two cities and generate a sort of 
collective effervescence, which provides fertile ground for embarking on danger-
ous border crossings.
ROUND-UPS AND THE RISK OF DEPENDENCY: 
C ONTINUIT Y OF LIFE STRUGGLES BEFORE 
AND AFTER EXILE 
After a three-hour Sunday mass, Maria and I found ourselves in the middle of a 
police round-up. We were just coming out of the Catholic Church of St. Peter and 
Paul in the center of Khartoum. Suddenly, the crowd started to get agitated. “There 
are policemen ready to take us when we exit the church,” murmured an old woman 
with eyes full of fear. “They have already taken someone.” Maria started to become 
nervous. “I cannot come to church anymore. It is too dangerous . . . now what do 
we do?” Some refugees were organizing a hamjad—a minivan—to pick them up 
at the entrance of the church. I went out to look for a hamjad to avoid the risk of 
Maria and Anna being arrested, and we got home safely.
In Khartoum, police round-ups are common and especially feared by refugees. 
Those who are apprehended without papers—but sometimes also those who have 
papers—are incarcerated, usually blackmailed in exchange for money and, some-
times, returned to camps. Eritreans call these round-ups geffa, the same word used 
to identify the round-ups in Eritrea to catch draft-dodgers. The need to run from 
police and authorities is one main element of continuity in the lives of Eritreans 
before and after their migration.
Round-ups were certainly among the top reasons why life in Sudan was con-
sidered unsafe and undesirable by my informants. They often told me of run-ins 
with Sudanese police and their attempts to pass unnoticed in order not to be 
harassed. “To be unnoticed” mainly entailed for men not to wander alone at night 
in unknown places, not to drink too much, and to follow the Muslim dress code 
(long sleeves and long trousers). For women, it meant wearing a long, black jel-
labiah (traditional Muslim dress) and head scarf as local women do.
68    Hypermobile and Immobile
Police controls were less common in Addis Ababa. However, while I was there 
in November 2013, my informants told me that the Ethiopian police were knock-
ing on doors in Mebrat Haile to check refugees’ permissions to be out of the camp. 
These controls were probably a consequence of rioting in the Tigray camps a few 
weeks before.37 And even so, living an “unnoticed life” was easier for Eritreans in 
Ethiopia. Not only is Tigrinya spoken in Ethiopia, but Tigrinya Eritreans resemble 
most Ethiopian highlanders (Amharas, Tigriyans, and Oromos) and have both 
their religion and cultural elements such as food and traditional clothing in com-
mon with them.
Besides avoiding authorities, the biggest problem for those living in cities was 
dependence on relatives abroad. Once they leave the camp, refugees are usually 
not entitled to any assistance. UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations pro-
vide only limited support to a small number of refugees considered to be in special 
need. Thus, many Eritreans I met had to rely on their relatives’ help for their daily 
living expenses. This was especially true in Addis Ababa, where finding work was 
harder. For example, Violetta had an uncle in Denmark paying her rent and send-
ing her some money every two months. Likewise, Alazar’s family received regular 
support from Minia’s sons in Israel and Canada. My informants who were students 
at Addis Ababa University would have not been able to survive without the assis-
tance of some relatives abroad, even if they received a small allowance and did not 
have to pay for tuition and accommodation.
Protracted dependence on relatives abroad was perceived as shameful, espe-
cially by young men, who acquire a status depending on their ability to provide for 
others. Like those young Eritreans stuck back home, the young refugees I met in 
Addis Ababa and Khartoum felt caught in a condition of socioeconomic, genera-
tional, and existential immobility.
Obtaining work in Ethiopia was generally deemed hard among refugees. Gov-
ernment control was tight and employers often asked for ID cards before hiring. 
Eritreans who could speak Amharic, or who had relatives or other connections in 
Addis Ababa, were more successful in finding work. Self-employment was toler-
ated and internet cafes and pool rooms managed by Eritreans kept popping up in 
Mebrat Haile during the months I spent there.
Although Khartoum was probably considered less safe, the job market seemed 
more accessible for refugees there. In Sudan, it was usual to find Eritreans employed 
as waiters, cleaners, and cooks. Many of them managed restaurants and other 
businesses in the name of a Sudanese national in the area of Jiref and Aldeim—his-
torical Habesha neighborhoods in Khartoum. Some of Maria’s neighbors worked 
in factories and workshops, while others owned rickshaws or minivans used as 
taxis. The Eritrean women I met—Maria too, for a short period—were employed 
as domestic workers.38
In spite of the challenging environment, these instances of informal integration 
and, at times, successful businesses illustrate that alternatives to onward mobility 
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do exist. However, even those among my informants who seemed to do okay in 
Addis and Khartoum felt obliged to embark on life-threatening journeys to reach 
Europe rather than investing more in their present lives there.
Families back home were worried if their sons and daughters were in Ethio-
pia or Sudan. The refugees themselves perceive themselves in transit and those 
relatives abroad—like my informants in Italy—felt the pressure of helping them 
get to Europe or other developed countries. I used to insist with my closest 
Eritrean friends, like Maria and Adonay, that life in Addis Ababa and Khartoum 
was not so bad after all. Even if the challenges were many, I thought that it was 
worth looking for an informal job and starting a new life there, since options for 
leaving the country were either too risky or not accessible, but they believed that 
there had been no point in leaving Eritrea only to end up staying in Ethiopia 
or Sudan.
IMAGINING THE FIRST WORLD FROM A MALL 
IN KHARTOUM
Anna, Maria’s eight-year-old daughter, had been impatient the whole day. Her 
mother was at work and I had been left to take care of her. “When is mom coming 
back?” Anna kept asking me. “Are we going to Afra?” Afra was a huge modern 
mall, not far from Khartoum international airport. Anna had never been there and 
probably had no idea of what it was, but from the way it had been presented to her, 
it sounded like a good place. During the day she had been boasting with the other 
children in the compound, “I am getting ready to go to Afra today . . . Milena and I 
will go there in the afternoon. You don’t know what Afra is? Really?!!? Ahaha!” The 
other small children looked at her with their mouths open in admiration.
Afra was an oasis in the desert. The building, sheathed in shiny black glass, 
resembled an Arabic royal palace built of pinkish stone and surrounded by palms 
and fountains. Inside, vivid signs touted expensive shops selling international 
luxury goods. To pass from one floor to the other, we had to use the big escala-
tors. It was Maria’s first time on the escalator. “Anna nei—come! Give me your 
hand! Milena hold me, please!” Maria pleaded in a frightened voice. Our common 
friend, Michael, led us to a kind of pizza hut for dinner. We all ordered food, but 
Anna was too excited to eat; she wanted to go and play in the recreation room 
that she could see on the corner. After the pizza we ran around after Anna in the 
recreation room, full of trampolines and big inflatable balloons. “It’s the first time 
I’ve seen Anna so happy,” Maria said.
When we finally managed to drag Anna out, night had fallen on the city and 
the bright colors of the mall lights hid Khartoum’s poverty. Maria exclaimed jok-
ingly: “Oh! This is Italy, not Sudan! Afra is Italy and we have been to Italy today!” 
Michael then cynically pointed out the poor surroundings of the mall: “but all 
around us is still Sudan . . . ”
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Maria’s ingenuous image of Italy—I believe she mentioned it more than another 
European country only for the sake of pleasing me—cannot certainly be general-
ized. Imaginaries are intrinsically and above all personal representations, although 
they also reflect collective views of reality.39 In this case, Maria’s association of the 
mall with Italy reflected an imaginary widely extant among many of my infor-
mants in Ethiopia and Sudan. Similar to what has been documented in African 
and other contexts, the mall, as the prototypical symbol of consumption, has come 
to represent modernity as a complex bundle of political and social freedom, tech-
nological advancement, and happiness.40 In Maria’s cosmology, the mall was a 
crucial feature of life in Europe, and she saw it as being somehow out of place in 
Sudan, a country which she despised for its lack of freedom, its dirtiness, its reli-
gious distance, and poverty. 
Once home, while braiding Anna’s hair before going to sleep, Maria ener-
getically told her: “Anna, pray to our beloved sweet Jesus Christ, pray that one 
day you, Milena and I can all go to Italy .  .  . always pray, never forget it, ok? 
Good girl!” But there was never enough money, and Maria was also scared of 
the risks along the journey. However, the thought of providing a better future 
for Anna tormented her day and night. Her exhausting search for a way ahead, 
however, emerged not only from a desire for modernity, but also from a social 
milieu characterized by high levels of self-segregation, and socioeconomic and 
cultural homogeneity.
STICKING TO GETHER .   .   . 
All of the dwelling arrangements I visited, whether in Addis Ababa or Khar-
toum, mirrored Eritreans’ perception of being in transit, and their need to con-
solidate and build up their social resources by living together with their com-
patriots. Urban refugees tend to concentrate in the same neighborhoods and 
share accommodation among themselves. However, the areas inhabited by my 
informants were not ghettos: they were not especially destitute neighborhoods, 
and they were populated by refugees and locals alike. For example, Mebrat Haile, 
where I used to live in a one-room flat with Violetta, was a lower-middle-class 
neighborhood. It covered a whole valley with huge grey condominiums, which, 
by local standards, are modern, desirable accommodation. Most Eritrean ref-
ugees I met lived there, along with Ethiopians. Several groups of four or five 
shared a one-room flat with a single toilet, while others stayed in cheaper accom-
modation in other areas.
In Khartoum, the neighborhood where I lived with Maria and her child was 
mostly inhabited by Sudanese (but we also had several Eritrean neighbors) and 
was not particularly deprived. Other Eritreans lived in the traditional Habesha 
area of Aldaim or around Aljiraf and Al-Shafa, where there had been Eritrean 
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schools for refugee children since the 1980s and there were now recreational cen-
ters. Although our neighbors were mainly locals, our compound was exclusively 
inhabited by Eritrean refugees. A couple who worked in a soap factory by day and 
made sandals at night lived in front of Maria and Anna’s one-room apartment. 
Istifanos, the husband, had managed to collect enough money to reach Sweden in 
June, while his wife waited for him to send her the reunification visa. Thirty-year-
old Jennah and her two children lived behind us, waiting for reunification visas to 
join the father in Sweden. In front of Jennah lived an old woman with her silent 
sixteen-year-old nephew, who moved to Libya in less than a month. Finally, next 
to Istifanos’s room, there was Haile’s extended family. Most of them were waiting 
for family reunification visas to join their partners in Canada. and the others were 
looking for options to follow them.
Other refugee houses that I visited in the city were also socioeconomically and 
ethnically homogeneous. These enclaves were not only emerging from the need 
to support each other in a challenging environment. They were also the result of 
mistrust between Eritreans and local populations. Interethnic relations between 
Eritreans, Sudanese, and Ethiopians are embedded in a decades-long history of 
power imbalances, religious diversity, and political and national conflicts. It is cru-
cial to gain insights into the stereotypes that characterize those relations in order 
to understand Eritrean views on Sudan and Ethiopia and why they do not repre-
sent viable destinations.
Figure 13. Typical Eritrean accommodation in Khartoum (photo by the author, 2014)
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.   .   .  WHILE DISTRUSTING OTHERS
Many of the Eritrean refugees I met all throughout my fieldwork depicted Ethio-
pians as lazy, cowardly, and uneducated, often referring to them as Agame, peo-
ple from northern Ethiopia who used to work as low-status laborers in Eritrea 
in the past.41 These stereotypes were created in opposition to self-representations 
of Eritreans as loyal, hard-working, brave, and educated. In issues concerning 
refugee procedures and associated complications, Ethiopians were often described 
as corrupt, envious of Eritreans and of the possibility of their being resettled else-
where. Although commonalities with Ethiopian highlanders are acknowledged, as 
denoted by the self-denomination Habesha,42 the social distance between the two 
groups seems wide. This becomes evident when looking at the perception of a suit-
able marriage: for many, having a daughter marry an Ethiopian would be a great 
misfortune. This is a concern especially because, in Tigrinya patrilineal society, 
children will take the name, the nationality, and their ethnic belonging from the 
paternal lineage.
Conversely, Eritreans were mostly depicted as conceited and arrogant by Ethio-
pians, who treated them with a paternalistic attitude. Violetta often had to endure 
comments from my Ethiopian friends, who, while intending to show their solidar-
ity to her as an Eritrean sister, somehow insulted her pride. One of the first things 
they would say after they discovered she was Eritrean, was: “Oh you are our sister; 
Eritreans and Ethiopians are the same people, it is just because of dirty politics 
that we are separated and your people are suffering.” Although this was meant to 
be friendly, it did not sound quite that way to Violetta, proud as she was, like most 
Eritreans, of the struggle for independence.
While Ethiopian and Eritrean identities are constructed as opposed,43 yet 
united by a set of recognized physical and cultural commonalities, Eritrean and 
Sudanese people were seen as incommensurably different. Even before getting 
to Sudan, my Eritrean friends told me never to trust Sudanese. When I got to 
Sudan, I discovered that Sudanese often represented the reification of all evils 
in my informants’ eyes. Maria, for example, thought that Sudan was filthy and 
that Sudanese people were not trustworthy. She hated the lack of freedom in the 
country, symbolized by the requirement to wear the veil and the long black Mus-
lim dress.
These negative beliefs translated into Maria’s daily practices. She invariably 
looked for an Eritrean taxi driver, saying: “Let’s get a Habesha one. I don’t like 
Sudanese.” Maria said it was very easy to distinguish Sudanese from Habesha: 
according to her, the latter were cute and slim, while the former were fat with ugly 
faces. However, this categorization was clearly unrealistic. Once, one of my Suda-
nese friends, Ismael, a twenty-six-year-old graduate from Khartoum University, 
took me home. He was tall and slim, with a clean and kind face. Maria happily 
approached him in Tigrinya: “Are you Habesh?” Ismael replied in Arabic: “No, I 
am from here.” Maria was very surprised to realize that Sudanese were not so dif-
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ferent from Habesha in the end, but she kept disapproving of my friendship with 
Ismael anyway.44
In turn, as I realized during several conversations with taxi drivers, shopkeep-
ers, students, and guides, Habesh were also seen rather negatively by many Suda-
nese. My sponsor in Sudan, a businessman in his thirties, bluntly expressed his 
doubts about me living with Eritreans instead of renting a hotel room: “Habesh 
people do not have prestige; they are not intelligent. We, the Sudanese, feel they 
are inferior to us. Why do you want to live with them?”
Some of the stereotypes characterizing Eritreans’ interactions with locals in 
Sudan and Ethiopia are remarkably postcolonial. This is evident in the continu-
ous comparison between the “cleanliness” and beauty of Asmara with the “dirti-
ness” of Addis Ababa and Khartoum.45 Although partly resulting from colonial 
discourse, the complexity of interethnic relationships between Eritreans, Suda-
nese, and Ethiopians also emerges from precolonial conflicts and recent social 
history. Reciprocal fears, mistrust, and negative judgments cannot be understood 
without considering the thirty years of war against Ethiopian rulers, the forced 
displacements of thousand families from Ethiopia in 1998–99, and the difficul-
ties historically experienced by Eritreans in Sudan.46 Religious interpretations 
(such as the veto on Muslim women marrying Christian men) and other cultur-
ally shaped gender attitudes can be added to explanations based on social and 
economic stratifications.47
The above considerations are necessarily simplifications of a much more 
nuanced and larger range of attitudes marking interethnic relations in both coun-
tries. However, they provide a rough idea of widespread prejudices, which may 
increase an already existing segregation of urban refugees, while strengthening 
their self-identification as a group in transit. Living together with little or nega-
tive interaction with local populations reinforces Eritreans’ feeling of being there 
only temporarily, while longing for other destinations. Within this sociocultural 
and legal context, it is not surprising that an emotional status comparable to what 
Émile Durkheim called a “collective effervescence” emerges in periods when 
structural opportunities for (irregular) mobility open up.
In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912), Durkheim describes the col-
lective feelings generated in the rituals of Australian Aborigines and argues that 
through this “collective effervescence,” societal moral order as well as individual 
belonging to it was renewed and reinforced.48 The mobility practices as well as the 
mobility-related discourse continually reproduced in the shared dwelling places of 
my informants were strengthening the moral and eschatological order implicit in 
their cosmology of destinations.
SPRING FEVER IN ADDIS ABABA .   .   . 
“Egi bahari tsobok [now the sea is fine]” and “Egi serghie tsobok [now the road 
is good]” were common statements in the conversation among my friends and 
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neighbors in Mebrat Haile. As the European winter was finishing and spring was 
at the door, the neighborhood was effervescent in anticipation of the departure 
of many of its inhabitants. These statements were not simply words in the air, but 
declarations of intent. Between February and March, more than half of the people 
I knew had left Mebrat Haile to go to Sudan and from there, crossed over to Libya 
and then to Europe. Even many of my friends in Eritrea, such as Lwam and Valen-
tina, moved in that period to go to Sudan (Lwam arrived in Italy soon afterward).
March is the right month, according to popular wisdom there, to start the jour-
ney from Sudan to Libya. The Sahara desert is not too hot and the waters of the 
Mediterranean Sea will be calmer by April than during the winter. Many people 
I used to hang out with called me from Sudan to give me their news; others just 
disappeared, and I found out about their departure only long afterward. The ones 
who had remained wondered if they had made the right choice, or simply kept 
trying to get enough money to follow their companions to Sudan.
In the evenings, the internet cafés were still full of young people, but conversa-
tions and interlocutors had changed. Since I started living in Mebrat Haile, Violetta 
and I used to spend long hours in Amanuel’s internet café trying to connect with 
our families or simply listening to Amanuel—the twenty-nine-year-old Eritrean 
manager—playing krar, a traditional lyre. Before March, I noticed those sitting 
close to me chatting with their families and friends in Eritrea through Yahoo mes-
senger and Facebook or video-calling their relatives or partners in Europe or the 
United States. In March, conversations were more often with friends who had left 
Mebrat Haile and reached Sudan: “Temesgen hawey, denhando? Sudan Kemmei? 
[Temesgen my brother, how are you? How is Sudan?]” A group of young boys 
from the neighborhood gathered in Amanuel’s internet point to talk to their friend 
in Khartoum and kept joking with him on skype: “Now you have to speak Arabic, 
bro, how are you managing?”
In that period Violetta and I often went to our favorite juice shop. Once, while 
we were waiting for our juices, a young Eritrean man started to talk to Violetta. 
“Are you one of us?” he said in Tigrinya. “Yes, I am,” answered Violetta with a 
smile. “How did you know?” “I can see it from your face. You are an Asmarina [a 
positive term to define someone who grew up in Asmara]!” The two started chat-
ting. Dani was twenty-seven and also from Asmara. “I am leaving to Libya soon, 
but I am scared,” he said quietly, and then more resolutely continued. “I don’t want 
to go, but I have no choice. I have no process [i.e. visa application] here,49 unless 
your ferengi friend marries me”—giving me a sarcastic look. “One of my brothers 
is in Switzerland, the other has just made it to Norway . . . I have to go.” Not only 
the fear of the risky journey, but also the anxiety of being left behind in the run for 
Europe was clear in Dani’s words.
In that period, even those Eritrean refugees who had told me that they did 
not want to take risks to get to Europe became convinced that the moment was 
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right. Amanuel, the internet point manager, for example, had told me about his 
plan to join some of his friends in Angola, but one evening in late February, com-
ing back from a night out, I overheard him saying to Violetta in Tigrinya: “Now 
the sea is calm. I have decided to go to Europe. I am planning to leave in a few 
weeks.” He explained that all his flat mates had already left. He reached Norway 
two months later.
Even Adonay, the philosophy student at Addis Ababa University, changed his 
mind around then. Since I had met him, he had been asking for my help to get a 
scholarship to a European university, but never seemed really to have Europe as 
his goal. “Have you heard what happened in Lampedusa last October?” he would 
say. “No, no, the risks are too high . . . that is not for me.” Then his plans abruptly 
changed in March. One night I received a message from him: “Milena! I will depart 
for Sudan tomorrow. I will keep in touch with you.”
I was amazed; the week before, we had proofread one of his last essays before 
his master’s thesis and he seemed determined to finish his degree in Ethiopia. Why 
had he changed his mind? Worried about losing the opportunity at least to say 
goodbye, I phoned him, asking, “What happened, Adonay?” “Sorry, Milena—he 
replied—These journeys are very risky, I did not want to tell you. But nowadays 
these journeys can be profitable; the way through Libya is open and there is good 
rate of success.”
We decided to meet in the Italian-built neighborhood of Piazza a few days later. 
Adonay looked worried in his tidy but worn-out button-down shirt. While we 
were sipping coffee from the terrace of a café, he kept touching his head and was 
nervously laughing while explaining to me about the uncle who was supposed to 
pay for his journey.
“But why, Adonay, did you change your mind? You said it was too dangerous!” 
I asked him. “I have been a burden for my family—he responded—At this age I 
should be able to provide for myself. At least. Yeah, yeah, it is not good, to become 
so miserable. I have been waiting here for very long, now it’s time to risk. If I die, 
I will die, that’s it.”
The difficulties in finding jobs, shame at not being an independent man, and 
the desire to migrate to a more suitable destination had been the ingredients of 
Adonay’s life for a while, but they had now become unbearable. Whereas all his 
friends, classmates at university and relatives were moving on, Adonay’s prospects 
had not changed. Immersed in the emotional atmosphere of anxiety and departure 
characterizing Eritreans’ dwelling spaces in those months, Adonay’s carefulness 
about risks turned into determination to migrate at all costs. However, his plans 
were never realized. His uncle was not ready to pay, but instead promised to help 
him establish some kind of business in Addis. Unfortunately, the uncle died a few 
months later, leaving Adonay without support—either to migrate or to start a new 
life in Ethiopia.
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.   .   .  AND IN KHARTOUM
When I moved from Addis to Khartoum at the end of March, I found that even 
there, Eritrean refugees seemed to be affected by “the fever of leaving.” Maria’s 
place was a buzz of continuous coming and going of Eritrean refugees, especially 
on Sundays. Maria would sit in front of her small stove and start preparing coffee 
while kindly entertaining her guests. No matter what the topic started as, it would 
not take long before all conversations shifted to the usual question: “Nski process 
allo?”—Do you have a process?
Some of Maria’s guests were lucky: they had managed to apply for a sponsor visa 
to Canada thanks to the help of some relatives there; others had found a husband 
or a wife somewhere who could grant them a reunification visa. Everyone was 
going to leave soon. Even those who did not have money for the smugglers were 
determined to leave. Rahel, one of Maria’s guests, told us that she and her husband 
did not have money, but were planning to ask the smugglers to take them to Libya 
and from there, one call here, one call there, and with God’s help, someone would 
pay. “After all,” Rahel said. “Libya is closer to Europe than Khartoum, isn’t it?”
The coffee ceremony in Maria’s house was somehow a collective ritual in which 
mobility-related norms were reproduced and the longing for onward migration 
was elicited.50 This could also eventually lead to attempting irregular migration or 
simply to frustration at the inability to move, as in Maria’s case.
“I would really like to go to Libya,” Maria sighed after a phone call announc-
ing that a friend and her baby had made it to Italy. “But I am too scared for Anna 
and I do not have money. People told me that if you do not have money, the 
smugglers rape you. I heard of one girl who has been raped by five men!! But 
Europe would be good for Anna . . . I would like her to study in a college and to 
learn English well.”
Although Maria’s past has remained a mystery for me until now (at first she told 
me she had no close family members, but then I received a call from her brother 
in the United States) it was clear that she did not have relatives ready to pay for 
her journey—otherwise, I believe, she would have moved then. The meager sal-
ary from her cleaning job—which anyway did not last for long—did not allow 
for daily survival and the smugglers’ fee to reach Libya. Out of the 500 Sudanese 
pounds a month (about €50), she paid 380 in rent, and the remaining money was 
barely enough for food—not even sufficient to send Anna to school. This brings 
us back to the conditions that produce immobility even in the presence of strong 
aspirations to migrate. Maria’s case illustrates again how capabilities to move are 
stratified according to socioeconomic status, gender, and the ability to mobilize 
resources from one’s own informal network of family and compatriots.51 However, 
the availability of resources is not enough to make sense of refugees’ determina-
tion to move on. Maria’s aspirations to live in the First World and to provide a bet-
ter future for Anna were continually reproduced by these social gatherings where 
all her guests talked about how and when to go.
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“The road is great now,” Seare, one of our usual guests, used to repeat confi-
dently. “Nowadays there are no problems at all! You should go Maria! Don’t be 
scared! Anna is big now . . . there are a lot of women who are still breast-feeding, 
but are already crossing the sea! Italians patrol the sea with helicopters, and ships 
come to fetch the refugees in the middle of the sea.”52
“Yes,” Maria muttered. “But we have no money.” At this point the conversation 
would often turn to the role I could possibly play as Maria’s helper.
Visitors would ask if I could provide her with a legal invitation to come to Italy 
or if I could pay for her journey across the Mediterranean. Sometimes they would 
ask Maria in Tigrinya, while on other occasions guests were more direct. Seare was 
extremely insistent. “What can you do for them? Take Anna with you then Maria 
will come by boat. I know one friend who can help us. If you pay the money then 
everything will be ok. Why are you scared? Now there is no problem!”
Although I told Seare that I did not agree with the journey, he kept insisting 
until I lost my temper and told him I was not ready under any circumstance to 
pay for such a risky trip. But these encounters left me wondering what my role as 
researcher was and what ethical principle I should have applied at that time (see 
Appendix). After these visits, Maria was often troubled. One time, she could 
not sleep and we stayed up for a while, chatting. “Milena, I am always thinking 
.  .  . where will Anna and I go?” she said. “How will we manage? My God .  .  . 
all our neighbors have some kind of process or some money, but I do not have 
anything. I always think I must be honest—if I am honest God will like it and 
He will open the way for me and for Anna. But I think too much, so sometimes, 
I start cleaning the room, I clean and clean and then I feel better.” Most of the 
time I felt powerless in the face of all her difficulties and suffering. I told Maria 
that I was going to help her to send Anna to school, but her expectations were 
much higher.
After my departure from Sudan. I kept in touch with her, as with most of my 
closest informants, and helped her send Anna to school. We decided together that 
Ethiopia would be an easier place to settle for them. They had Ethiopian passports, 
so Maria could work and Anna could peacefully go to school. I asked one of my 
Italian friends in Ethiopia to look for employment for Maria and soon thereafter, 
Maria found work as a cleaner in two Italian houses that provided a good income. 
They found a room close to Anna’s school and for a few months everything seemed 
to proceed smoothly. Then I received a call from Maria saying that she wanted to 
leave again to go to Sudan. Life was hard in Addis, too. Her husband had come 
back home, but he was still behaving badly, and Maria could not bear him. After 
a month, I received her call from Sudan. She said she wanted to go to Libya and 
take Anna with her. She wanted me to pay. I refused, saying that the situation in 
Libya was too dangerous. Our conversation left us both disappointed. I am sure 
she thought I was a stingy, ungrateful Western woman, and I thought she was a 
careless Habesha woman. Then, the news reached Maria that a boat with seven 
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hundred people on board had sunk in the Mediterranean (April 20, 2015), which 
slowed down her plans to cross over to Europe. However, her restlessness has not 
ceased, even now. After that, she decided to go back to Eritrea—apparently it was 
safe for her to do so. Then, a few months later, she went back to Sudan. The last 
time I talked to her, she was asking me for help to move to Ethiopia again.
Maria’s frustrated desire for mobility points to the strength of collective imagi-
naries, moral attitudes, and communal emotional energy surrounding the search 
for a new home among refugees in transit. Although the availability of money and 
the capacity to mobilize it through one’s own networks is crucial to understand 
who moves and who does not, the determination to move at all costs reflects the 
power of shared moral expectations associated with migration and the widespread 
belief that these cannot be met in countries like Sudan and Ethiopia. Moralities, 
imaginaries, and emotions are not only relevant for interpreting the flow of migra-
tion from Ethiopia and Sudan, but also—and arguably even more so—in analyzing 




Transnational and Peer Pressure in 
Onward Migration in Europe
The previous chapter examined Eritrean refugees’ desire to move on from their 
first country of asylum after escaping from their homeland. That desire did not 
disappear after they arrived in their first European country, in this case, Italy.1 In 
spite of easy access to legal protection,2 well-established Eritrean communities, 
and long-standing historical linkages, most Eritreans do not want to settle there. 
Instead, they repeatedly gambled on the possibility to seek asylum elsewhere.
Secondary refugee movement in Europe is pervasive, notwithstanding policies 
aimed at limiting it, such as the Dublin Regulation.3 According to official figures, 
over 34,000 Eritreans landed on the Italian coast in 2014, but only 450 sought asy-
lum there4. Most, if not apprehended by the authorities upon arrival, try to avoid 
the identification procedure and travel on to other countries, preferably Scandi-
navian ones, such as Norway and Sweden. This chapter adopts a transnational 
approach in order to make sense of how and why such movement takes place 
in spite of the related risks. Jumping from my informants’ everyday lives in Italy 
to their families’ houses in Asmara, I illustrate how the feeling of an “unfinished 
journey” emerges from several factors, ranging from limited contact with previous 
generations of Eritrean migrants to poor integration into local society, from the 
influence of information from destination countries to the expectations of families 
back home.
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My argument is that the secondary mobility of Eritrean refugees is neither sim-
ply an adaptive strategy to cope with the difficulties of everyday life nor just the 
outcome of social connections in other countries. Rather, it is also the product of 
a shared cosmology of destinations that prescribes both socioeconomic goals and 
the most suitable destinations. Italy is not a final destination, either for migrants 
or for their families back home, in this set of moral obligations and geographic 
imaginaries, which overcome legal obstacles and persist even where local integra-
tion beckons.
HIDE AND SEEK:  ERITREANS MOVING 
THROUGH ITALY
Many of the refugees whom I met in Eritrea, in Ethiopian refugee camps, in Addis 
Ababa and Khartoum, called me during the summer of 2014 to tell me that they 
were transiting through Italy. Lwam managed to cross over from Libya and con-
tinued her journey to Germany. Amanuel, the krar player who had managed the 
internet point in my neighborhood in Addis Ababa arrived in Sicily in August and 
proceeded to Norway a week later. Jacob, the resolute young engineer I met in Adi 
Harush, called me from Rome in June after almost a month in Libya to ask for help 
to continue his journey to Denmark. Seare, the promoter of the Mediterranean 
crossing at Maria’s place in Khartoum, also called me from Milan before moving 
on to Denmark. Having known Lwam, Amanuel, Jacob, and Seare before, I was 
aware that Italy had never been their intended destination.
It was relatively easy for some of my informants to move on from Italy. Some 
of them simply bought a train ticket to Switzerland, Germany, or beyond. Others 
hired passeurs so as to cross without being caught and risking the registration 
of their biometric information—especially fingerprints—in the shared European 
database EURODAC, which would undermine their asylum application in other 
European countries. Invisibility is crucial for a smooth passage.5 
Most of the Eritreans with whom I did my research in Italy between 2012 
and 2013 arrived before 2009 and had not been able to escape the identification 
procedure.6 Although this had made it hard for them to be granted asylum else-
where in Europe, it did not prevent them from trying. Since their fingerprints had 
been recorded, some of my informants went so far as to burn them off chemi-
cally. Others left their Italian documents with their friends and moved to north-
ern European countries, hoping that their fingerprints would not be found and 
that their cases would be considered differently by the authorities. Most of them 
were deported to Italy, but some managed to have their applications accepted after 
repeated attempts.7
These repeated attempts to seek asylum outside Italy were puzzling to me. I 
certainly knew that starting a new life was not easy in Italy given the little insti-
tutional support provided to refugees; however, I also thought that easy access to 
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legal protection and well-established Eritrean communities in the country could 
function as magnets for newcomers. In light of the poor prospect of success, cost 
in time (two to three years on average), and dangers involved,8 attempting to reach 
northern Europe did not seem worthwhile to me, but my informants thought dif-
ferently. Eritrean migration through Italy provides an interesting point of depar-
ture for revisiting the debate on secondary mobility in Europe.
WELFARE DISPARITIES ,  ESTABLISHED NET WORKS 
AND ADAPTATION:  REFUGEES’  SEC ONDARY 
MOBILIT Y IN EUROPE
In spite of the efforts to homogenize the European asylum system (CEAS) deep-
rooted disparities across welfare regimes play a crucial role in stratifying refugee 
reception. Asylum seekers and refugees in Italy receive little institutional support, 
whereas in northern European countries they receive stipends, housing, and other 
forms of assistance.9
The Italian reception system is widely stratified and varied. Several systems 
have been implemented to address asylum flows since 2000, with shifting balances 
in the roles of local and central authorities, civil society, and private actors.10 This 
has produced extremely diverse reception conditions according to the period, the 
region, and the actors involved. Although regional differences in the assistance of 
refugees are not negligible and services provided can significantly vary from case 
to case, in general terms, the Italian reception system has hardly been effective in 
guiding asylum seekers and refugees through their local integration process.11
Most studies on secondary mobility have thus considered secondary move-
ments as adaptive strategies to cope with economic, legal, and social restrictions 
that make life hard in the first country of emigration.12 However, when applied 
to the Eritrean case, these interpretations fall short. Eritreans are determined to 
move through Italy even before having experienced the challenges—or the oppor-
tunities—of living there. They are resolute as regards seeking asylum elsewhere in 
spite of significant risks.
Other common explanations of refugees’ secondary mobility in Europe argue 
for the relevance of historical and social connections in directing asylum seekers’ 
destination choices.13 Based on these accounts, asylum seekers would tend to go 
to countries—usually the ex-colonial metropole—with which they often share a 
common history, language, and cultural traits, and where they can often count on 
an already well-established community of compatriots. Even in this case, however, 
Eritreans seem an exception. In spite of colonial linkages to Italy and a historic 
Eritrean diaspora there, Eritreans generally do not want to remain in the country.14
In order to understand Eritreans’ secondary movements, it is crucial to exam-
ine the transnational field of relationships in which refugees’ everyday lives are 
embedded. Although relatively peripheral to refugee studies, the transnational 
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approach has been crucial to understanding refugees’ integration patterns, deci-
sion-making, aspirations, and movements.15 Cindy Horst shows how the longing 
for onward mobility among Somalis living in Kenyan camps emerges from the 
continuous exchange of ideas, images, and money between refugees in developed 
countries and those in camps.16 Khalid Koser and Charles Pinkerton highlight the 
role played by informal social networks in circulating information about possible 
destination countries and directing the choices of prospective asylum seekers.17 
Specifically with respect to the case of Eritreans seeking to reach Scandinavia, 
J.-P. Brekke and G. Brochmann argue that perceived inequalities between condi-
tions in northern Europe and in Italy are only in part the result of objective dis-
parities.18 They also mirror information, images, and the aspirations of Eritreans 
in different locations.
Studies on transnationalism, however, consider the links between two sites; 
typically, the destination and the home country, or the home country and the 
expected areas of transit, or the area of transit and the preferred destination. Nev-
ertheless, refugees participate in different transnational flows, which link them 
not only with compatriots who have reached their intended final destinations, but 
also with their families back home. On the one hand, they are often in contact by 
telephone, visits, and internet social networks with those kin and friends who have 
reached their final preferred destinations, usually a northern European country. 
On the other hand, Eritreans in Italy are linked to their families back home by a 
more or less implicit system of expectations concerning remittances, support for 
kin’s prospective migration, and suitable countries of destinations. Such a trifold 
focus is of paramount importance to grasp Eritrean refugees’ motivations to con-
tinue their journeys onward from Italy, as well as to understand their perception 
of “being stuck.”
SPIES AND TR AITORS:  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
AND GENER ATIONAL DIVIDES AMONG 
THE DIASPOR A
Eritreans have migrated to Italy since the 1960s. At first, this emigration mainly 
involved women employed as domestic workers by middle-class Italian families—
who had often lived in Eritrea during the colonial era—in cities like Rome, Naples, 
and Milan.19 In the late 1970s, however, many young men arrived, fleeing from 
violence and forced conscription in Eritrea. These often came to Italy with the 
intention of moving on to other countries that offered them better employment 
prospects and legal protection such as Germany, Canada, and the United States.20
Sociological literature from the 1980s describes numerous politically organized 
communities of Eritreans in Milan, Rome, Bologna, Bari, and Naples. In 1983, it 
was reported that in Milan there were some three thousand Eritreans with legal 
residence permits. Similarly, in Rome, it is reported that Eritreans numbered 
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around three thousand in the early 1990s.21 These numbers are likely inaccurate, 
however, given the difficulty in differentiating Ethiopians from Eritreans—they 
had the same nationality—and there were also numerous undocumented migrants.
Against this background, the literature on migrants’ social networks might sim-
plistically lead us to see the cohesive community of Eritreans in Italy as a major 
reason for refugee newcomers to stay in the country. However, the community in 
Italy, as much as elsewhere, is deeply divided.22 Those who arrived before the 1990s 
are usually supporters of the former EPLF and current PFDJ government. Moti-
vated by government propaganda, they see Eritreans who fled after independence 
as deserters and traitors.
During my field visits in Genoa, I met several Eritreans who had come to Italy 
in the 1970s. “These who come to Europe now are not refugees, but economic 
migrants!” Mrs. Gianna thundered from behind her desk in the local migration 
bureau when she heard what the subject of my research was. “They say that in 
Eritrea there is no freedom only because they want to attack the government! . . . 
They just do not want to work hard, but want to have a lot of money, a car . . . they 
see the pictures of their friends online, leaning on a Ferrari, but the Ferraris are not 
theirs! Only when they come here do they realize that the situation is very bad.”
Mrs. Gianna’s attitude to her young compatriots clearly reflected a pro-gov-
ernment rhetoric that denied all the political aspects producing contemporary 
Eritrean migration, and in this, she was no exception among older Eritreans in 
Genoa. She introduced me to Rachele and her husband Giovanni, Eritreans of the 
older generation who had a small shop in one of the port alleys. I asked them if they 
knew any of those young Eritreans who had arrived in Genoa in the past five years. 
“I don’t know them, Rachele replied. “I only see them passing through.” Rachele 
and Michele also seemed to be convinced that there was no political reason to 
flee Eritrea, a political division that has hindered solidarity with recent Eritrean 
refugees. The older and the younger generations of Eritreans deeply distrusted 
each other. Mrs. Gianna’s migration bureau was meant to be an important point of 
reference for immigrants and asylum seekers in the city, but the Eritrean refugees 
I met in Genoa were purposely avoiding it. “Mrs. Gianna and her friends are spies 
of the government,” Brahnu, a twenty-seven-year-old refugee who had arrived in 
Italy in 2007, said. “We do not like to go to her office.” My informants in Milan 
and Rome also routinely avoided contact with pro-government older Eritreans. As 
many of them owned Eritrean restaurants and the bars in the two cities, and the 
choice of where to have a meal could be complicated at times. Explaining why he 
did not want to take me to a specific restaurant in Milan, Gabriel said, “There are 
many things old Eritreans do not know . . . they have an old-fashioned mentality.”
This does not mean that all connections between older and younger genera-
tions were severed. Not all older Eritreans were pro-government. Many were ex-
guerrilla fighters in the ELF (the front antagonistic to the EPLF; see Introduction) 
and had been opposed to the current rulers right from the start. Older Eritreans 
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in Italy are also often the ones who send money to help their kin migrate to 
Europe. Moreover, there were some local Eritrean organizations assisting young 
Eritreans At the beginning of my fieldwork, I tried to contact these associa-
tions in order to gain better access to the community, but I quickly realized that 
they were rarely a point of reference for recently arrived Eritreans. First, these 
associations were mostly engaged in transnational activities, rather than in pro-
viding services locally. Second, they had a more or less explicit political stance 
against the Eritrean government, and for this reason many newcomer refugees 
preferred not to have anything to do with them. As various scholars of Eritrea 
have highlighted, the exercise of “voice” has been significantly hindered by fear 
of government reprisals, as well as by the ongoing influence of the national unity 
and patriotism discourse.23 Although some of the young Eritreans I met supported 
the recent opposition movement called Eritrean Youth for Social Change (EYSC), 
most tended to reject political engagement and to distrust everything associated 
with politics. Unlike in the 1980s, political parties now played a minor role in the 
lives of Eritrean refugees in Italy.24 It is probably the generalized suspicion of all 
politicized forms of organized assistance that has led many newcomer refugees to 
organize among themselves to cope with the challenges of living in Italy, such as 
the lack of housing facilities.
LIVING AS SQUAT TERS:  B OT TOM-UP INTEGR ATION 
OR SEGREGATION?
For those Eritreans who arrived before 2010, the general path was usually the fol-
lowing. During the assessment of their asylum application, they resided in a CARA 
(the Italian acronym for Centri di Accoglienza per Richiedenti Asilo, reception 
centers for asylum seekers), then they were pushed out without any assistance. 
The main system of assistance in place for refugees and asylum seekers since 2001, 
the Servizio centrale del Sistema di Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati, or 
SPRAR, and its related regional projects could only host about 7,600 individuals in 
2011, for example, when there were 37,000 asylum applications.25
Extreme poverty among refugee populations has been widely documented in 
the main Italian cities. The economic crisis, which has particularly hit those sec-
tors where foreign workers are mostly employed,26 has increased the difficulties 
for newcomers in finding employment. Moreover, due to limited institutional sup-
port in terms of housing, many refugees have found informal accommodation in 
squats, shantytowns, and overcrowded houses. In Genoa, my informants tended to 
share cheap flats in the area of Sampierdarena, an ex–working class neighborhood 
on the periphery of the city, today mostly inhabited by immigrants;27 in Milan and 
Rome, many had started squatting in abandoned buildings. Looking at these hous-
ing arrangements is crucial to understanding the complex interaction between 
social segregation, forms of local integration, and transnationalism. It is in these 
Figure 14. Collatina, the first squat 
inhabited exclusively by Eritreans and 
Ethiopians in Rome (photo by the 
author, 2012)
Figure 15. Ponte Mammolo, a now dismantled shantytown on the periphery of Rome (photo 
by the author, 2012)
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contexts that Eritrean refugees exchange information about living conditions in 
other countries and reciprocally foster the desire to move on.
Along with the informal settlements—more or less shantytowns—that autono-
mously emerged at the periphery of the city, such as the village of Ponte Mam-
molo (fig. 8), organized squats have become one of the main housing strategies 
of recently arrived Eritreans in the city. These organized squats are the result of 
an interaction between refugees’ housing necessities and the local movement for 
housing rights,28 which has been active in the area for over fifty years.29 Such an 
interaction has produced a wide range of different squats inhabited by Eritreans, 
characterized by different levels of ethnic concentration, socioeconomic integra-
tion, autonomy from the political movements and seclusion from the outside.
Four informal housing arrangements inhabited by Eritrean refugees—the shan-
tytown of Ponte Mammolo and the squats of Collatina (fig. 7), Anagnina (fig. 9), 
and Metropolis (fig. 10)—became the focus of my observations in Rome between 
June and December 2012. At the time of my study, Collatina hosted around five 
hundred Eritreans and Ethiopians; Anagnina had around eight hundred inhabit-
ants, mostly Somalis, Ethiopians, and Eritreans; a hundred Eritreans were living 
in Ponte Mammolo, along with migrants from eastern Europe; and some eighty 
people from all around the world lived at Metropolis. Although these places had 
infrastructural problems, they also had services such as running water and elec-
tricity, as well as shops, restaurants and cafes. Along with other neighborhoods of 
the city where Eritreans have traditionally been present—such as the area around 
the Termini railway station—the squats had become important meeting points.
In the beginning many of these squats were occupied by refugees with the help 
of left-wing groups of the local housing rights movement, but lately many squats 
have become independently managed by refugees, and some have been squatted at 
refugees’ initiative, such as the building close to Termini Station.30
A combination of institutionalized marginality and instances of active citi-
zenship,31 these squats evolved into self-segregated areas mostly off-limits for 
the locals. For example, Collatina, the first squat (2004) exclusively managed by 
Eritrean refugees, had become inaccessible to Italians. A sign on the front door of 
the building stated: “Access to the building is not granted to people who do not 
live here.” Unsurprisingly, the rule applied only to “outsiders” and not to fellow 
Eritreans, who could visit friends inside or use the internal shops and facilities 
(restaurants, barber shops, tailors, etc.). Similar to Collatina, entrance to the Ter-
mini squat was prohibited to “non-Habesha.” When I visited Alazar, I had to sneak 
in without being noticed by the guard always standing at the door. According to 
my informants, these entry policies have been enforced by the organizing commit-
tee for fear of journalists’ drawing the squats to the authorities’ attention.
Squats like Anagnina and informal settlements like Ponte Mammolo were less 
strict in their entry policy but nonetheless very isolated and closed to the outside. 
While I was free to enter and exit Anagnina and Ponte Mammolo, people there 
Figure 16. Anagnina, a Roman squat inhabited by over 800 people from the Horn of Africa 
(photo by the author, 2012)
Figure 17. Metropolis, a squat inhabited by both Italians and migrants (photo by the author, 
2012)
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would still look at me with suspicion if I was not accompanied by an insider. This 
closure to the outside is probably due to the irregularity of these settlements and 
the fear of being spied upon and reported to the authorities. However, this per-
petual suspicion is also somehow typical of Eritreans, as a result of the extremely 
repressive political environment that they have experienced throughout history 
(see Appendix). In practical terms, the Eritreans’ suspicion of strangers meant, 
not only that I had to make significant efforts to gain the trust of my informants, 
but also that I could not rely on a single informant to grant me access to different 
sites, even in the same city. Because it was such a segmented and divided com-
munity, I had to navigate different social networks to access different populations 
of Eritreans.
I was able to gain access to these places thanks to my long-term friendship with 
Alazar, his networks, and my previous contacts with Eritreans in Genoa. After 
having been given five years-refugee-status, Alazar left Italy in 2009. A few months 
later, I had a phone call from him. “Milli, how are you? I am in Norway! It is cold 
here,” he said. The conversation did not last long, because my Tigrinya was too 
limited, as was Alazar’s English. We spoke again on the phone a few times and 
then lost contact for a year. I then heard that he had been deported to Italy after 
Norwegian authorities discovered that his asylum case had already been processed 
and accepted there. When I started my research on Eritrean refugees in Italy in 
2012, I found him living in the Anagnina squat in Rome and working as a skycap 
at Ciampino Airport for a few days a week. Alazar knew people and places and 
everyone knew him.
He introduced me to Senay, a childhood friend of his from Asmara, who put 
me up on an old sofa that reeked of alcohol in his one-room flat in Metropolis for 
most of the time I spent in Rome. Located in a particularly deprived and margin-
alized area of the capital, Metropolis was a mixed squat where Peruvians, Roma, 
Moroccans, Sudanese, Italians, and Eritreans were living together. Although life 
in the squat was marked by interethnic collaboration, the cohabitation was not 
always easy: I witnessed several violent fights between Peruvians and Roma during 
my stay there. Entry policy was very strict there as well, but at Senay’s request, the 
committee, mainly led by an Italian left-wing organization called Blocchi Precari 
Metropolitani (Precarious Metropolitan Blocks), or BPM, temporarily accepted 
me. Nevertheless, at the entrance gate there was always a picket line to check who 
was going in and who was going out.
Although Alazar and Senay could grant me access to most squats and 
Eritrean gathering places in Rome, they were not familiar with the Eritreans 
living in the shantytown in the Ponte Mammolo area. Alazar would not even 
enter the messy accumulation of shelters comprising the settlement. In order 
to have a guide in that community, I had to call my Eritrean friends in Genoa, 
who put me in touch with Kibreab, a former sociology student at the University 
of Asmara. Like most inhabitants of Ponte Mammolo, he had a common back-
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ground with my informants in Genoa: they all came from the same area in the 
south of the Eritrea.
Alazar, Senay, and Kibreab became my main informants in Rome. All three 
were nearly thirty, unmarried, living in unstable material conditions, and had 
come to Italy the hard way across the Mediterranean. They had all tried to move on 
from Italy, but had been sent back. Nonetheless, they were still planning the next 
move to try to circumvent the Dublin Regulation. At the time of writing, Alazar is 
the only one of the three left in Rome; Senay managed to obtain asylum in Sweden 
on his second attempt; Kibreab, after trying to obtain asylum in the Netherlands, 
gained entry to the United States by marrying an acquaintance living there. Each 
of them enabled me to enter a different informal settlement, peopled with differ-
ent characters, and with its own rules and features. Alazar showed me the world of 
Anagnina squat, hosting me there for several nights and days; Senay welcomed me 
in his room in Metropolis for a few weeks; Kibreab guided me through the Ponte 
Mammolo shantytown.
These settlements were ethnically homogeneous and their population was 
characterized by low socioeconomic and cultural integration. With the excep-
tion of Collatina, which had almost become a permanent squat for Eritreans and 
Ethiopians who had regular jobs and had been living in Italy for a while, the 
population of the other squats was mainly jobless, or employed part-time in low-
skilled temporary or seasonal jobs. My Eritrean informants living in Anagnina, 
for instance, were working as transporters in Ciampino airport or for global cou-
riers such as TNT and SDA. Those living in Ponte Mammolo were unemployed 
or worked as fruit pickers in summer. Moreover, they spoke little Italian and did 
not have any contact with locals. They used to spend their free time in Eritrean 
bars in the area close to Termini Station or in the cafes and restaurants inside 
Anagnina or Collatina.
This systematic separation from the Italian society is important to examine how 
social expectations and desires concerning other destinations are reproduced. The 
levels of internal homogeneity and external segregation of Eritrean refugees in 
Italy are comparable to those of their counterparts I met in refugee camps or in 
Addis Ababa and Khartoum. Although the structural confinement of the camps 
is different from the complex socioeconomic processes that pushed Eritrean refu-
gees together in these informal settlements, these settings share two remarkable 
commonalities: limited or no interactions with the local society, and a widespread 
suspicion and fear of locals, who are often identified as possible threats.32
FEELING AND BEING STUCK:  PERCEPTIONS AND 
PR ACTICES OF ( IM)MOBILIT Y
The term “stuck” has often been used of asylum seekers and migrants settled in 
transit countries who would like to seek asylum elsewhere, but cannot.33 “To be 
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stuck in transit” conveys the idea of a status that should be temporary becoming 
permanent because of structural constraints on mobility. It also implies normal-
ization of precariousness and uncertainty, at least for some categories of people.34
Although the idea of “being stuck” touches on migrants’ limited access to 
geographic mobility, it is important to keep the two concepts separated. As Joris 
Schapendonk observes,35 the perception of being stuck does not always corre-
spond to a physical impossibility of moving. In his case study, migrants that got 
stuck in Morocco were very mobile in their daily practices. They moved camp-
ing arrangements to be prepared to escape from local authorities; they regularly 
crossed the Moroccan-Algerian border to work, and some of them even went 
back to their countries. Likewise, Eritreans in Italy felt stuck, but were highly 
mobile. In spite of being fingerprinted in Italy, they had tried more than once to 
seek asylum in other European countries; some of them had gone back to Africa 
to visit their families (in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan) or/and to marry other Eritrean 
refugees in Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola, and elsewhere. After Alazar arrived in Italy 
in 2008, for example, he sought asylum first in Norway, and then in Sweden. 
When his fingerprints were found, he voluntarily came back to Italy. He then 
went to visit a friend in Angola, and in 2012, he went to Ethiopia for a month to 
get married. Such movements were common among Eritreans I met.
To be stuck in transit is thus not necessarily a physical condition. Rather, it 
points to an emotional and social condition, or to an existential perception of 
unsettledness. As Ghassan  Hage observes, “a viable life presupposes a form of 
imaginary mobility, a sense that one is going somewhere.”36 When this sense of 
going somewhere is lost, individuals experience existential immobility—which 
he calls stuckedness. According to Hage, most voluntary migration stems from a 
willingness to react to this immobility. This is also the case for the many Eritrean 
refugees I met. Yet they felt stuck at all stages of their migration. My informants 
in Eritrea thought that their life was going nowhere due to the—as they perceived 
them—hopeless economic and political conditions of the country. Likewise, those 
Eritreans I encountered in Ethiopia and Sudan felt that they had no future there. 
Thus, the experience of existential immobility among my informants in Italy was a 
perpetuation of what I encountered before.
As mentioned in a previous chapter, structural obstacles to migration are only 
one of the various dimensions of their immobility. Their feeling of being stuck 
emerged from the social condition of dependency. In practice, my informants in 
Italy were still unable to provide for their families. They often felt trapped in that 
state of eternal adolescence which they had hoped to escape by leaving Eritrea. “I 
have been working in Italy for five years and I still cannot support my brother who 
is getting married in Eritrea, nor send money to my family,” Ogbazgi muttered 
amid the strident noise of the Genoa railway station. We were waiting together 
for the train that was to take him to Switzerland, his final destination. He added, 
“This is not good—I am not a child anymore.” His words exemplify the feelings of 
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underachievement of many Eritreans in Italy. Their journeys cannot end until they 
have attained the status of adulthood.
Moreover, as often highlighted by those scholars who have studied migrants 
in transit,37 the perception of being stuck in transit implies limited engagement in 
the country of residence, and a strong emotional orientation toward the desired 
country of destination. The Eritrean refugees I met were highly connected with 
other Eritreans in other countries and in the homeland, but did not show any 
intent to engage in the place where they lived. Not only were social and economic 
contacts within the Italian society limited, but also their intentions to get a job, to 
learn Italian, or to obtain regular housing were weak. For instance, when I asked 
Kibreab why he did not work harder on his Italian skills, he answered, “My mind 
is not settled. I cannot focus on studying. We have too many problems and our 
families back home are waiting for our support.” Although it is undeniable that 
the Italian context was challenging in many senses, one may wonder if their pes-
simistic attitudes also contributed to their own marginality. The perception that it 
was possible to quite easily obtain everything they needed “somewhere close by” 
seemed to direct all their efforts toward the next attempt to seek asylum in another 
country, rather than toward trying to find their way in Italy.
WHAT PUSHES ERITREANS TO MOVE ONWARD?
Peer pressure . . . 
Living in squats with compatriots at the margins of the receiving society and shar-
ing the same ideas and desires about future migration are the two factors that 
underpin Eritrean refugees’ attempts to move beyond Italy. Similar to what I have 
previously observed in refugee camps and in urban setting in Ethiopia and Sudan, 
dwelling in the same spaces may facilitate the emergence of a shared emotional 
atmosphere that is conducive to further migration, which I have called a state of 
collective effervescence.
Some of the informal settlements where I stayed in Rome, the houses I visited in 
Genoa, and also the public spaces usually frequented by Eritreans were crossroads 
of people coming and going. The ground floor and second floor of Anagnina, in 
particular, was known as a kind of informal center of assistance for Eritreans who 
have no other place to go and cannot be privately hosted by friends or relatives. 
Those in need were usually “Dubliners” (i.e., returnees to Italy from other Euro-
pean countries under the Dublin Regulation) or new arrivals. For instance in the 
summer of 2013, after I came back from my fieldwork in Eritrea, Anagnina was 
busier than usual: the main hall and the second floor were flooded with old mat-
tresses on the floor where the new arrivals, transiting from Lampedusa to other 
European countries, were sleeping.
In Anagnina as well as in other places mainly inhabited by Eritrean refugees, 
new arrivals find not only accommodation and some practical help, but also some 
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protection from the risk of meeting public officials who may force them to provide 
their fingerprints. In Metropolis, for instance, Senay hosted a young man who had 
not been fingerprinted yet and wanted to move on to Switzerland. Similarly, in 
the houses in Sampierdarena (Genoa) I visited, Eritrean women who had joined 
their husbands through family reunification procedures were waiting for the right 
moment to reach another European country and seek asylum there.
Likewise, Ponte Mammolo was a refuge for people in transit and for others who 
had been forced to return. Some had just arrived from reception centers in the 
south of Italy, and some others had recently been sent back from northern Euro-
pean countries. While I was walking in Ponte Mammolo with Kibreab, I saw many 
women with children and asked him if the kids were going to school. “No, they 
usually don’t,” Kibreab said. “They are in transit here, waiting to move on toward 
other countries where their fathers and uncles are.”
While all these people were moving northward, those who were stuck in Italy 
were feeling left behind. Conversations about the pros and cons of living in dif-
ferent countries were continually going on in places like Anagnina. “Have you 
ever been in other countries in Europe?” Alazar’s neighbor asked me in one of 
the many afternoons I spent chatting and listening to music with Alazar and his 
friends on Anagnina’s first floor.
“Yes, I have been to France, for example,” I answered.
“Oh! How is it?”
“It is a nice country . . . ”
“And is it good for refugees?”
“I think it is more or less like Italy.”
“Oh . . . I see. Northern European countries are better.”
The hierarchy of destinations I observed in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan was 
evident in this conversation, too. Northern European countries were considered 
top destinations, while Italy was believed to be a good place to some extent—for 
the weather and because people were deemed friendlier—but with no socioeco-
nomic opportunities. The United States, Canada, and Australia were also seen as 
top destinations. On the contrary, Greece and Spain were known for being unde-
sirable and even unsafe countries. These widespread representations were also 
reproduced by the flow of information, images, and people coming back to Italy 
from those top destinations.
. . . information and images from the First World . . . 
Despite their ethnic segregation, the Eritrean refugees whom I met in Italy were 
deeply embedded in transnational relationships with their kin, friends, and 
acquaintances in other countries. The transnational dimension of their daily lives 
is noticeable in their use of technology.38 For example, Alazar used to receive many 
calls a day from his friends still in Sudan, from others who had reached northern 
Europe, from family members who worked in Israel, and still others in the United 
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States. Senay was more active on Facebook: he used to spend a long time looking 
at the pictures of his friends who lived in other countries and chatting online with 
them. Such a widespread flow of information and images elicits a feeling of dispar-
ity between the “unlucky” ones in Italy and the “lucky” ones who live elsewhere. It 
also produces of a sense of longing for further migration.
Information and images from the First World not only reach Eritrean refu-
gees in Italy through technology. As most of them have attempted to seek asylum 
further north, they have directly experienced the differences of being an asylum 
seeker in Italy and in a Scandinavian country. Senay, for example, had tried to seek 
asylum in Sweden and often remembered his days as an asylum seeker there as a 
beautiful period of his life. “You see, Milena, I was fat at that time, because I was 
relaxed,” he told me, while we were sitting in front of his Facebook pictures. “I had 
such a great time there,” he added. “I met my old friends from Asmara, and you see 
what a house we had?! Not like the ugly squat where I live now.”
“Dubliners” are not the only ones who come back to Italy. Whenever the Eritre-
ans who have made it to the First World come back on vacation, they bring images 
and information that make their “stuck” friends want to leave. Social, cultural, and 
economic remittances play a key role, not only in places of intense out-migration, 
like Eritrea, but also in so-called transit areas, such as Italy. Once, I went with 
Alazar and Senay to meet a friend of theirs, Girmay, who had come from Swit-
zerland for a few days’ vacation. We sat in an Eritrean bar, not far from Termini 
Station, where Alazar, Senay, and Girmay and the bar owner gossiped for a whole 
afternoon, exchanging information about how to move from one place to another 
and sharing views about the lifestyles and living conditions in different countries.
Moreover, unmet family expectations concerning their migration path and 
economic support for their kin weighed like stones on their shoulders. While eth-
nographically exploring the disturbances in the flows of communication, gifts, 
and remittances between refugees in Italy and their families in Eritrea, the next 
sections illustrate the implications of these unmet expectations on practices and 
resilient aspirations of onward mobility.
. . . and expectations from Eritrea
Eritrean emigration is not perceived only as an individualistic search for better life 
prospects, but also as a strategy to ensure families’ well-being through remittances. 
It is embedded in a web of economic, moral, and cultural expectations concerning 
the destination of the migration journey, the kind of life they should have in that 
country, and the kind of support refugees will provide for those who stay behind. 
Although many studies investigate the moral economy of migrants’ remittances, kin 
obligations, and gift exchange in transnational families,39 the influence of families 
on migration decisions has rarely been considered an important factor in refugees’ 
movements.40 However, kin-bound obligations and values directly impacted my 
informants’ feelings of being stuck, as in Gabriel’s case.
94    An Endless Journey
Gabriel arrived in Italy in 2007, when he was twenty-three. He stayed in a cen-
ter for assistance of asylum seekers in Crotone in Calabria for a few months, the 
time necessary to be granted legal status. Then, like most other refugees in that 
period, he left on his own. He went to Rome, where he slept in the Anagnina squat 
for a while, and then moved to Milan, where a friend of his had told him that 
there were more work opportunities. He remembered the period in Anagnina as 
a horrible nightmare. “Everything was dirty and we were sleeping on the ground. 
I hate Rome.” In Milan, too, until it was demolished, he lived in a squat—in Porta 
Romana, where he had a small shop. “I was doing good business there,” he told 
me during our long strolls around the periphery of Milan. He found a job in Rho 
Fiere, an industrial area of Milan, and worked there for two years, but when I met 
him in the summer of 2012, he had lost the job and was involved in a legal dispute 
with his ex-employers.
Gabriel loved Milan, especially for its elegant shops, from which he liked to 
buy expensive clothes and shoes, which made him feel he had really reached the 
First World. Although he often complained about his compatriots, he spent most 
of his time in the Eritrean neighborhood around Porta Venezia, where he used to 
eat his lunch or drink beer. He felt at home there somehow. He kept on saying that 
he could have found a job whenever he wanted in Milan, because he knew people 
and was a hard-working man. However, his job hunt was continually delayed: he 
was undecided whether to stay in Italy or move on. “My family thinks Italy is not 
good for me,” Gabriel used to tell me. “They want me to go to Germany, where we 
have some relatives . . . but I want to decide my life for myself.”
At first I did not give much importance to this statement about his family’s 
pressure to move on, but as soon as I entered Gabriel’s family’s house in Asmara 
in 2013, I realized that I had been wrong not to do so. After having let me through 
the door and into the living room, Ester sat down in front of me, briefly introduced 
herself, and welcomed me into the family. Then, only a few minutes into the con-
versation, she asked me why Gabriel did not move to Germany or a Scandinavian 
country. She was worried about her nephew and thought the situation in Italy was 
not good for him. I explained to her that Gabriel was not allowed to seek asylum 
in another European country, and that it was probably better for him to try his best 
to find a new job in Italy. However, she was not convinced. After a while, Yordanos, 
Ester’s eldest daughter, came into the living room. “I know it is not easy,” she said, 
“but we see other people who have settled down in other countries in Europe. Now 
they are doing well. We wish the same for him.”
Gabriel’s relatives were aware that life for refugees in Italy was hard. As I real-
ized during my fieldwork in Eritrea, most families knew that. I was often asked: 
“How is the crisis going in Italy?”; “Is it true that people cannot find work there?” 
Aragay, one of our neighbors in Petrosia, told me, “Everyone knows that our guys 
in Italy are living in bad conditions, work is hard to find and people sleep in the 
street.” This information was usually provided by those Eritreans who had man-
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aged to pass through Italy and were residing in other countries. Eritrean national 
television also used to broadcast news about refugees’ hardships in Europe so as 
to discourage further illicit emigration from the country. However, the fact that 
refugees were facing hardships in Italy was not enough to exonerate them from 
blame. Believing that other countries in Europe could offer young Eritreans more 
opportunities, families often complained about the fact that their sons had not 
made enough of an effort to move to those “good countries.” 
Although families had general ideas about opportunities in different European 
countries, they seemed to ignore other important, but more specific aspects of 
migrants’ lives abroad. In particular, they did not know about the Dublin Regula-
tion and the problems that refugees had to face after being expelled back to Italy. 
Young Eritreans seemed better informed on these issues; for example, many of 
them knew about the importance of avoiding being fingerprinted in Italy in order 
to seek asylum in other northern European countries. Nonetheless, even among 
them, misinformation was far from rare.
Families’ expectations about their children’s onward mobility were not only 
rooted in the belief that Italy could not provide good conditions for settlement. 
They also mirrored the hope that migrant children would be able to support them. 
More specifically, support was expected in two domains: economic remittances for 
everyday survival in Eritrea and assistance to siblings who intended to migrate. 
This is crucial not only for understanding the pressure experienced by refugees 
abroad, but also to analyze the relational mechanisms that maintain the flow of 
refugees from Eritrea to Ethiopia, Sudan, Italy, and beyond. The fact remains that 
most of my Eritrean informants in Italy were not able to meet their families’ expec-
tations, since they were struggling simply to survive. This had significant implica-
tions for their family relationships and for the social status ascribed to them by 
their community of departure.
THE PRICE OF DISAPPOINTING FAMILIES
Gabriel’s family members in Asmara, particularly his sister Lwam, were bitter 
about the fact that Gabriel had not remitted anything since his arrival in Europe. 
Although they knew life was hard in Italy, they still felt bad—especially because 
he did not send anything through me. “Not even a picture,” Lwam said, saddened. 
“Life is hard in the village where my parents are. I hope one day I will be able to 
help my father.” At that time, she was often thinking about migrating to make up 
for her brother’s lack of success.
Lwam used to accompany me on visits to the families of my “Italian” infor-
mants. She often shared the feelings of frustration of the families for whom I had 
not brought gifts. She once commented to me upon leaving one home, “For people 
here, if someone migrates and cannot survive on his own, but still waits for money 
from relatives, it is like he is dead. It is already a shame to live with family here 
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in Eritrea, but you can accept it. But if you go abroad and you have to ask others 
[for money], that is not life, it is death.” Her words powerfully define the price 
that an emigrant may have to pay if he/she disappoints social expectations. The 
risk of “social death” feared by refugees I met in Ethiopian camps seemed to be 
even greater for those who had reached Italy but were not able to send remittances 
back home.
Not only families but also the community at large negatively judged refugees 
who did not help their families back home. That became clear to me when Lwam 
and I went to visit our neighbor Tegesti for a Sunday coffee. Tegesti was a smil-
ing, prosperous woman in her fifties who often used to come to Ester’s place for a 
chat and a cup of coffee. Her family had a clothes’ kiosk at the market close to the 
medeber (“caravanserai” in Tigrinya). Her house—a construction of sheet metal, 
scraps of wood, and plastic tarps—was just one street behind the one where my 
hosts used to live. Tegesti invited us to sit on the terrace outside, while Aragay, her 
husband, was shaving, holding a small broken mirror with one hand and the razor 
with the other.
While we were drinking our coffee, Tegesti started speaking about her two sons 
abroad. They were apparently doing well in Angola, but had not yet started to send 
remittances to the family. One son had left three years before and started working 
in Khartoum as an electrician. All the money he earned there was spent to help 
the younger brother emigrate. After his brother joined him, they moved to Angola 
and started working in a supermarket. With four other children to support, Tegesti 
was hoping to receive some money soon: “We cannot survive here without their 
help! 100 euro a month is 5,000 nakfa here!”
Tegesti then asked me about Lwam’s brother, Gabriel. I reported that he was 
fine, and she exclaimed wryly: “It is not enough if he’s okay, because the family 
here is waiting for nakfa! Nakfa! Nakfa!” She rubbed her thumb and index finger 
together in the “money sign,” looking into my eyes to be sure I got the point. Lwam 
laughed bitterly. She clearly felt embarrassed about her brother. Aragay mediated, 
saying that everyone knew how hard life was for refugees in Italy.
In order to avoid the social stigma associated with being in Europe but unable 
to help family members back home, Eritreans I met in Italy kept trying to move on 
to other European countries, deemed to be more generous. Until they succeed in 
that, however, they have a hard time dealing with their families back home. While 
mobile phones as well as other communication technologies have greatly facili-
tated transnational communications, they have also increased social control over 
migrants. Calls to and from family members and friends may become a burden 
for refugees, who feel overloaded with requests for money.41 Avoidance of com-
munication is one of the possible strategies to cope with overwhelming demands. 
Several of my informants had, in fact, stopped calling home. Senay had not called 
home for two years. Senay’s lack of contact with his family was common among 
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other Eritrean refugees I met in Italy. For instance, while I was in Asmara I met 
with Samhar, Kibreab’s eldest sister. She told me that Kibreab rarely called them: 
“He says he is busy . . . I know that he does not call because things are not going 
well in Italy and he cannot help the family. Please, when you go back tell him that 
things are okay here. Just ask him to take care of himself.”
In fact, Kibreab had been homeless and jobless for most of the previous four 
years. Back in Italy, I showed him the pictures of his family and gave him his sister’s 
message. “I feel ashamed to call them and hear about all their problems without 
being able to send them anything,” he told me bitterly. “I want to call when I can send 
some money. We have come here to help them . . . but now things are hard.”
Kibreab’s words show that contact avoidance is not only rooted in the inten-
tion to escape requests, but also in feelings of shame about what is recognized 
as an unfulfilled family obligation. Not much had changed in these young men’s 
perceived social status since they had left Eritrea. Geographic mobility had not led 
to the expected social mobility. In Eritrea they could not reach adulthood because 
of compulsory national service, and in Italy they were still children who could not 
support their relatives, or please them with eye-catching gifts.
GIFT S AND C OSMOLO GIES
Before leaving Italy, I had asked my Eritrean friends if they wanted me to take 
some gifts to their families, and some of them filled my luggage with pasta, olive 
oil, clothes, electric razors, phones, shoes, and pictures. Others did not answer 
my question, but still gave me the contact details of their families, whom I then 
visited. Others just avoided me for the whole time that preceded my departure. I 
noticed that those who sent gifts were the ones with a more stable emotional and 
economic situation. They were also the ones who had kept more in touch with 
their families.
Brahnu, a thirty-year-old who lived in Genoa, asked me to take some gifts to his 
family in Decamhare. Although he was still struggling in many senses, Brahnu was 
better off than many other Eritrean refugees in Italy. He had a job as a waiter in a 
catering business and carved traditional music instruments to sell over the inter-
net to musicians around Europe. When I told him I was going to Eritrea, he gave 
me a bag full of things for his family: shoes for his mother, religious posters, family 
pictures, a razor for his brother, and a camera—the latter two items being needed 
for a business scheme he had thought up for his brother and cousins. When I 
went to Brahnu’s family to deliver the gifts, his mother told me that her son had 
always been very mature and clever. Brahnu called his mother that day. and they 
all praised him for his generosity.
I gathered that Brahnu kept in touch regularly with his family, sometimes sent 
them money, and was ready to help his brother to leave the country. His gifts were 
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certainly appreciated for their economic value, but they were primarily symbols of 
an ongoing relationship between him and his family. Brahnu’s family also filled my 
bag with gifts for him and his daughter: a traditional dress for the girl, traditional 
baskets, homemade shiro (traditional legume flour), and berbere (a local spice mix).
This system of gift-exchange tends to parallel the flow of remittances, but is 
still distinguishable from it. Some scholars frame gifts as another kind of mate-
rial remittance,42 but gifts among my Eritrean informants and their families are 
better analyzed by looking at the example of the kula ring in the Trobriand archi-
pelago described by Bronisław Malinowski.43 The exchange of products involved 
in the kula ring—such as necklaces and bracelets made of shells—did not have a 
direct economic value, but was crucial to reaffirm trust, which underpinned trade 
relationships among the different islands. In a similar vein, the gifts sent by my 
refugee friends to their families were not as important for their economic value 
as for their symbolic value: they were symbols of an ongoing relationship that 
included economic remittances and practical support for other members of the 
family to migrate.
This is also the reason why, in other cases, my informants avoided sending gifts. 
Gifts had no meaning when the relationship between the family and refugee had 
been interrupted by the impossibility of the refugees fulfilling their perceived obli-
gations. For Senay, Gabriel, and Kibreab, it would have been ridiculous to send 
gifts if in reality there was no real possibility of providing material help to their 
families. Moreover, their families did not make an effort to send gifts back to them, 
except for a few packets of homemade shiro or some pictures.
Even though the value of transnational gifts was mostly symbolic, they still had 
to fulfil some requirements. Things coming from Europe should be new, advanced, 
or the latest model. Family members often expect high-quality products, consis-
tent with the “modernity” associated with life in the First World. Anything less 
than that may be criticized, and the sender may be judged selfish and not generous.
Alazar’s family, for example, was very critical of the gifts he sent them. On 
my first visit to their place in Asmara, I brought them pasta, soap, olive oil and 
some second-hand clothes that Alazar had given me at Termini Station before 
my departure. I then met them again in Addis Ababa, after they had all fled the 
country and were trying to find a way to move on to Europe or Canada. Robel 
and Lula—Alazar’s younger brother and sister—had crossed the southern border 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia on foot. After three months in a camp, they man-
aged to get permission to leave. Alazar’s mother Minia and her husband went to 
Khartoum by bus and then by plane to Addis Ababa, and they all started to live 
together again in one of the big condominiums in Mebrat Haile, just a few blocks 
away from my own flat. Alazar had also given me some gifts for them on this visit, 
such as a second-hand computer, a pair of brand-name sneakers, a second-hand 
mobile phone, and several cheap items of clothing.
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During one of my visits to them, Lula told me with a disgusted expression 
that the gifts sent by Alazar were not nice. “The problem is that Alazar does not 
like to share his money with others. All the clothes he sent are not good. I hate 
them. I don’t like anything there. I don’t even like skirts, I’ve never worn them. 
He sent so many .  .  . Look! All the stuff he sent is still in the suitcase!” Robel 
agreed, snickering, and complained about the laptop: “You see, it only works 
when plugged in!”
Minia, on the other hand, was more defensive about “her” Alazar, but she was 
trying to understand from me what kind of life Alazar was leading. She did not 
know much about her son’s living conditions: she was not aware that he had a 
job, she did not know where he was living, and could not understand the hard-
ships he faced. Then Lula started praising Gaim, their other brother: “Gaim is 
really generous. I would like to become a medical doctor. I want to become a 
perfect person. Especially since I met Gaim. . . . He could not study when he was 
a child, but he’s done so many things for me, making me study. I feel I want to 
be perfect for him.”
Gaim had earned a lot of money working in Israel and had just managed to 
move to Canada with a fake Ethiopian passport. He had paid for everyone’s flight 
from Eritrea and was trying to get his siblings out of Ethiopia whatever it took. 
Alazar for his part could not see the point in helping everyone migrate to Europe, 
when life is so hard there too. The way he saw it, it would have been better for them 
to settle in Ethiopia and start a small business there. When he came to the railway 
station to give me the gifts for his family, he showed me the nice pair of brand-
name sneakers that he had bought for Robel. “This costs 90 euros! I never [would 
have] bought this for myself. . . . They asked [for] so many things, but they do not 
realize that with a salary of 800 euros, it is hard to survive here. They ask, ask, ask, 
because I am in Europe. But I let them ask,”, he said, laughing.
By comparing the gifts from Alazar with those from his brother, the left-behind 
kin were reproducing the cosmology of destinations that frames Italy as a country 
of transit and Canada as a top destination. An interesting parallel can be drawn 
here with Ivan V. Small’s findings on transnational gift exchanges in Vietnam 
and their impact of the spatial imagination of remittance receivers.44 According 
to Small, in the eyes of those who receive them, remittances and gifts represent 
not only the intentionality of the overseas giver, but also the world he inhabits. 
Using Small’s interpretation, the gap in the recipient’s valuation between the gifts 
received from Alazar and those received from Gaim represented the gap between 
the two worlds they inhabit: Italy, where Eritreans were still struggling, and Can-
ada, a modern, First World country that offers a “good life.”
To a certain extent, we could also say that people are valued according to the 
place they have managed to reach. Alazar was seen as unsuccessful compared to 
Gaim, who had managed to reach Canada. The help that Alazar was giving to 
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the family was also devalued by the comparison with the support that Gaim had 
been giving to the family. His gifts were considered insignificant compared with 
the ones sent by Gaim. Even the migration support that Alazar had managed to 
arrange for Lula was not comparable with what Gaim could do for them from 
Canada. In fact, Alazar had arranged a fake marriage for his sister and was trying 
his best to find another one for Robel, but, as Minia happily exclaimed, “Now that 
Gaim is in Canada, he will send visas for everyone!” Things were obviously not as 
easy as Minia thought, but her words illustrate the widespread system of values, 
images, and expectations related to migration and specific destinations.
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Moralities of Border Crossing
Inside the World of Smuggling and 
Transnational Marriages
Among Eritreans, the use of smugglers’ services and transnational marriages to 
cross tight international borders is systemic. Whereas policy makers, international 
organizations and the media generally sanction these illicit migration practices as 
despicable and exploitative,1 this chapter highlights the underlying sense of justice, 
fairness and solidarity underpinning them. From an emic point of view, smug-
gling and transnational marriages are mostly seen as expressions of solidarity and 
legitimate economic transactions. 
The analysis of migrants’ views of these covert and unauthorized practices seeks 
to illustrate what authors like Nicholas De Genova, Sandro Mezzadra and John 
Pickles call migrants’ struggles over borders and the political order these borders 
protect.2 Without being explicitly oppositional and political, these views implicitly 
and practically unsettle dominant politics of migration. They show refugees’ aware-
ness of the aleatory nature of today’s borders and the lack of legitimacy that bureau-
cratic bans on visas have in their eyes, leading to their refusal to be subject to them. 
Some scholars have recently pointed out that migrants’ moral understanding 
of borders is crucial to analyzing unauthorized migration. Drawing on the studies 
of legal noncompliance, Emily Ryo argues that Mexican unauthorized crossings to 
the United States is rooted in migrants’ norms and values that do not recognize 
legal authorities establishing and enforcing border controls as legitimate.3 As she 
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illustrates by analyzing data from two surveys conducted in Mexico, the perceived 
unfairness among Mexicans of U.S. border regulations is associated with the deci-
sion to breach them. The lack of legitimacy of U.S. border enforcement, she sug-
gests, is rooted in the long history of political, social, and economic interdepen-
dence between the United States and Mexico and the relatively recent targeting of 
Mexican migrants in U.S. policies and procedural justice.
Underlying conceptions of fairness and justice are also crucial to understand-
ing refugees’ deceit in institutional settings. Cheating, lying, and noncooperation 
have commonly been reported in refugee camps, reception centers, and other 
refugee facilities.4 Struggling to survive in an institutional environment shaped by 
the patronage of different service providers, those in camps have to find their way 
through lies, deception, and trickery. As argued by Gaim Kibreab, these emerge from 
a gap between refugees’ ethical views, which make them accountable to their com-
munity and families, rather than to those managing the structures or allocating aid.5 
Likewise, emic moralities6 are crucial to make sense of migrant smuggling and 
transnational marriages. By analyzing the protagonists’ point of views, I show that 
these activities should not only be considered as risky, deleterious enterprises to 
which refugees passively submit. They are instead collective tactics put in place to 
achieve what my informants believe is their right to mobility. The focus on illicit 
practices is thus not a voyeuristic investigation aimed at reinforcing the image of 
the reckless, untrustworthy migrant. Its objective is to uncover their—more or less 
implicit—radical political dimension. By this, I do not mean to downplay their 
contradictory and problematic aspects.7 Rapes, torture, and death are extremely 
common among those who are smuggled across borders. Likewise, power imbal-
ances and abuse can at times underpin transnational marriages. These instances 
are, however, the inevitable implications of the lack of alternatives for legal and 
safe migration, not the root causes of migrants’ suffering.
WHOSE FAULT? PERCEPTIONS OF MOR AL AND 
NATIONAL B ORDERS
“Miss Milena, first of all, may I ask you the purpose of your stay?” Hagos asked me 
in English in front of a group of twelve other Eritrean refugees who had gathered at 
Sister Kudussan’s place to talk to me about the change of visa policy at the Italian 
embassy in Addis Ababa. That was one of the main concerns for Eritreans at the 
time of my fieldwork in Ethiopia (2013–14). In fact, a recent change in procedure 
at the Italian consulate had made family reunification processes with partners in 
Europe significantly more difficult. Hagos, a thirty-year-old refugee and his fel-
lows from Mai Nefas, a village in Eritrea, had apparently seen in me a possibility to 
reverse this worrying tendency.
“I am here to conduct my research on Eritrean refugees for my PhD,” I replied. 
Hagos seemed satisfied with my answer and continued:
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“Miss Milena, we appreciate you very much because you came here to listen 
to our stories. So I prepared a few points for you. Point 1: We have been forced to 
escape from our country because of the lack of freedom, such as the freedom of 
expression. If someone says something he will be taken to prison and none will 
hear of him for long time. We have to do national service for long time. Can you 
comment on this, Miss Milena?”
“I am aware of the problems in your country,” I said. Yonas, another Eritrean 
refugee, translated this into Tigrinya for the other participants.
“Point 2: Here in Ethiopia we face many difficulties because we don’t have oppor-
tunities for study and work. Ethiopians are our enemies and do not want us to go 
to Europe and the United States. They took away our rights and shoot us when we 
express our opinion. We have no freedom here. Can you comment on this?”
I responded that I knew that they had no rights to work in Ethiopia, but that 
they should also consider concessions by the Ethiopian government, such as per-
mission to attend university and the then recent “out-of-camp” policy, allowing 
Eritreans with family connections in Ethiopia or who could prove to be able to 
support themselves to reside outside camps.8
“ .  .  . very few opportunities to study,” Hagos replied, smiling. “Third point: 
Recently a boat full of our people sank in Lampedusa.9 I personally think that the 
first responsible for this tragedy is the government of Eritrea; secondly I think 
the one responsible is the embassy of Italy in Ethiopia, because many people had 
a process10 with Italy but their visas had been rejected by the embassy. Can you 
comment on this?”
I replied that I could not judge other people’s work and that the consulate had 
its own ways to check the plausibility of marriages.
“How can the embassy know which marriages are real and which ones 
are false?!”
I explained to them that the consulate staff cross-checked the data and the 
information refugees provided about their partners. At that point, the atmo-
sphere heated up. Dbab, a woman in her fifties, shook her head; Candle, a young 
woman on my right, exclaimed that the problem was the Ethiopian translator at 
the embassy. Hagos added “those . . . they don’t want us to go to Europe.” Georgis 
reported that the previous week, twenty-eight Eritreans had applied for reunifi-
cation, but only two had been accepted—“But the marriages were true! I know 
it!” he said. Hagos continued: “Fourth point: because of colonization, I think that 
Italy has the obligation to receive and welcome Eritreans. Thank you for listening 
Miss Milena.”
Saying that I could not change the laws on asylum and the regulations on inter-
national migration, I tried to address their doubts about visa proceedings and 
rights of asylum seekers. But my answers did not bring solutions to their problems, 
and most of them left the room unsatisfied. Yonas, the twenty-two-year-old trans-
lator for the occasion, smiled bitterly while walking out of the door and murmured, 
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“I do not need any process. My legs will be my process.” He intended to cross the 
desert and the Mediterranean in the next months with the help of smugglers.
Yonas’s statement powerfully exemplifies the determination of many Eritrean 
refugees to vindicate what they perceive as their rights through actions. Faced 
with all those bureaucratic and legal mechanisms—such as visa requirements and 
international asylum regulations—which immobilize them in a geographic, social, 
and political condition of marginality, my informants’ attempts to circumvent bor-
ders can be seen as resistance practices expressing their right to escape.11 The prac-
tice of unauthorized border crossing to Europe was not negatively sanctioned by 
the groups of Eritreans I met; rather, it was considered to be the “only possible 
alternative” to an unfair social and geographic immobility in Africa. Likewise, cir-
cumventing consular regulations for the purpose of obtaining visas was not per-
ceived as an immoral act, because embassies and what they represent were not 
recognized as legitimate authorities.
Hagos’s hierarchy of blame for recent migrant fatalities illustrates the extent to 
which refugees’ perspectives differ from the predominant conceptions of history, 
rights, and responsibilities implicit in the public discourse on unauthorized migra-
tion. Faced with the death of their compatriots at sea, he and the other refugees 
apportioned blame firstly to the Eritrean government, which was compelling them 
to leave the country, and secondly to the international community, specifically 
Italy, which did not permit refugees to move freely to Europe and to other devel-
oped countries. Ethiopians were also pointed out as enemies, obstructing Eritre-
ans’ path to freedom. Although perceptions about smugglers were not univocal 
among refugees I met, as illustrated later, smugglers were not even mentioned 
among those possibly responsible for migrants’ deaths. Nor were the migrants 
themselves blamed for their attempts to cross the border illicitly. This perspec-
tive completely overturns common interpretations of unauthorized migration in 
international public discourse.12
In the United States as well as in European policy and media discourse, smug-
glers are typically considered those mostly accountable for migrants’ suffering. The 
European Agenda on Migration, adopted by the European Commission in 2015, 
identified the fight against migrant smuggling as a priority. Smugglers are targeted 
“to prevent the exploitation of migrants by criminal networks and reduce incen-
tives to irregular migration.”13 However, as many commentators have argued, the 
availability of smuggling services is not among the “incentives to irregular migra-
tion.” Rather, these emerge from the deterioration of conditions and limited long-
term prospects in transit countries. Whereas authorities tend to emphasize smug-
glers’ violence toward their customers, authors like David Spener have highlighted 
instead the structural violence of nation-state borders, which create a sort of global 
apartheid.14 Smuggling, in this perspective, as a mechanism that facilitates “autono-
mous migration” in violation of state regulations, is a resistance practice. 
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Hagos’s claims were in that period materializing in organized protests – the 
ones he referred to in his speech against the symbols of the international asylum 
regime and Western nations. Just a month before I arrived in Ethiopia (October 
2013), a large protest had taken place in the camps in the north of the country.15 
During a mourning ceremony for the victims of the Lampedusa accident, refugees 
voiced their anger at a system that, in their eyes, did not provide them any pros-
pects beyond risking their lives at sea. The main claim was that the Lampedusa 
tragedy had been the consequence of insufficient resettlement quotas from the 
camps. Peaceful demonstrations were held, but smaller groups of young refugees 
also threw stones at local bureaus. Significantly, the most violent acts targeted the 
symbols of the current asylum regime, such as UNHCR offices and services, as 
several of my informants who were present at the events confirmed.
My informants’ claims, however, were far from being the coherent product 
of a mature political consciousness. Revolutionary and reactionary aspects were 
ambivalently present in their claims. While protesting against the injustice of the 
international asylum system, Hagos evoked Italy’s historical colonial role to chal-
lenge current restrictive visa policies, saying, “because of colonization, I think 
that Italy has the obligation to receive and welcome Eritreans.”16 Such postcolonial 
claims were common among Eritreans across my research sites.
Taking into consideration this shared moral framework is key to overcome sim-
plistic understandings of illicit practices surrounding border-crossing. The analysis 
of the specific moral, social and economic contexts in which they are embedded 
reveals blurred boundaries between refugees and smugglers, victims and exploiters, 
marriages of convenience and those established on the basis of love, tradition, or 
solidarity. Drawing from my ethnographic interviews with a variety of informants 
throughout my fieldwork and participant observation among refugees and smug-
glers in Ethiopia and Sudan, the next sections examine the social and moral roots of 
smuggling and transnational marriages in the context of Eritrean migration.
EXPLORING THE SO CIAL AND MOR AL WORLD OF 
ERITREAN UNAUTHORIZED MIGR ATION
Human smuggling has received widespread attention by policy makers and 
scholars over the past twenty years.17 Mostly analyzed concurrently with traffick-
ing, smuggling has often been described for its exploitative character. However, 
an increasing number of ethnographic studies point to a very different aspect 
of smuggling. Researchers working on the U.S.-Mexico border have illustrated 
how coyotaje—the smuggling of immigrants into the United States—is socio-
economically and morally embedded in migrants’ communities.18 Other scholars 
working with Somalis, Afghanis, Syrians have illustrated how smuggling activi-
ties are often framed as acts of solidarity in communities affected by protracted 
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displacement.19 Tekalign Ayalew Megiste, in particular, talks about smuggling as 
system of “protection from below” from below in the context of Eritrean migra-
tion. Smuggling, he argues, emerges as a sort of community knowledge histori-
cally developed through contextual experience and transnational exchanges of 
information, “that allows those in transit to be guarded from criminal organiza-
tions, environmental challenges, and restrictive migration regimes, but also from 
the trap that asylum conditions—including refugee camps—have become.”20 My 
ethnographic investigation similarly shows how smuggling is deeply embedded 
in its history and society.
DISGUISED AS SHEPHERDS:  A LONG HISTORY 
OF B ORDER CROSSING
Clandestine border crossing has long been a necessity in the region. History books, 
private chronicles from the 1970s–80s,21 and oral narrations of first-generation 
refugees show that many mechanisms of the contemporary smuggling process 
have been in place for a long time. Escaping the purges of the Derg in the 1980s, 
Eritreans would disguise themselves as shepherds to avoid patrols. Many of them 
used local guides—equivalent to contemporary pilots—who requested a payment 
according to the relationship with the smuggled individual: relatives would not 
have to pay, while others might pay up to 600 Ethiopian birr—equivalent to about 
U.S.$300. Violence, rapes, and kidnappings were also common.
The chronicles of the time testify to the long-standing existence of an elabo-
rated professional and economic system developed around people smuggling.22 
Then, as today, this system involved a wide variety of individuals who enabled the 
unauthorized passage of Eritreans from one country to another. This multiplicity 
of characters, roles, and activities is hardly reducible to the mainstream categories 
of the international debate. During my research I heard several terms used for the 
“professionals” of the migration business. The commonest were pilots, delelti, and 
semserti. It became clear that words like “smugglers” and “traffickers” did not make 
much sense in the context I was studying. Looking at the internal differentiation 
of the smuggling business in Eritrean migration shows, not only how misleading 
it is to use the word “smuggler” to identify all these different figures, but that these 
practices are embedded in Eritrean society and in refugees’ social milieu.
PILOT S:  THE GUIDES 
“Pilot” is the word used by Eritrean refugees to refer to the “guide” who actually 
accompanies escapees walking through the border in return for payment. In the 
literature on Mexico-U.S. border crossing, these guides are called “coyotes.”23 This 
role is especially important in the crossing between Eritrea and Ethiopia or Eritrea 
and Sudan, which is mostly done on foot. However, not everyone I met had crossed 
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the border with the help of a professional pilot. Many of the refugees I interviewed 
told me that their getaway was possible because they had been moved to a military 
post or to a teaching job in some areas close to the Sudanese or Ethiopian border. 
From there some of them knew the way or had friends who helped them.
According to the refugees and brokers I interviewed, professional pilots are 
Eritreans highly familiar with the border region. Ex-militaries and shepherds are 
also suited for this role due to their physical resilience. In fact, they are generally 
well trained to walk for long hours at night to avoid soldiers.24
It was surprising to discover that aside from a few who lived in border com-
munities and managed to work as guides without being noticed by authorities, the 
majority of pilots did not live in Eritrea. As I was told in several instances, many 
of them were Eritrean refugees in Sudanese and Ethiopian camps. They used to go 
and collect people in Eritrea and then take them across the border. Others had two 
passports and could freely enter Eritrea and Sudan.
I never had the chance to formally meet a pilot, but my informants spoke about 
them in almost legendary terms. The disregard of the dangers, their physical resil-
ience and knowledge of the territory make pilots objects of respect and admiration 
as well as fear and hatred when things do not go smoothly as wished. Petros, a 
twenty-four-year-old theology student who had recently fled from Eritrea to Ethi-
opia, said, “They [pilots] are heroes to me! They grant us a way out from Eritrea in 
spite of huge risks!” However, on other occasions I was told that pilots would not 
hesitate to abandon slow walkers to the soldiers’ mercy if they had to.
While pilots are crucial in the first part of the journey from Eritrea to neighbor-
ing countries, drivers become more important in the second and third parts of the 
journey when people are driven from Sudanese or Ethiopian camps to Khartoum 
and from there through the Sahara desert in Libya. In Libya, pilots and drivers are 
replaced by boatmen. As I have been told, while pilots and drivers in the first part 
of the journey were usually Eritreans, drivers and boatmen in Ethiopia, Sudan, 
and Libya were of different nationalities: drivers in Ethiopia were usually Ethio-
pians, and in Sudan, Sudanese; boatmen in Libya were sometimes Tunisians, but 
in many other cases they were chosen from among the Eritrean refugees them-
selves.25 People with some nautical experience or mechanical skills are sometimes 
allowed or asked to steer the boat in exchange for a discount or free passage. These 
details, however, are continually changing, along with the geopolitical fluctuations 
surrounding migration corridors. Since my informants passed through Libya, 
the situation in the country has worsened dramatically, and the conditions of the 
smuggling business have completely changed. As I was told by several research 
participants in 2015 and 2016, Eritrean middlemen who controlled the passage 
through Libya had to interrupt their operations due to the violence in the country, 
as well as Libyan and Italian police interventions targeting them.26 The seeming 
lack of well-established Eritrean brokers in Libya and the shift of the control in 
the smuggling business to Libyan militias and Touba Bedouin may be among the 
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main reasons for the radical deterioration of the conditions of migrants who want 
to traverse Libya and a huge increase in the risk of being kidnapped and tortured. 
If smuggling is, as Tekalign Ayalew Mengiste argued, a system of “protection from 
below,” anti-smuggling actions risk to further increase migrants’ vulnerability in 
already extremely unstable and violent contexts. 
HAWAL AS:  THE MONEY-TR ANSFER AGENT S
Transactions of money between smugglers, refugees, and relatives abroad paying 
for the journey usually take place through informal circuits. The financial agents 
of this informal money-transfer system are called hawalas. The system works as 
follows: the refugee’s relative, who usually lives in Europe or the United States, 
pays a local hawala in cash; this hawala in Europe has contact with another hawala 
in Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia, or Libya, who pays the money to the smuggler who 
has provided the service. The two hawalas will each charge a commission for this 
service, settling with each other later.
This practice is centuries old and well known—albeit by different names—not 
only in Eritrea, but in the whole Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and South and 
East Asia.27 These informal financial systems are based on the transfer of the debt 
from one person to another and can work only if there is trust between agents 
and between them and the customers. The hawala system originates in contexts 
where there is no institutional banking or when a formal financial service is 
not convenient.28
In the case of Eritreans, hawalas are typically individuals who have a shop, or are 
involved in some kind of trade in Eritrea or elsewhere. To have a shop allows the 
hawala to settle the debt via a trade transaction, so hawalas usually come from the 
Eritrean lower middle class, or from more resourceful families who have trading 
licenses and good contacts with government officials to ensure a smooth business.
These systems of money transfer have increasingly become the target of West-
ern governments’ controls because of alleged implications in funding terrorism, 
but the greater part of their business consists of migrants’ remittances.29 With 
regard to the Somali xawilaad, Anna Lindley argues that “their services have 
served to sustain local livelihoods and alleviate suffering.”30 Likewise, the hawala 
system in Eritrea not only enables payment to smugglers, but is also used to sus-
tain families at home in times of crisis. However, hawalas are not only targeted 
by Western governments. In 2015, the Eritrean government enacted a series of 
financial interventions that severely affected the business of hawalas, as well as the 
positive impact of remittances and the purchasing power of locals.31 This may have 
also indirectly influenced the possibilities of relatives abroad financing journeys 
out of the country and led, along with other factors, to the decrease in Eritrean 
arrivals in Europe in recent years.
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THE UNIVERSE OF BROKERS
Eritreans in Ethiopia referred to brokers mostly as delelti, while those I met in 
Sudan mostly called them semserti.32 Both words refer to specialists in unauthor-
ized migration who are able to provide a wide range of services, from fake papers, 
like national ID cards and passports, to business marriages and border crossings. 
Different semserti are specialized in different services, depending on their contacts 
with local authorities, pilots, drivers, and military officers. Their job mostly con-
sists of “connecting” demand with supply—customers with pilots and drivers—
and they are usually the ones who make the highest profit. They are often respon-
sible for organizing the logistics of the journey, such as travel arrangements and 
the provision of food and shelter during stops.33
However, in every transaction there can be more than one middleman. Let’s 
imagine that Rachel, a fictional Eritrean girl, wants to find a way to escape from 
the country. She personally does not know a pilot or a semsari, so she would usu-
ally ask someone who has already escaped the country to put her in touch with 
a trusted pilot. Her hypothetical friend, Simon, who lives in Addis Ababa, does 
not have direct contact with the pilot, but he knows a middleman. Simon finds 
out that the price to cross the border is U.S.$1,000. Depending on Simon’s will to 
help Rachel or to make some money out of her request, he may or may not add 
U.S.$500 for facilitating the transaction. Likewise, the middleman whom Simon 
had contacted may not be in direct contact of the pilot, but, as a ring in the chain 
of transactions, he may charge some money on top of the initial price set for the 
pilot to accompany Rachel across the border. The less direct and longer the chain 
of people that connects the customer and the pilot, the more expensive the trip is.
This gives an idea of the ramifications of the smuggling business within some 
sectors of the Eritrean population and shows that clear-cut distinctions between 
refugees and middlemen, and even between victims and exploiters, often make 
little sense in this context. Most middlemen are refugees themselves, who may 
have been involved occasionally in helping someone to get out of the country with 
a big, little, or no compensation in exchange. However there were degrees of pro-
fessionalism and expertise within the universe of middlemen. Some do it sporadi-
cally or in their free time, others do it full time, like Tsegay and Michael, whom I 
met, respectively, in Addis Ababa and Khartoum.
Tsegay, a church boy . . . 
To meet someone directly involved in the smuggling business became crucial for me 
in order to understand the inside mechanisms of the migration industry, which was 
moving thousands of Eritrean refugees across the border. However, it was not easy to 
get to know one of them. When I asked my informants and friends in Addis Ababa, 
all of them told me that it was impossible: smugglers would be too scared to talk to 
110    Moralities of Border Crossing
me. Public attention was at the time focused on secondary movements of Eritrean 
refugees from the camps in Tigray to Sudan, and the Ethiopian police were known 
to be strict with anyone involved in the smuggling business. Adonay tried asking a 
classmate of his who was working as a middleman on the side. He refused and even 
got angry at Adonay for mentioning his existence to me. Temesghen, my neighbor in 
Mebrat, also discouraged me from searching, exclaiming: “They do not want to share 
their injera [flat bread typical of the Eritrean and Ethiopian culinary tradition].”
However, one day in February, Stephanos, one of the young theology students 
I met through Sister Kudussan, called me to say that his “friend” had agreed to 
talk to me. Surrounded by excavation works in Mexico Square, Violetta (my inter-
preter at the time) and I met for the first time with “the smuggler” Tsegay. Con-
trary to all conventional images of smugglers as cruel villains, Tsegay was a smiling 
man in his late twenties with a clean, kind face and a funny trotting gait, wearing 
a checked shirt and a black leather jacket. He invited us for a pizza in a nearby 
restaurant and told us his story.
Originally from a small village close to the Catholic town of Segeneiti, Tsegay, 
the third of ten brothers, had been raised in Asmara. After school, he was sent to 
Assab as a soldier but fled in 2008 through the Danakil desert. He began his activi-
ties as delalai simply because he needed money. His uncle in the Emirates was not 
financially supporting him, and finding work was not easy in Addis at the time. 
He wondered what people desired the most, and found that the answer was easy: 
“to leave.” Together with a former comrade from Assab, he started the business in 
2010, about three years before I met him.
In the beginning, his business was mainly based on crossing from Eritrea into 
Ethiopia. In my understanding, this period of his activities overlapped with his 
stay in May Aini camp, where as an ex-soldier, he had little difficulty getting pilots 
to trust him; then, a year before I met him—probably when he had made some 
money and could move to Addis Ababa—he expanded the range of services he 
offered. When I interviewed him, he could organize the trip from Ethiopia to 
direct Sudan or to Libya, provide passports or residence permits in Ethiopia, and 
arrange business marriages.
Tsegay told us that getting into the business had not been hard. Competition, 
as he said, was fair. He claimed he had not received any threats from other com-
peting brokers. His job mainly consisted of putting customers in contact with 
people offering the services they required: staff in the Ethiopian Ministerial Office 
of Nationality for an Ethiopian passport, a driver for a journey to Sudan, a guide 
for the escape from Eritrea. Although some collaborations with these other agents 
were stable, none was set in stone, and they could be changed or canceled if oppor-
tunities and conditions changed.
Tsegay planned to work as a delalai just until he could get enough money 
together to leave the country himself. The year before, he had had to pay for his 
brother to get to Sweden, and this had delayed him, but, he said, “In a year, I 
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should be all right.” He dreamt of reaching England—in his view a country of 
opportunities for those like him who wanted to pursue further education.
When the interview came to an end, Tsegay nodded his head and invited his 
two friends who had quietly been sitting at a nearby table to join us. Violetta was at 
ease chatting with those guys. They were all wodat Asmara, “Asmara boys,” smart 
talkers, full of jokes and stories. They laughed a lot together, while I tried to catch 
the main sense of the conversation in Tigrinya. Violetta suddenly remembered 
that she had seen Tsegay before: “Oh, you were in that comedy at the Catholic 
Church of Saint Paul [in Addis Ababa]! You were very good and sang with a loud 
and clear voice in the choir!” Yes, that had been him. He attended that church 
regularly. After that, Tsegay and his friends became regular visitors at Violetta’s 
and my place, but he was not the only delalai I met. After moving to Khartoum, I 
happened to run into another broker.
. . . and Michael, “a schoolboy”
It was an ordinary Sunday in Khartoum. It had been a few days since I had started 
living with Maria and her eight-year-old child, Anna. That day, after going to the 
market, Maria took me to the house of her friend Seifu, a thirty-two-year-old 
Eritrean woman who had been Maria’s neighbor in Asmara. Seifu was sharing the 
place with other two Eritrean ladies and three young Eritrean men. All of them 
were waiting for a family visa or for the right moment to move to better destina-
tions. Seifu had been in Khartoum for three years and was waiting for a reunifi-
cation visa with her husband (a “business” one, as I later understood) who had 
moved to Sweden.
We were sitting in Seifu’s living room chatting with her housemates when 
Michael and two Somali men walked in the door. Michael was an old friend of 
the household. Seifu, Maria, and their housemates had all grown up in the same 
neighborhood in Asmara. Short and thin with shiny curly hair, tidy clothes and 
a pair of glasses, Michael hardly seemed twenty, like someone fresh from school.
Michael barely said hi to me, but he kept glancing in my direction while 
Mohammed, his talkative Somali partner, was telling me how he and Michael had 
become friends during a holiday together. I found myself unable to believe his story 
entirely, and when Michael and his friends offered us a lift home, I asked Michael, 
“What do you do in Khartoum?” He ignored me, but the driver answered: “We 
sell cars.” Before dropping us off, Michael asked for my telephone number, and not 
long afterward, he called me, saying: “I think we have an appointment. We’ll be 
there in thirty minutes.” I was surprised, since we had not fixed any appointment, 
but the prospect of meeting up with Michael also felt promising.
From that meeting on, until I left Sudan, Michael opened up a whole world for 
me. On that first night out, he revealed to me that he was a semsari and took me to 
one of the bars frequented by people smugglers in the city. Michael and his busi-
ness became one of my main interests, but hanging out with him was not always 
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easy. Although I used to meet up with him together with Maria, Anna, Seifu, and 
other friends on social occasions such as Easter celebration or Sunday coffees, 
we could not speak about his work in the presence of others, since he wished to 
keep it secret. He was otherwise available only during working hours, which, for 
him, meant nighttime. But even then, he was often unwilling to answer my ques-
tions, saying: “Not now Milena, I am trying to relax, please.” He knew that I was a 
researcher and that I was interested in his job, but it seemed hard for him to see me 
as a professional; for him I was more of an entertaining companion. Planning was 
almost impossible with him. Sometimes he would give me an appointment only to 
cancel, saying, “Sorry Milena . . . sra allo [I had to work]”; at other times, he would 
just call me in the middle of the night to tell me: “We are coming. Get ready.”
I managed to have significant conversations with him in unconventional envi-
ronments, such as his house before he was too drunk or high to understand what I 
was asking; in noisy bars full of semserti; in romantic luxurious restaurants, inter-
rupted by the continuous phone calls of his assistants; in the warehouse where 
migrants transiting to Libya were temporarily staying, while Michael and the 
guardians were drinking whisky and dancing to loud pop and Tigrinya music
KILLERS AND SEMSERTI :  RESPONSIBILIT Y AND 
AC C OUNTABILIT Y IN THE SMUGGLING BUSINESS
While driving around Khartoum Talata, Michael pointed out at some flashy Mid-
dle Eastern restaurants at the side of a popular road we were passing. “These are 
the shops of the killers. They sell our people like beasts. I am a semsari, but I 
have humanity.”
The “killers” in Michael’s terms were what international conventions call traf-
fickers, that is to say, criminals who exploit other human beings, usually in the sex 
industry, slave labor business, and body organs market.34 They are usually distin-
guishable from smugglers because they get hold of their victims by force, whereas 
smugglers’ services are usually sought by the migrant. Although separately defined 
in international protocols, authors have often analyzed them as contiguous busi-
nesses. Many, in fact, have highlighted that migrants’ experiences defy easy catego-
rization, since smuggled migrants may be coerced, punished, and held hostage at 
many points along the way.35
Although smuggled migrants may end up being trafficked, smugglers and traf-
fickers usually have divergent interests.36 While smugglers want their customers 
to be highly satisfied with their services, because their profits depend on their 
reliability and good reputation, traffickers prey on their victims and do not care 
about their popularity. In the context of Eritrean migration, the Rashaida ethnic 
group and other Bedouin groups are especially infamous for the kidnapping of 
refugees who tried to cross the Sinai Desert from Egypt to reach Israel.37 Many 
kidnappings have also been reported from the area of Kassala in eastern Sudan. 
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These “killers” took their victims to bases in the Sinai and tortured them so that 
their screams would convince their families abroad to pay a ransom, which could 
amount to U.S.$50,000. According to several reports, from four thousand to thirty 
thousand Eritreans were trafficked in the Sinai from 2009 to 2013, for ransoms 
totaling U.S.$600 million.38 According to Michael, the owners of those restaurants 
in Khartoum were related to the traffickers and were using the restaurant to laun-
der the money they made from the kidnappings. Once I asked Michael if he had 
ever sold people to the Rashaida: “No, no, never! You know, one month ago in a 
village outside Khartoum, there was a truck full of Eritrean refugees from Ethio-
pia. The Rashaida came. They were armed with guns and wanted to kidnap them. 
My assistants had guns too and protected the refugees. Only one died in the shoot-
ing. I care for my customers . . . Ah and do you remember the other day when I 
told you that I was busy? It was because a truck of people from Ethiopia had been 
caught by the Ethiopian police. I paid money from my own pocket to free them!”
For Michael it was very important to mark his distance from the killers and to 
state his “humanity,” despite the irregularity of his business. He also tended to stress 
that he was taking responsibility for the smuggled refugees. Tsegay similarly said 
that one of his duties was to look after his customers: “I take responsibility for the 
people I send.” Were the two smugglers I encountered examples of “good” semserti 
or were these claims just good business?
Tsegay’s and Michael’s attention to their customers, their claim of “being respon-
sible for them” can be interpreted as part of their ethical code or an expression of 
empathy with the refugees, but also as a marketing strategy. Tsegay did not have 
difficulties admitting that “to take responsibility” was necessary for the success of 
his business: “If someone I send dies, I lose customers,” he stated bluntly. As both 
smugglers explained to me, the success of their activities was mainly based on 
word-of-mouth reputation: the death or imprisonment of some customers would 
mean that next refugees would choose another delalai over them. 
Semserti, in any case, are the ones held responsible by other refugees and their 
families if something goes wrong. For this reason, collaboration with trustworthy 
partners (pilots, drivers, other semserti) and the control over the whole smuggling 
process were crucial in Michael’s and Tsegay’s business. Partnerships in business 
were mainly based on personal knowledge and national belonging. Tsegay pre-
ferred first of all to collaborate with Eritreans he had known for long time, then, 
on a scale of decreasing trust, he could work with Eritreans in general, Ethiopians 
and with other nationalities, only if they had no other available contacts. Eritreans 
were the most trustworthy, not only because of national solidarity, but because 
they were accountable for their deeds. With a somehow disturbing clarity Tsegay 
reminded me that the business of smuggling people could get serious: “It is easy to 
track an Eritrean and his family if something goes wrong.” For this reason, Tsegay 
usually required one of his Eritrean collaborators to accompany drivers of other 
nationalities and ensure that things went as planned.
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Without denying that violence can be an integral part of smuggling, especially 
when things go wrong, the above ethnographic insights illustrate that it is cru-
cial for scholars to carefully consider that smugglers and traffickers are the same 
people: they instead belong to competing markets.
A LOT OF MONEY AND HOW TO SPEND IT: 
A MOR ALIT Y OF SHARING
Owing to the covert nature and shifting conditions of the business, it is difficult 
to give a realistic estimate of the overall amount of money circulating around the 
smuggling of migrants, but in 2017, the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) estimated around U.S.$10 billion annually.39 In particular, it is calculated 
that the routes from West, East and North Africa to Europe, and South America to 
North America generate approximately USD 6.75 billion a year.
Against this background, Michael’s was only one of many small enterprises that 
thrive. He was indeed able to earn a lot of money; during the five weeks I was in 
Khartoum alone, he received sixty Somalis from Shagarab and thirty Eritreans 
from Ethiopian camps. If, as he claimed, he earned around U.S.$1,000 for each 
person he sent to Libya, he would have grossed around $90,000 in one month. 
He was also getting money from people who were crossing from Eritrea to Sudan 
and those who paid to be driven from Ethiopia to Khartoum. Certainly, Michael’s 
profit might dramatically decrease if his customers were apprehended by the 
police or kidnapped along the way.
Michael’s earnings as a smuggler also had positive implications for those around 
him. Young men hanging out at Seifu’s house often ran small errands for Michael 
in exchange for some money. Michael was extremely generous with his friends: he 
bought new furniture for Seifu’s house, gave money to Maria and Anna whenever he 
saw them, bought a big ram for Easter, and treated everyone—including me—to a 
night of dancing on one of the many barges on the Nile River in Khartoum. His gen-
erosity was almost excessive; I often felt I was experiencing some kind of potlatch.40
However, not all smugglers are so wealthy. Earnings depend on the popular-
ity of the smuggler, the number of customers available, and the competition. For 
example, Tsegay told me that his earnings were not so great, probably because 
he had only recently started out in the business. His income fluctuated strongly, 
depending on the season. In a good month—usually from January to September—
he could earn up to 12,000 birr (U.S.$550), but in some months, there simply was 
not enough demand for his services.
LIKE SURGEONS? 
Both Tsegay and Michael held anti-government political views. In their opinion, 
the government is the cause of all the suffering Eritreans face. Tsegay supported a 
recent political movement called Eritrean Youth for Social Change, which prom-
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ises to unite all Eritreans in a single front of liberation from the dictatorship of Isa-
ias Afwerki, the independent nation’s first, and thus far only, president. Michael’s 
political views were more ambivalent, but he often declared: “I hate those below 
[in] the government. Isaias is a hero, I love what he represents and his history, but 
those below him are all corrupt.”41
Both Tsegay and Michael thought that I, as researcher, had an important role to 
play in witnessing and denouncing the suffering of their people. It was because of his 
political views that Tsegay agreed to talk to me. He appreciated the fact that some-
one was interested and would publicize the hard conditions under which Eritreans 
lived. Michael similarly often praised me for having made the effort to go to Sudan 
to see with my own eyes what Eritreans were going through (see Appendix).
Tsegay and Michael regarded smuggling refugees as a “remedy” for the tragic 
situation of their people, rather than an extension of it.42 When I asked Tsegay how 
he thought of his role as a delalai, he replied: “You know, in life good things go 
together with bad things. Even a doctor has to do things that imply a high risk and 
sometimes the death of his patients. For example, when a doctor takes his patient 
into the operating theater, he has to ponder possible risks and positive outcomes 
of the operation. Similarly, I have chosen to look at the positive outcomes of my 
work: my customers will benefit greatly from the surgery [I perform].” Tsegay and 
Michael presented themselves as providing the means to quench people’s thirst for 
a better life and freedom of movement.
Nevertheless, Tsegay and Michael were not completely comfortable with their 
job, which they tended to keep secret from their loved ones. When I asked Tsegay 
if his family in Asmara knew about his job, he smiled, embarrassed, and said: “No, 
I do not think they would appreciate it.” Similarly, Michael wanted to keep his job 
secret from even his closest friends in Khartoum. The first time Michael told me 
about his other life as a smuggler, he cautioned: “Don’t tell Maria, Samson, and the 
others about my job, okay? They are like my family here; I do not want them to be 
involved.” His generosity could be interpreted as a way of addressing his sense of 
guilt about the way he earned his money. Although he sometimes boasted about 
his wealth, he was not proud of his activities. The first time he confessed to me 
what he did, sitting in the bar that night, he whispered: “All these people are not 
good . . . I am not good either.” Likewise, their customers have contradictory moral 
views of semserti.
CUSTOMERS’  VIEWS ON BROKERS:  HEROES 
OR VILL AINS?
Although news media and international organizations characterize people smug-
glers as profiteers and exploiters, studies show that they are often highly respected 
in their communities, sometimes even considered philanthropists.43 In other 
reports, their business does not bear a particular moral connotation and is per-
ceived as something ordinary.44
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The refugees I met sometimes showed disapproval of smugglers, and sometimes 
admiration for them and appreciation of their services. When I asked Adonay in 
Addis Ababa what his view on smugglers was, he answered: “It is not ethical; peo-
ple are sold from one person to another and they risk their lives.” During my field-
work in Ethiopian refugee camps, Jacob, a twenty-six-year-old engineer resolved 
to move to Europe, thought likewise. “They are exploiters,” he said. “They just want 
to make money out of people’s misery!” Nevertheless, he was determined to use 
their services before long, and when I pointed out what I saw as a bit of hypocrisy, 
he replied, “We have no other choice.” Isaias, another older Eritrean refugee, who 
was present during my conversation with Jacob, had a different view: “Smugglers 
are not exploiters,” he said. “They just give people what they ask of them. Some 
are very generous; they take people even if they do not have enough money to 
pay them . . . so many times I saw people begging them to put them on the truck 
during the night!”
I often got negative answers when I asked other refugees directly about smug-
glers. Positive comments were more common when an opinion was not solicited. 
Maria and I once visited her friend Gerre in a nearby neighborhood of Khar-
toum. Like the other Eritreans I met in Khartoum, he was living in a compound 
he shared with fellow Eritreans. One of his neighbors was a semsari. As we were 
leaving, Gerre said of his semsari neighbor: “He is an honest one. All the people 
he sends to Europe get safely to their destination.” Gerre’s moral assessment of his 
neighbor was not concerned with the latter’s breaking international laws on smug-
gling; it was based on the reliability of the services provided.
Refugees’ answers to my direct questions were regularly influenced by what 
they thought I wanted to hear. Since I was a white European woman doing research 
on refugees and smuggling, my informants probably imagined that I endorsed the 
general humanitarian discourse that portrays smugglers as criminals and refu-
gees as victims. This relational mechanism, I believe, should also be considered 
when researchers conduct their interviews with refugees in the destination coun-
try. Without underestimating the amount of suffering they often experience dur-
ing their journeys, it should also be considered that refugees may change their 
attitudes to smugglers once they arrive at the destination because of the label-
ing process typically produced in asylum procedures and reception: the more the 
smuggler was labeled as a criminal, the more the refugee could play the role of the 
suffering victim. Performing victimhood can be crucial for recognition of refugee 
status upon arriving at one’s destination.45
Luckily, most of my informants whom I met again after the journey did not have 
especially bad experiences with their brokers. The sea crossing and long periods 
of custody while waiting to embark were physically exhausting, they said, and the 
food provided was bad, but they did not seem to blame all this on their semserti 
in particular. The unstable political conditions in Libya, the risk of being caught 
by police or militias or being attacked by Libyans were responsible. Trust of and 
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loyalty to the smuggler remain strong even after they arrive at their destination. 
Senay, my host in the Roman squat, told me how he had felt protected the entire 
time until he had crossed the sea by the semsari who helped him in Libya. He was 
deeply thankful to him and ready to reciprocate the favor anytime.
Occasionally, the Eritreans I interviewed modified their declared attitude to 
smugglers after I clarified my neutrality on the topic. Once I was chatting about 
smuggling with Gebreyesus, a talented twenty-eight-year-old novel writer who 
was among Maria’s friends in Khartoum. When I asked him what he thought 
about smugglers, he said that that profession was deeply “unethical,” being against 
international law, but later when I expressed my doubts about the moral condem-
nation of smugglers, he said: “In a sense, smugglers could be compared to those 
individuals who helped black people during slavery moving from the South to 
the North in the United States and today are considered heroes. . . . Who knows? 
Maybe one day smugglers will be considered heroes, too, because they helped 
people find freedom.”
Comments I heard about semserti were not limited to the ethical/unethi-
cal nature of the occupation. Gebreyesus, for example, found semserti generally 
quite ridiculous: “They are so arrogant . . . always with their phones, talking about 
money . . . but they don’t think about the consequences of their actions.” Maria, 
my host in Khartoum, was more concerned about the long-term prospects of the 
profession. In fact, although Michael was very concerned about keeping his work 
secret to his close friends, Maria suspected it: “Michael has so much money . .  . 
he spends it here and there . . . I think he is in the smuggling business . . . but it 
is not good for him . . . now he may have a lot of money, but one day he may lose 
everything. I tried to tell him the other day to be careful, but he is too young, he 
won’t listen.”
In sum, perceptions of smugglers among Eritrean refugees are mixed: some-
times, they are depicted as champions of generosity, but hated if customers feel 
cheated. However, the moral judgment generally does not concern the nature of 
the activity, but the quality of the service and the way it has been provided. Unau-
thorized border crossing is not negatively sanctioned, nor are the actions of those 
who enable it. As a matter of fact, refugees’ dreams of moving elsewhere could not 
be realized without the assistance of these experts.
Aside from unauthorized border crossing, Eritrean refugees have other ways to 
overcome what they see as the unjustified obstacles to mobility. One of the main 
alternatives to being smuggled across the desert and the sea is to arrange a mar-
riage with somebody living abroad.
ANOTHER WAY OUT:  TR ANSNATIONAL MARRIAGES
Transnational marriages can involve partners of different nationalities, but most 
typically they are contracted compatriots either at home or living in desirable 
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destination countries. Although such marriages are often organized and paid 
for with the sole purpose of emigrating out of Eritrea, Ethiopia, or Sudan, many 
others emerge out of a “cultural logic of desire.”46 On the one hand, the desires 
and romantic dreams of those who feel stuck in Eritrea, Ethiopia, or Sudan are 
projected onto charming expatriates; on the other hand, those who have reached 
Europe—mostly men—seek to start a family and plan their future with their first 
childhood love or a girl recommended to them by their families. These unions are 
variously the result of geopolitical power imbalances, gender obligations, personal 
desires, and solidar ity.
From a gender perspective, for Eritrean men I met in Italy, as also observed 
among other groups of migrants, transnational marriages were a way to abide 
by traditional values, meet kin, and settle down with a “trusted person.”47 As 
described in previous chapters, the achievement of manhood by establishing one’s 
own family is one of the reasons why many young men have left Eritrea. For their 
part, Eritrean girls are usually happy to marry compatriots living in Europe. As 
described in the first chapter, beles, migrants, are favored by many young women 
in search of their soul mates because migrants and the world they represent are 
positively valued in Eritrean society and because of the opportunities related to 
a marriage with a person living outside Eritrea. Even families bless these unions, 
thinking that a beles would offer better prospects to their daughters. Arranged 
marriages, which are often seen as sites of female subordination and distress, may 
instead be considered sites of agency. In fact, Eritrean women actively pursue 
their migratory aspirations through them using their family and ethnic networks. 
However, it would be wrong to think that they favor these marriages only for 
pragmatic convenience.
Tangled with instrumental motivations and cultural logics of desire, transna-
tional marriages are also solidarity mechanisms in a context where migration rep-
resents the main channel for personal realization, socioeconomic mobility and 
families’ survival.48 Exchange of favors among members of the same community 
and traditional family arrangements commonly underpin transnational marriages. 
Before moving forward, it is important to briefly distinguish among the dif-
ferent categories of marriages to which I refer in this chapter. According to the 
European Council, a marriage of convenience is understood to refer to a mar-
riage contracted for the sole purpose of enabling the person concerned to enter or 
reside in a member state.49 Marriages of convenience are not necessarily “business 
marriages,” as my informants would call them. The latter imply that someone who 
wants to move to Europe or elsewhere would pay someone who is already there 
to marry him/her. Marriages of convenience and business marriages are different 
from arranged marriages, which are typically organized by families or among the 
partners even if there is no prior intimate relationship between the future couple. 
This kind of union is not in any way illegal—it simply reflects a different idea 
of marriage, family, and love. Marriages of convenience, arranged, and love mar-
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riages are much more intertwined in the perspectives of my informants than in 
bureaucratic categorizations.
When I arrived in Addis Ababa in October 2013, I met many young Eritrean 
women and men waiting for spousal visas. To my surprise, most of them were 
engaged in a reunification processes involving a partner in Italy. This had started 
to be a concern for the Italian consulate in Addis Ababa, which thought there was 
something strange behind the increase in Eritreans’ applications for reunification 
visas. The complex moral entanglements of these marriages were at odds with the 
moral assumptions of the consulate’s staff.
BUREAUCR ATIC ENC OUNTERS:  THE ITALIAN 
C ONSUL ATE AND THE REFUGEES IN ADDIS ABABA
“We see many of them in our visa section,” an Italian consular official told me in 
2013. “We have up to forty Eritreans a day. Since 2011, it has become a mass phe-
nomenon. We believe these are all fake marriages. We cross-check the data, call 
the supposed husband or supposed wife and check that they know the person that 
is applying for visa. Sometimes we find an age gap [that is] too big. For example, 
sometimes the guy has left the country when the woman was still a child and it is 
plausible that they had a sentimental relationship. Sometimes it is clear that they 
never met.” The position of this official is based mostly on the cultural assumption 
that love and intimacy are sine qua non conditions for a real marital relation-
ship.50 Marriages that do not correspond to this normative ideal are thus put under 
special scrutiny in the context of bureaucratic procedures for family reunification 
visas.51 Federica Infantino found that arranged marriages, holiday flings, couples 
who had met in cyberspace, and those with a considerable age gap were all often 
subject to visa restrictions at European consulates in Morocco.52 As the notion of 
“marriage of convenience” is hard to defend in legal terms, much discretion is left 
to the individual officials, with the result that these bureaucratic practices are often 
used to filter out not only illicit but also regular migration.53
These observations are pertinent in analyzing the position of the Italian consul-
ate in Addis Ababa. The diplomatic officer cited above, for example, saw marriages 
between partners with a big age gap as likely to be “fake.” The fact that partners 
had not known each other long before the marriage was also a reason to doubt 
that there had been a sentimental relationship before the marriage. However, as in 
many other non-Western societies, a sentimental relationship is not a precondi-
tion for marriage in Eritrean society.54 It is still widely accepted that men marry 
younger women, and that marriages are arranged by the families of the spouses. 
When I told the Italian official this, she replied:
“Yes, but they come to Europe and they have to respect European regulations 
on marital matters. Anyway, the ones that come to apply for visa certainly are not 
political refugees . . . these are not like those who land in Lampedusa. These are 
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young girls, 17–18 years old, with fancy polished nails, that don’t even know what 
politics is . . . it is certain that by now Eritreans know how to cheat the system. . . . 
There are criminal networks behind these marriages, just as they are behind the 
secondary movements to Sudan. These young boys and girls would not know how 
to find the contacts, the houses to rent in Addis, the documents to organize the 
journey and the marriage.”
The position of the Italian consular official well represents a mix of common 
misconceptions about marital regulations, criminal networks, and the way real 
refugees should look. She assumed that arranged marriages were against European 
regulations—even though at most they could be against European moral views 
about the right marital motivations. She also equated, or at least related, the tra-
ditional practices of arranged marriages and marriages of convenience with the 
operations of criminal networks. Although “business marriages” may be arranged 
by a middleman, this does not mean that a whole criminal network lies behind the 
union.55 Finally, the attractive young girls, nicely dressed and wearing nail polish, 
who regularly came to apply for reunification visas, did not correspond with the 
official’s mental image of political refugees. “These are not like the ones who arrive 
in Lampedusa,” she said, implying that the ones on Lampedusa were real refugees. 
Apparently, those in Addis Ababa were not desperate enough.
It should be noted that the interview took place only two months after the 
Lampedusa tragedy in October 2013, in which over 360 Eritreans died. At the time, 
no doubt partly owing to the pronouncements of the pope, the prevailing dis-
course and general atmosphere in Italy tended to see all boat people as desperate 
refugees seeking safety, whereas at other times, such as the period following the 
“Arab Spring” of 2011, the public debate was rather dominated by the perception of 
an invasion of boat people.56 Although it was mostly correct to say that most girls 
who had escaped the country even before going to Sa’wa probably knew little of 
politics, it is also true that their political stance was irrelevant to their applications 
for family reunification visas. The Italian consular official was not responsible for 
assessing the legitimacy of Eritreans’ refugee statuses, nor was that relevant to the 
procedure of family reunification. Instead, the “fake refugees” argument was used 
by the official as proof that these applicants did not deserve entry visas.57
The change in Italian visa policy was a big topic of discussion among Eritreans 
and source of concern for many of them. As an Italian citizen, I became the target 
of their complaints, as shown in the remarks of Hagos and the other Eritrean refu-
gees I met with at Sister Kudussan’s place, quoted earlier in this chapter. Once, a 
thirty-two-year-old Eritrean refugee named Simon, who was living in Italy, insisted 
on talking to me about this, even when I told him I could not influence any of the 
decisions made by the visa officers. He had come to Addis to get married and found 
the situation at the Italian consulate very worrying: “How can they pretend to know 
which is a real marriage and which is not?” he said angrily. “For example, I met my 
wife on Facebook when I was in Switzerland. Her cousin was with me there and she 
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gave me my wife’s contact info. Then I came here to marry her. This is my life! How 
can they see in my heart?! In Italy it is hard to find girlfriends and we cannot go 
back to my country to get married; that is why we came to Ethiopia.”
Eritreans usually migrate in their twenties or thirties when they are still single. 
Thus, it is no wonder that once they have reached their destination, they also aspire 
to get married and form a new family. These are aspirations which men carry with 
them from the time they leave Eritrea, where the obligation to do national service 
hindered their ability to become traditional breadwinners. Almost all my infor-
mants in Italy (who were mostly men) got married during the five-year span of 
my research, and many of these unions were not arranged for economic purposes. 
Often, getting married with someone in Ethiopia and Sudan was also a strategy 
to pursue their own social and geographic upward mobility or to help a fellow 
Eritrean stuck back home or in transit.
These marriages usually involve Eritreans living in Sudan and Ethiopia for a num-
ber of reasons. First, it is especially difficult to find a partner in Europe, since there 
are usually far fewer young Eritrean women in Europe than men. Second, their still 
limited integration in Europe makes relationships with natives harder to establish. 
To this, we may want to add common endogamous preferences among Eritreans. 
Transnational marriages are a solution to all these problems.
The disappointment of Eritrean refugees was rooted in their previously held 
assumptions about the generosity of the Italian visa section. There had been rumors 
that the Italian consulate was liberal in issuing family reunification visas. As I was 
able to confirm through informal interviews with visa officers from the Norwegian, 
Swedish, and Swiss consulates in 2014, family visas were in fact harder to obtain 
there. Usually, only couples who had children and could prove it by a DNA test 
stood a chance of being reunited with their partners.58 The less stringent procedure 
of the Italian consulate might have been one of the reasons behind the numerous 
applications received by the visa section at that time. More important, this increase 
may simply have corresponded to the rising number of Eritreans who sought asy-
lum in Italy in those years and wanted to reunite with their previous partners. How-
ever, not all these unions were necessarily genuine.
FAKE MARRIAGES? 
Although the approach of the Italian consulate to the issue of family reunification 
visas was based partly on wrong assumptions, some of my informants’ claims of 
innocence were also hard to believe. Since 2009, I had heard of “business mar-
riages”—that is how Eritreans refer to marriages that have been paid for—and 
throughout my fieldwork in Rome and Genoa, I met many Eritrean refugees who 
had gone back to Addis Ababa and Khartoum to get married. Some of them did it 
with the sincere purpose of settling down, but many were paid to do so, or did it 
as a favor to relatives or friends.
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False marriages were common in the squats I visited in Rome. Alazar’s room-
mate in Anagnina, Ibrahim, showed me photographs of himself with his bride 
in Sudan—standard shots taken in front of the city hall with the witnesses of the 
marriage and a few individual ones of the groom and the bride in cheap (Western 
or habesha) ceremonial dress. “Is this a real marriage?” I asked Ibrahim. “Yes, yes,” 
he said, and Alazar exploded in a big, revealing guffaw. In September 2013, after his 
second asylum application had been refused in Sweden, Alazar traveled to Addis 
Ababa for his own wedding. When he came back he showed me the pictures, say-
ing: “Look how elegant I was in this suit! Konjo naw? Beautiful, right?” This mar-
riage was an exchange of favors among families in need. In a few months’ time, 
the reunification documents would have been sent to Ethiopia, and Alazar’s “wife” 
would then be able to enter Italy without being fingerprinted by the consulate and 
continue her journey to seek asylum in other northern European countries. More-
over, the woman Alazar married had a sister in Sweden, who married Alazar’s 
brother in Sudan to get him a visa to enter the Schengen Zone.
As I learned from Alazar and several other informants, the prices for a bogus 
marriage in 2013–14 varied from 13,000 to 17,000 euros, depending on the country of 
residence of the spouse.59 For example, a marriage with someone in Italy would usu-
ally cost 13,000 euros; a marriage with someone in Norway was worth 16,000 euros; 
but marriages with a Canadian resident usually cost around 17,000 euros. Although 
the prices were quite stable, they were not fixed and depended on the reciprocal 
arrangement or on the commission asked by the middleman organizing the deal.
Sometimes, individuals who trusted me had no difficulty confessing it; others 
pretended that their marriage was real until their cases had already been rejected 
at the consulate and they had moved on to other places. For example, Hagos, the 
speaker for the group of refugees at Sister Kudussan’s house, told me that his mar-
riage was fraudulent only when I met him again in Khartoum. He had paid for his 
marriage in Italy, and as things did not work out with the visa, he was waiting to 
get his money back.
Pursued by those who have been systematically excluded by all other means of 
regular mobility, even business marriages can be seen in some instances as collec-
tively organized practices of resistance to a system that does not serve refugees in 
any meaningful way. Certainly, only refugees who have the necessary family and 
economic resources can afford them. Others with more limited means may fall 
back on cheaper but riskier smugglers’ services. Still others, of course, are obliged 
to stay.
I also received many “marriage proposals.” At times, the romantic attention 
I received may have been sincere, but it could also be interpreted as mirroring a 
specific political economy of desires and values. As a white, middle-class, relatively 
young woman with a European passport, I was likely to be seen as a sort of exotic 
object of desire. However, on other occasions, it was impossible to misinterpret 
the intentions behind marriage proposals. Robel, Alazar’s brother, advised me, 
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“You are not married, right? You could earn a lot of money if you wanted to.” 
Other times, these proposals were simple requests for help. A young Eritrean man 
repeatedly asked me if I could help him to reach Europe by marrying him. Sis-
ter Kudussan also suggested that I could marry one of her relatives—as an act of 
Christian charity.
As the above instances illustrate, business marriages were not perceived as neg-
ative, immoral practices. Rather, they were mostly normalized as simple business 
transactions or exchanges of favors among families in need. Sometimes, they were 
even regarded as expressions of generosity and solidarity among members of the 
same community in crisis. Although business marriages could also involve recip-
rocal exploitation among refugees, they were mostly seen as a legitimate way to 
escape the geographic, social, and gender immobility forced onto them.
LOVE,  C ONVENIENCE,  AND TR ADITION
As has been noted, Eritrean refugees are rarely happy to settle down in Italy, but 
owing to the Dublin Regulation, they often get stuck there. They may then believe 
that by getting married to someone in Sudan or in Ethiopia, or by reuniting with 
wives from those countries, they will be able to pursue their initial intentions to 
obtain asylum in northern Europe. Since family reunification visas did not at that 
time require them to be fingerprinted by the Italian consulate,60 once the reunified 
partner was in Italy, he/she would immediately move to another European country 
and apply for asylum there. The refugee, usually a man, who had applied for family 
reunification from Italy, would then join his partner in the chosen European des-
tination. Thus, transnational marriages both make it possible to move on to one’s 
desired destination and partially fulfill kin expectations related to manhood. This 
is illustrated by the case of Ogbazgi, whom I met in January 2011.
On a flight from Rome to Addis in 2011, I met two friendly young Eritrean men, 
Ogbazgi and Kibrom, who had been living in Italy for three years. Ogbazgi was 
working in a greenhouse in Sicily, and Kibrom was a builder in Sampierdarena, 
Genoa. They were going to Addis Ababa to marry two Eritrean girls from their 
villages in the southern highland region. During our chats, Kibrom kept teasing 
Ogbazgi, saying that his future bride was almost a stranger to him. Ogbazgi denied 
this, but other Eritrean friends had already told me about “business marriages,” 
and I thought Ogbazgi’s was one of them. However, I realized later that Ogbazgi’s 
case was different.
Ogbazgi and Kibrom invited me to their weddings a few weeks later. The two 
young women were originally from the same village as the two young men. They 
had both crossed the border illicitly with the specific intention of marrying their 
childhood friends. The families had given their blessings. After a few days, Kibrom 
and Ogbazgi returned to Italy, and their wives applied for visas. In less than a year, 
the two young brides arrived in Italy and then moved to Switzerland to seek asy-
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lum and settle there. Ogbazgi and Kibrom followed them there soon after. I met 
Ogbazgi again on his way from Genoa to Geneva in summer 2012. He told me that 
he was going to miss Italy, but at the same time, he was looking forward to a better 
life in Switzerland with his wife. He had initially had a few problems legalizing his 
position there, but after the birth of the first child, he was granted legal residence 
in Switzerland and could stay with his family. Ogbazgi and Abeba have had their 
second child and have more or less adapted to their new life in Switzerland.
Ogbazgi’s case illustrates how family obligations, mobility strategies, conve-
nience, and love can all play a part in transnational marriages. Ogbazgi’s marriage 
was to some extent arranged. The two partners had not really seen each other for 
a long time, but as they described it to me, they had been best friends as children. 
Their families were from the same village and agreed that their union would suit 
both parties. When I spoke to Abeba, his young bride, she seemed happy with their 
wedding and looked forward to her new life in Europe. By marrying her, Ogbazgi 
was also pursuing his aspirations to move on from Italy, while forming his own 
family and achieving an important step into adulthood. Although unconventional 
from a Western perspective, their marriage cannot be considered fake or one of 
convenience. Traditional family expectations about marriage and adulthood, the 
desire to leave Eritrea, the aspiration to settle down with a trusted partner known 
by the family, feelings of love, care, and solidarity are all valid and even crucial 
ingredients of marriages across borders among Eritreans.
This brings us back to the morality underpinning border-crossing practices. 
My earlier account of the world of smugglers and transnational marriages illus-
trates the gap between legal borders and the moral boundaries of those who cross 
them. The lack of compliance to border regulations among my informants reveals 
different perceptions of fairness, rights, and responsibility, which have their point 
of reference in the community. Although they may involve contradictions, trans-
national marriages are collectively organized, socially embedded tactics to cir-




Making Sense of High-Risk Migration through Gambling
Legal channels of geographic mobility are progressively diminishing, and a 
significant number of migrants try to overcome national borders in unauthorized 
ways. However, unauthorized migration often implies high risks. International 
media often report on the incredible journeys of those trying to reach Australia, 
Italy, Greece, or Spain in makeshift boats or on the death of migrants trying to 
cross the Mexico-U.S. border through the desert. Most of these attempts are com-
monly explained by referring to migrants’ desperation.1 However, this interpreta-
tion can only partially make sense of the motivations of those embarking on these 
risky ventures. Eritreans’ trajectories, as described throughout this book, show 
that their movements cannot be reduced to simple mechanical reactions to dan-
ger. The space for choice, although often severely constrained, was evident in my 
informants’ tortuous and fragmented journeys across borders. If a choice exists, 
how do refugees weigh the risk of staying versus the risk of leaving?
After a review of the main available explanations of high-risk migration,2 I pro-
pose to examine refugees’ decisions through the concept of entrapment, as devel-
oped in gambling studies. This idea is crucial, I argue, to understand the emic 
perception of mobility and immobility, because it introduces cognitive cogency 
to mobility choices in the presence of significant obstacles. My informants’ heart-
felt obligation to move on is not only the combined result of limited long-term 
prospects in different countries of arrival and the set of expectations, desires, and 
moral prescriptions—the cosmologies of destinations—they shared with their 
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peers and families. This obligation is strenghtened by the sequential character of 
their stepwise migration. The concept of entrapment enables me to show how the 
duty to move ahead becomes more and more compelling because of the accumu-
lating emotional and social costs of migrants’ journeys.
Although it reconstructs in detail what is at stake for my informants at each 
step of their journey, this chapter is not meant to be a rationalistic cost-benefit 
analysis. Rather, it is an attempt to grasp the feelings, the values, the perceptions of 
those who keep migrating no matter the risks. To make sense of their journeys, it is 
crucial to acknowledge that each move is substantially related to and engendered 
by previous ones. This is not simply because they are all part of a personal, moral, 
and social set of expectations about migration and its goals. It is also because high-
risk migrants, not unlike gamblers, are betting in a game of risk that becomes 
almost impossible to leave. I am in no way suggesting by this analogy that my 
informants’ conduct is comparable to that of compulsive players. Gamblers and 
refugees are different in a number of aspects, ranging from the risks at stake to the 
conditions they face. However, they have one crucial characteristic in common: 
they make not only one, but many sequential risky choices. I argue that this serial 
aspect, widely ignored in the literature on high-risk migration, is key to making 
sense of migrants’ determination to move on in spite of mounting losses.
THE DEBATE ON HIGH-RISK MIGR ATION:  TAKING 
STO CK AND A WAY FORWARD
One of the main explanations of high-risk migration rests on the assumption that 
individuals would avoid life-threatening journeys if they knew how dangerous 
they were. The issue is then enabling access to reliable information. Awareness 
campaigns organized in the last pen years by the International Organization for 
Migration in areas characterized by intense emigration have tried to sensitize pro-
spective migrants to the dangers of unauthorized migration. However, even when 
information is available, migrants may avoid it or discredit it as irrelevant to their 
case, some scholars argue.3 Maria Hernández-Carretero, for instance, found that 
many of her Senegalese informants who were determined to attempt to cross to the 
Canary Islands expressly rejected information about the difficulties of the journey 
and just focused on the possibilities of enjoying a better life in Europe.4 The point 
is, then, not only to disseminate the information, but to make it convincing. It has 
also been pointed out that migrants may not find the source trustworthy.5 Most 
notably, international organizations and national authorities are not deemed cred-
ible, inasmuch as they are seen as representing less the interests of the migrants 
than of those who want to stop unauthorized migration.
A second trend of explanations concerns the relativistic perception of risk. 
Whereas the public debate and risk analysts have assumed that risks are objective 
and absolute facts, social scientists have often pointed out that the definition of 
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risk itself depends on social and cultural criteria.6 Therefore, perceptions of risks 
cannot be categorized as biased or unbiased, irrational or rational, lay or expert 
views, but should be analyzed against the relevant social and cultural background. 
Migration scholars have also used this approach to make sense of high-risk migra-
tion.7 As these authors claim, potential migrants may be aware of the dangers 
involved in unauthorized border crossing, while still perceiving them as “accept-
able.” But how can life-threatening risks become acceptable?
Whenever a large number of individuals from the same place engage in high-
risk migration, a “culture of acceptance” may emerge. Building on Paul Slovic’s 
risk theory,8 Lynnaire Sheridan’s work on the Mexico-U.S. border illustrates how 
common and familiar dangers may be less worrying than those seen as rare, but 
memorable. She shows that migration risks not only become normalized, but may 
also become desirable, as a sort of rite of passage to adulthood.9 This is not specific 
to Mexico, but has been widely documented as happening in other areas of exten-
sive long-term, widespread emigration.10
Life-threatening risks associated with migration may become acceptable when 
the risk of staying is perceived as even higher than the one of leaving. Whenever 
somebody lives in conditions of severe personal distress, socioeconomic vulner-
ability, with a lack of reasonable alternatives and even absence of future prospects, 
even high risks can be reframed as opportunities. According to Madeleine Hay-
enhjelm, those risks are radically distinguishable from those related to lifestyle, 
or large-scale technological or societal risks, and could thereby be defined as 
risks from vulnerability.11 In contexts such as the ones from which unauthorized 
migrants originate, marked by socioeconomic stagnation and by intense emigra-
tion, geographic immobility is often equated with “social death.”12
The risks that Eritreans run when they flee their country can thus also be clas-
sified as “risks from vulnerability.” Their context of choice is typically character-
ized by poor outset conditions, by limited reasonable alternatives, and by the hope 
that running the risk will bring a positive change to their lives. As described in 
chapter 1, the everyday life of many young people in Eritrea is severely constrained 
by government (such as by compulsory indefinite national service) and economic 
deprivation, while the flow of images and information from the outside world 
conveys the idea that a better life is achievable elsewhere. Unable to realize their 
most basic aspirations regarding freedom, work, and study, as well as their hopes 
of having a family, young women and especially young men are often stuck in a 
condition of social liminality.
Although the above considerations about the culture of acceptance and the rel-
ative value of risk are useful for analyzing my informants’ attitudes to border cross-
ings, they also have a limit: they imply that migrants just move from the origin to 
the destination, and that the migration decision is made at one single point. On 
the contrary, the cases of Eritreans and many other refugees and migrants show 
that migration is rather a stepwise process.13 Decisions to engage in dangerous 
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journeys are made all along the way: when Eritreans decide to flee their country, 
when they continue their journey from the first safe African country to Libya, 
when they search for ways to reach Italy, and, once again, when they try to move 
on to northern Europe. Although their agency is significantly constrained, in every 
lap of their journey there is a choice to be made between the risks/opportunities to 
stay put and the risks/opportunities to move on.14 It is crucial, I argue, to consider 
these moments of decision, not in isolation, but as parts of a sequential, cumulative 
process, in which previous choices influence subsequent ones. In order to examine 
such a process, I suggest a frame of analysis drawn from the study of gambling 
behavior. However, before moving on to that, let me draw on the ethnographic 
material I collected in Ethiopian camps to show why assuming Eritreans’ limited 
access to reliable information explains their risk-taking behavior is mistaken.
ONWARD .   .   .  NO MAT TER THE RISK
My informants across four countries were usually well aware of the potential dan-
gers of their journeys. Eritrean refugees in Italy knew the risks involved in seeking 
asylum in northern Europe after having been identified in Italy, and my infor-
mants in Eritrea knew the consequences of being caught fleeing the country, but 
this did not stop them from repeatedly attempting to do so. After having been 
imprisoned for over a year after a failed getaway, for example, Paolos, Johanna’s 
brother, mentioned in chapter 1, tried to escape twice more, and, when I met him, 
Figure 18. Young Eritreans in Hintsats camp (photo by the author, 2013)
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he was resolved to do so yet again. Likewise, those I met in Ethiopia and Sudan 
were resolute in their determination to reach Europe no matter the perils.
When I asked refugees in Adi Harush camp in Ethiopia if they were aware of the 
dangers awaiting them on the way to Europe, I always received the same answer: 
“Yes, we know.” The tragic 2013 Lampedusa sinking was still fresh in the minds of 
the camp inhabitants: some of the people who died there had lived with them in 
Adi Harush, and others had been friends of theirs in Eritrea. Their knowledge of 
the risks wasn’t necessarily secondhand either. Some of those I met had already 
experienced failed journeys. Still, they were ready to try their luck again.
While conducting my small survey on migration aspirations in the camp, Jer-
emiah, my interpreter, and I entered a little mud hut with a low ceiling and col-
ored posters of Bollywood actors on the walls. Welcomed by the smoke of coal 
and the smell of roasted coffee beans, we sat inside facing a small crowd of young 
men waiting to drink their coffee. Saleh and Mukhtar, two young men in their late 
twenties, were our hosts. They had been in the camp for a year and eight months 
respectively. I started asking everyone my usual questions about their plans for the 
future, but they were usually received with a sarcastic smile. Sure, they all wanted 
to move on from the camp soon. Saleh liked Canada, but was not sure how to 
reach it; Mukhtar was planning to go to Germany. The others did not say where 
they wished to go.
“We just want to get away from here,” one of them said.
“I understand,” I replied. “But are you aware of the risks that you could face on 
your way?”
“Yes, we are,” he answered, and hugging the man on his right, said by way of 
explanation, “He come from Sinai.” The Sinai desert, as I reported before, is prob-
ably the most horrific site of Eritrean migrants’ suffering. Those who survive it tell 
horrific stories of kidnappings and torture and show scars on their bodies as proof.15
The man who had been to Sinai was called Bere. He had escaped from Sa’wa 
in 2010 with some of his companions and reached Shegarab camp. He wanted to 
get to Israel, but things did not go as planned. While he was trying to reach Israel 
with the help of smugglers, he was sold to a Bedouin Rashaida criminal gang in 
the Sinai and imprisoned there for two months until his family in Eritrea paid a 
ransom of U.S.$2,500 (125,000 nakfa) Released by the traffickers at the border with 
Israel, he was caught by the Egyptian police and beaten so badly that he had to be 
hospitalized for a week. Then, he was taken to prison in a nearby Egyptian town, 
where he stayed for four months before being returned to the camp in Ethiopia in 
September 2010.
Overwhelmed by Bere’s misfortunes, I stammered: “I am so sorry .  .  . maybe 
now the UNHCR will consider you for some kind of resettlement process.” But 
Bere promptly replied: “I have no process. I stayed here three years and now it is 
time to leave. There is no future for us here, and our families are waiting for us. 
God will be with me.”
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The perceived lack of future, the need to migrate for the family’s sake, and 
seemingly fatalistic acceptance of God’s will were not new to me.16 I encountered 
them whenever I talked to Eritreans about their aspirations to migrate. However, 
I was surprised to hear such determination from somebody who had already gone 
through so much suffering. And Bere was not an isolated case. In Mai Ayni, Adi 
Harush, and Addis Ababa, I met ten refugees who had undergone similar experi-
ences in the Sinai and Egyptian prisons. Some of their stories were so brutal that 
my interpreters could hardly keep translating. In spite of all that, six of them were 
ready to move again after resting for a while.
Bere’s instance blatantly points to the inadequacy of blaming the decision to 
engage in high-risk migration on lack of information about risks. This determina-
tion to move on seems to indicate that the dangers of the journeys, even the most 
fearful ones, have become normalized as part of a sort of subculture of risk. Is 
it possible that, as Lynnaire Sheridan has argued in the context of Mexico-U.S.17 
border crossings, my Eritrean informants had come to accept the risks as an ordi-
nary—perhaps even a necessary—part of their migration experience?
GET RICH OR DIE TRYING
I met 40-year-old Jeremiah the day after my arrival in Adi Hurush camp. Jeremiah 
had a house to himself in zone 1, the nicest area of the camp. He had been granted 
such privileged accommodation because he was HIV-positive, had had TB for a 
long time, and was cyclically sick. He coughed the entire afternoon while talk-
ing to me about his life before and after becoming a refugee. Jeremiah had read a 
lot and was interested in politics, religion—he was an evangelical Christian—and 
music. He kept quoting the Bible, Dan Connell’s investigative journalism,18 and 
songs by Tracy Chapman and 50 Cent.
Jeremiah had led a very adventurous life: he was born to an Eritrean father 
and an Ethiopian mother in Addis Ababa, moved to Eritrea after independence, 
and became an important manager of Assab Port. After revealing and denounc-
ing corruption in the administration of the port, he became unpopular among 
political cadres and had to flee the country. Then he lived in Uganda, South Sudan, 
Kenya, and Ethiopia, continually trying to reach the First World in any way pos-
sible—by resettlement process, study visa, fake papers, transnational marriage, 
or smugglers—all in vain. Finally, sick and tired, he had somehow “retired” to 
the camp, where he was able to get some free medical care (although limited) for 
his condition.
“I was one of them once,” Jeremiah said, referring to those young refugees who 
were doing their best to leave the camp to reach Europe or other developed coun-
tries. “I would have done anything to get there. . . . Indeed I tried everything . . . 
but now I am tired, my time is finished. I am out of the game.” Then he tried to 
explain the mentality of the young refugees on the move: “Do you know 50 Cent? 
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The title of one of his albums is Get Rich or Die Tryin’. Do you know it? We have 
a similar expression in Tigrinya, “Wey keb, wey geb.” It means “Either you rise or 
you fall.” That is what they think. They know about the danger of Sinai, they know 
about the danger of Lampedusa, but they see their friends who made it to Europe; 
they see their neighbors leaving from the camp and reaching Sweden or Norway. 
They cannot wait here; they want to have the life they see on TV. They will not 
stop until they do.” After all his experience, Jeremiah was advising Yohannes, his 
young friend and brother in faith, not to follow the flow of those who were chas-
ing after success. “I told him to get married here in the camp and start a family 
while he is here. In the camp he can slowly develop his artistic skills [Yohannes 
was a very gifted painter] and wait for some opportunities in Addis Ababa or in 
other countries.”
Jeremiah’s remarks indicate how Eritrean migration is embedded in a complex 
set of collective images, societal expectations, and personal desire to be part of 
the imagined outside world. This is also what I have tried to highlight throughout 
this book, using the concept of “cosmologies of destinations.” Moreover, Jeremi-
ah’s account underlines the role of peers in reciprocally reinforcing motivations 
to migrate, as well as the imitation mechanism among travelling partners, kin, 
and acquaintances as crucial in the decision to do so. Jeremiah’s words illustrate 
the mentality of a sort of subculture of migration in which risks are elaborated 
through cultural categories, normalized and accepted as inevitable. Trained in the 
military, often accustomed to challenging environments and even to punishments, 
many Eritreans may have developed a sort of acquaintance with risk. Moreover, 
as I illustrated in previous chapters, the practice of unauthorized border crossing 
belongs to the history of the Eritrean people and is today a pervasive practice, 
involving thousands of them every month. However, even if Eritreans are used to 
even the most extreme risks, they are still scared by them—and for good reason.
Many of my informants in Ethiopia and Sudan were fearful about their pro-
spective border crossings. In Addis Ababa, Adonay was extremely scared when 
he thought his departure to Libya was approaching. He could not concentrate on 
his studies thinking about the journey and was extremely emotional during our 
conversations. When I met Hagos (spokesman for a small community of south-
ern Eritreans in Addis Ababa) again in Khartoum, he told me that considering 
the favorable conditions provided by Italy’s Mare Nostrum (“Our Sea”) opera-
tion,19 his brother was pushing him to go to Libya. But Hagos was hesitant and 
frightened. Dani, a freshly arrived refugee in Addis Ababa, told Violetta and me 
before moving on: “I am terrified . . . I don’t want to go, I know all the risks, it is so 
dangerous, but I have to go, I have no choice. I don’t have any process here.” These 
instances suggest that the decision to engage in difficult journeys is not so much 
the result of an increased tolerance of risk, but rather the consequence of feeling 
they have no reasonable alternative. Eritrean refugees felt “entrapped,” caught in a 
condition that obliges them to keep moving onward, no matter the risks.
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Trying to make sense of my informants’ attitudes, I came across the schol-
arship on gambling. The concepts I found there—among them, entrapment—
resounded with my informants’ ways of framing their attempts as games of risk, 
chance, and fate. In referring to their migration attempts, they often defined them 
as lottery draws.20
REFUGEES AS GAMBLERS:  A NEW APPROACH 
TO MIGR ATION TR AJECTORIES 
What do Eritrean refugees’ migratory practices and gambling have in com-
mon? Although this parallel is admittedly unusual, it has, I argue, the potential 
to uncover neglected aspects of contemporary forced migrants’ complex and 
lengthy trajectories.
Gambling and high-risk multi-step migration share several characteristics. 
First, these two activities both involve chance, investment, risks, and opportuni-
ties. They are both games of chance in which individuals willingly risk money, 
time, energy, and personal security to win a prize or attain a goal. Second, my 
informants, like regular players, tend to bet more than once. They are serial risk-
ers. Here, I am not trying to suggest that migrants’ attempts to migrate are com-
pulsive behavior. What I am interested in here is to show the common sequential 
feature of my informants’ trajectories and gamblers’ bets. Migration trajectories 
to Europe can entail several wagers. They risk once when escaping their country, 
twice when moving on to Libya, three times when they cross the sea to reach Italy 
and four times when they attempt to obtain asylum in northern Europe. This 
would apply to a successful, extremely lucky trajectory, but migration pathways 
are usually far from linear. Rather, they correspond to the “fragmented journeys” 
that Michael Collyer sees as a common feature of global migration systems.21
One’s escape from Eritrea may be the last of a series of attempts. As described 
in chapter 1, many of my informants had tried to flee more than once and were 
sometimes severely punished for doing so. The passage from Ethiopia to Sudan 
and Libya often involves betting that their relatives will be able to pay for their 
journeys. As noted earlier, relatives were often reluctant to pay for these risky jour-
neys; thus, many of my informants negotiated their passage to Libya with their 
middleman without telling their families. A phone call asking for payment for past 
(travel to Libya) and future (travel to Italy) services may catch relatives, often in 
the diaspora and unprepared and unable to pay, by surprise. Inability to pay can 
result in long periods of waiting in harsh conditions, and sometimes in depriva-
tion and torture.22 The sea journey across the Mediterranean is also likely to be the 
last of many failed tries.23 Finally, attempts to seek asylum in northern Europe are 
usually repeated more than once when refugees are returned to Italy under the 
Dublin Regulation. My informants share a systematic tendency to take repeated 
risks with regular gamblers.
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Yet high-risk migration and gambling differ on several crucial points. First of 
all, the conditions in which refugees and gamblers “bet” are drastically different. 
As already mentioned, the risks run by refugees could be defined as “risks from 
vulnerability,” since they are characterized by poor outset conditions, lack of rea-
sonable alternatives, and hope of a positive change. Refugees’ ability to choose 
is thus limited, whereas gamblers’ bets may be seen as an unconstrained leisure 
activity on the part of quite well-off individuals.24
Above all, the risks and rewards involved in gambling and in high-risk migra-
tion differ in quality. A gambler primarily risks money; a refugee primarily risks 
his/her life. What is at stake for migrants is the possibility of safety or a better life, 
whereas the expected reward of gamblers is eminently money. Compulsive gam-
blers can certainly reach the point of risking their social status, even their lives to 
some extent, at the final stages of their pathological compulsion to bet, but these 
are not the first stakes of the game. For many refugees—this is certainly the case 
of Eritreans—migration is instead a life-or-death game from the outset. More-
over, the numerous cases of Eritreans kidnapped in Sinai remind us that not only 
death, but also extreme physical suffering can result from a wrong step in high-
risk migration journeys. No matter how relativistic perceptions of risks may be, it 
is undeniable that loss of life and physical suffering still have an ultimate value for 
human beings. Thus, even if refugees have arguably higher probabilities to suc-
ceed compared to gamblers,25 they risk something that is incommensurably more 
valuable. Nonetheless, the parallel between gamblers and Eritrean refugees still 
has the potential to uncover some important mechanisms underpinning refugees’ 
attitudes to risk.26 The concept of entrapment is particularly interesting in making 
sense of why migrants take risks no matter the cost.
ENTR APPED
The emotional condition experienced by Eritrean refugees once they have left their 
country can be associated with the feeling of entrapment typically documented 
among gamblers.27 Entrapment defines the psychological condition of gamblers 
who feel obliged to continue betting both time and money owing to the percep-
tion that they have gone too far to give up. Individuals may feel compelled to bet 
repeatedly in order to win a higher stake and then repay previous debts. Accord-
ing to Jon Elster, entrapment could be caused by a high level of tolerance for risk 
developed after serial gambling and the thrill connected to it; however, it could 
also simply be analyzed as a causal mechanism whereby individuals continue bet-
ting in order to pay previously contracted debts.28 This, as Elster suggests, can be 
considered a rational mechanism, since a possible disaster is preferable to a certain 
one. For instance, if an individual has already lost a lot of money and has to face 
major negative consequences as a result, he/she may keep betting the money left 
in the hope that it will enable the gambler recoup his/her losses.
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The word “entrapment” is often used in migration studies, at times as a stronger 
synonym of being stuck, to highlight those structural process—legal, economic, 
and political—that immobilize migrants in a place or condition. Steff Jansen 
employs this term to describe the spatial immobility produced by bureaucratic 
paradoxes of visa regimes.29 Guillermina Núñez and Josiah Heyman call enforce-
ment at the Mexico-U.S. border “entrapment.30 Although these analyses and the 
cases they describe largely overlap with the instances and processes of immobili-
zation that I describe throughout this book. The notion of entrapment as drawn 
from gambling studies adds an important dimension to this debate. Entrapped 
individuals not only feel immobile, they also feel caught in a loop of actions from 
which there is no way out except “winning.” The idea of entrapment thus is not 
only descriptive of a condition, it also implies a course of action. For Eritrean 
refugees to feel entrapped means that they feel obliged to keep trying to move on 
to their final destinations in spite of the risks and the losses. The idea of entrap-
ment can, thus, play a crucial role not only in unfolding the manifold meanings 
of mobility and immobility, but also for the investigation of migration dynamics.
In order to leave Eritrea, many of my informants spent significant amounts of 
money—several thousand euros—usually borrowed from their family back home 
or from relatives abroad. This does not mean that refugees will be indebted at 
the end of their migration, as described for other immigrant groups,31 but they 
are expected to start contributing to their families’ incomes back home by send-
ing remittances and helping other members of the family to leave the country. 
While they are in Ethiopia and Sudan, they nonetheless remain heavily dependent 
on their families, sometimes even for their daily survival. Even if they manage 
to get a job there, their salary is usually not enough to help their families back 
home; rather, it is barely sufficient for their own survival. As a result of their migra-
tion, then, they have worsened both their social status and their dependency on 
their families.
On their way out of the country, Eritreans have not only invested a lot of money. 
The journey has also cost them a lot in several other aspects—in a way they have 
lost their entire world, including their dear ones and their familiar life environ-
ments. While crossing the border, they endured significant physical challenges 
and risked being arrested by Eritrean police or dying. In Ethiopia or Sudan then 
they have faced hostile environments and accumulated stress partly connected to 
the past they left behind and partly to the future they have not yet reached. All 
these costs have been paid, not simply to escape conscription in Eritrea, but to 
win the prospect of a decent life for themselves and their families. This is deemed 
possible only outside Africa and beyond southern Europe. This socially defined 
goal is reciprocally strengthened and emotionally reproduced through moments 
of “collective effervescence” in their dwelling places. If the jackpot defined by the 
cosmology of destinations is not won, all the huge investments up till then become 
worthless. This is why the only perceived solution to solve their situation and to 
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justify previously accumulated losses is to face risks even higher than those run to 
escape from Eritrea by moving on to Libya and then to Italy.
The condition of “entrapment” assumes many other meanings in the passage 
from Ethiopia/Sudan to Italy through Libya. First, entrapment is not only a psy-
chological condition here, but a physical one, inasmuch as the journey to Europe 
entails several steps of forced immobility. As I explained earlier, migrants often 
willingly accept the possibility of being imprisoned by smugglers for the time 
needed for their kin to pay for the journey. These moments of forced immobility 
do not emerge from lack of agency. As argued by Noelle Brigden and Ċetta Main-
waring in their analysis of migrants’ journeys across the U.S.-Mexico and south-
ern European borders,32 these periods of involuntary immobility are strategic 
choices enacted by migrants in order to fulfil their migration project. It is at this 
point of the journey that the paradoxes and complexity resulting from the inter-
play between choice, aspirations, and constraints are mostly evident. Bound to 
the idea—and moral obligation—that there is no other alternative but moving 
on, migrants choose temporarily to give up their freedom to achieve their goals. 
By doing so, they force their relatives, mostly living abroad, to come up with the 
necessary resources for travel they often did not agree to. Entrapment here does 
not define only the physical experience of migrants and their psychological status, 
but also the condition of their families and kin, who are bound to finance jour-
neys that may lead to the deaths of their loved ones. Once they have reached Italy, 
achieving socioeconomic integration remains very difficult. 
Many Eritrean refugees in Italy face multiple challenges in integrating into the 
Italian labor market and starting to send remittances back home. Thus, their social 
status in their community of reference back home is arguably even lower than 
when they were in Africa. Although they have reached Europe, they are not able to 
help their families and prove their manhood. Even in Italy, then, Eritrean refugees 
are entrapped between mounting losses and the hope of achieving a better future 
by running more risks. Moving inside Europe, in their eyes, is simply one more 
step forward. They have already gone so far—not only in terms of distance from 
home but also in terms of money and time invested—that they simply cannot give 
up at this stage. Despite the legal residence they have gained, their lives in Italy are 
unexpectedly hard, while the lives of their friends who made it to Norway, Sweden 
and other northern European countries seem easy and comfortable.
In the case of secondary movements within Europe, refugees usually no longer 
risk their lives, but failed asylum applications generate psychological stress, a sig-
nificant expenditure of time (two to three years on average), and, to a lesser extent, 
a loss of money. The psychological stress is owing to living in an unstable con-
dition for long time—sometimes detained—without knowing the result of their 
bureaucratic process; and being obliged, after their return to Italy, to start their 
lives anew, such as obtaining legal papers again and finding accommodation and a 
job. However, most of the trauma is caused by the failure of their migratory plans, 
136    Entrapped
the same plans that pushed them out of their homeland and kept them moving on 
to Europe.
In a way, one might say that the power of their families’ and their own cos-
mology is even stronger in the last step of the journey. In spite of safety and legal 
residence, individuals’ aspirations and family expectations become more press-
ing. The feeling of being so close to the final destination, the First World, but not 
able to reach it, elicits even stronger desires to move on and led my informants 
to attempt again and again to seek asylum in northern Europe, in spite of the low 
odds of success. In fact, it should be noted that although the risks involved in 
failed asylum attempts are not perceived as particularly high, the odds of success 
in this last lap of the journey are dramatically lower than in previous crossings. 
If refugees’ biometrics have been recorded in the European biometric database, 
EURODAC, the migration gamble becomes comparable to a lottery in which the 
odds of winning are extremely limited and investments are low.
This chapter has analyzed my previous ethnographic material through an analyti-
cal frame that can make sense of widespread, ongoing, and resilient migration in 
the face of huge obstacles. Drawing from the study of gamblers’ behavior, I argue 
that refugees’ commitment to keep migrating on progressively increases, in spite 
of mounting losses and high risk, mainly owing to the social and emotional condi-
tion called entrapment. To talk about entrapment here is another way of looking at 
immobility, not only as a structurally determined physical state, but also as an emo-
tional condition, which is typically experienced by those migrants who repeatedly 
take risks in searching for their new homes. While summarizing the geographic, 
social, economic, generational, gender, and emotional dimensions of (im)mobility, 
the notion of entrapment points to the cognitive aspect of feeling stuck and its impli-
cations for migration dynamics, attitudes to risk, and resilience to mobility barriers.
Although the case of Eritrean migration is specific for a number of historical 
and political reasons, my informants’ trajectories may be considered as exemplary 
of refugees’ reactions more generally against the increasingly restrictive structure 
of opportunities they face. The idea of entrapment could potentially be applied to 
asylum migration dynamics on a larger scale. Through this framework, it is possi-
ble to better understand why a number of asylum seekers repeatedly run very high 
risks in order to reach developed countries, and why migration and asylum flows 
have not significantly decreased, despite increasingly tightened immigration poli-
cies. It is crucial to take into consideration here the cumulative stepwise character 
of their migration. Previous choices, the risks already run, and the strong personal 
and family investments all affect subsequent decisions, which, from an emic point 
of view, often become obliged choices.
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What pushes thousands of young people to leave their homeland every month? 
What makes Eritrea—a country neither involved now in open war nor really at 
peace for almost two decades—the ninth refugee-producing nation worldwide? 
What leads Eritreans to migrate on after they have reached first countries of refuge 
in spite of the incredible dangers of doing so? This book has answered these ques-
tions by illustrating the power of transnational moralities, shared imagination, and 
emotions in the migration stories of my research participants and their families. 
Their struggles to evade detection, cross borders, and find a suitable home speak 
of the many paradoxes surrounding asylum regimes, migration management, and 
their implications in the contemporary world. 
Against the common framing of refugee flows as emergencies or exceptional 
events, The Big Gamble has aimed to emphasize the “normality” of these move-
ments.1 This does not mean that the political and institutional conditions that 
produce and reproduce them should be accepted. Quite the opposite. Analyzing 
the systematic/normalized aspect of these migrations implies acknowledging how 
extremely critical circumstances have become ordinary owing to the unchanged 
political situation in countries of origin and the inability of asylum regimes to pro-
vide prospects for those in protracted displacement. Recognizing that high-risk 
mobility has become the norm and not the exception allows researchers to investi-
gate not only how political and institutional factors influence the drivers of migra-
tion, but also how individuals, families, and communities organize to respond to 
chronic lack of prospects, both at home and in exile. In this way, it is possible 
to illuminate agency and the exercise of choice even among those conventionally 
defined by the lack of those.
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In contexts where crisis has become ordinary, old-fashioned categories such as 
the binary distinction between voluntary and forced migrants make little sense. 
For people struggling every day with structural violence, lack of freedom, and 
deprivation, the desire to leave home is deeply intertwined with the need to do 
so. Mobility here is a choice, although extremely constrained; it is an aspiration 
socially cultivated to the point of becoming an expectation. Among communi-
ties with a global diaspora—the result itself of a decades of displacement—these 
expectations tend to be directed toward certain destinations, historically identified 
as providing better prospects for safety and stability.
One of the main implications of these considerations is that forced migration 
should not be the key notion in the debate on asylum rights and refugees. It should 
rather be replaced by analysis of how mobility and immobility are produced and 
reproduced at different stages of the migration process. This analysis should be 
focused on the moral, social, and emotional factors that enable and hinder aspi-
rations to mobility and their realization. Although the idea of forced migration 
emerged as a conceptual tool more widely to embrace those circumstances—not 
necessarily mentioned in the Geneva Convention—that force people out of their 
country, its theoretical strength remains limited. The condition of “being forced” 
is still an overwhelming part of it. This implicitly excludes appreciation of the role 
of aspirations, imaginaries, and moralities in understanding why many leave their 
home country, and why they try to keep moving forward once they have reached 
a first, second, or even third safe haven.
This argument has implications for public discourse, since the moral—as well 
as legal—grounds for providing protection to asylum seekers should not be based 
on how helpless/choiceless/pushed they are. The right to seek protection should 
be separated from the assumption that the only deserving refugees are those who 
are exceptionally forced out of their countries by a sudden humanitarian crisis 
or an explosion of violence. Vulnerability does not equate with lack of choice 
and agency. In fact, in some cases extreme vulnerability may be the result of an 
active attempt to circumvent border enforcement. As Noelle Brigden and Ċetta 
Mainwaring highlight, “migrants temporarily surrender control at points during 
the journey, accepting momentary disempowerment to achieve larger strategic 
goals.”2 Prevailing discourses over refugee deservingness should not exclude an 
appreciation of refugees’ agency and their capabilities.3 This is crucial not only for 
understanding who can move and who has to stay put, but also to shift common 
visions of refugees as burdens to social welfare, rather than potential contribu-
tors to richer societies. Those who seek to improve refugees’ living conditions and 
chances of protection should not try to impose the image of the deserving refugee 
as a choiceless victim, but rather to discard the binary logic opposing forced and 
voluntary migrants, deserving victims and bogus migrants. Due to the tragically 
ordinary dimension of its exodus, the Eritrean case is a point of departure from 
which to blur boundaries between forced and voluntary migrants, to reflect on 
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the manifold meanings of immobility in migration journeys and the transnational 
social mechanisms reproducing refugee movements over time.
Migratory departures are an ordinary reality in Eritrea. Historically associated with 
the sacrifices of the war against Ethiopia, as well as with the crucial importance of 
remittances to the livelihood of those who stay behind, migration is a key ingredi-
ent in the symbolic and practical organization of Eritrean society. Nationalistic 
propaganda, intimate family histories, and locals’ daily survival revolve around 
it. However, in an illiberal political atmosphere such as the Eritrean one, current 
emigration remains a covert and counterinstitutional enterprise, which is publicly 
condemned and severely punished. As in many other contexts characterized by 
chronic stagnation and structural violence in Africa, and not only there, escap-
ing is seen by the young as a way to achieve freedom, economic stability, and the 
moral status associated with adulthood. Migration may be differently perceived 
by young men aiming to become family breadwinners and young women fleeing 
a suffocating patriarchy, but geographic mobility is generally viewed as a path to 
social recognition among their peers and respect from their families. Migration 
from Eritrea cannot be reduced to a reaction to danger. Rather, it is a long-term 
strategy to combat socioeconomic, political, and existential immobility, enable 
family survival, and pursue one’s dreams. 
Unlike that of forced migration, the concept of involuntary immobility, as elab-
orated in the work of Jørgen Carling and Stephen Lubkemann,4 is crucial for mak-
ing sense of current exodus from Eritrea. To leave a country where passports are 
not easily obtainable takes a lot of effort and resources. Those with enough con-
tacts among high-ranking officials may be able to secure permission to exit. Oth-
ers need money, contacts, physical strength, and courage to cross highly patrolled 
borders without authorization. This means that access to geographic mobility is 
highly stratified in Eritrea. Who can and who cannot move depends crucially 
on socioeconomic family status and the accessibility of transnational networks. 
Those who can pay more are also those who can travel more safely—by employ-
ing more experienced brokers, safer means of transport, or obtaining semi-legal 
papers—even if in unauthorized ways. Whereas a successful passage generally 
mirrors individuals’ determination, as well as families’ contacts, resources, and 
networks, immobility is the only option left for those who do not have the means 
or the capabilities to pursue their aspirations. All my informants’ histories were 
extraordinarily telling about freedom to move on (conspicuous by its absence) or 
backward as a powerful factor of social stratification on a global scale.5
(Im)mobility, however, is much more than a physical experience that Eritreans, 
like many other migrants, face at every step of their fragmented migration tra-
jectories.6 Their sense of being stuck is telling of other forms of immobility. Most 
of them share a perception, as well as a very real condition, of social immobil-
ity, related to the lack of access to resources able to fulfil their basic social rights, 
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as well as deep-rooted aspirations to modernity; and, in parallel, of generational 
immobility, pointing to the societal constraints on the transition to adulthood that 
they were expected to realize, and to which they aspired. Both forms of immo-
bility are remarkably gendered in their manifestations. More fundamentally, the 
Eritrean youth I met—whether movers or stayers—were often exposed to a form 
of temporal immobility, inasmuch as their precarious conditions seemed to lock 
up their lives in an “extended present,” with little scope for long-term projects, 
unless projected elsewhere; and indeed, of existential immobility, as highlighted 
by their ways of positioning themselves in socially widespread and legitimated 
cosmologies of destinations. Finally, there is another crucial aspect of immobility 
that I observed: the sense of entrapment that binds migrants to try again and again 
to reach their desired destination in spite of incredible dangers. Further research 
on the interplay between mobility and immobility, as enacted at all of the levels 
highlighted above, can contribute to advancing the understanding of contempo-
rary migration at large, well beyond the conventional and hypostatical categories 
of refugees/forced migrants versus economic/voluntary migrants—and, for that 
matter, well beyond the Eritrean case.
Many concepts developed in the study of voluntary migration, such as aspira-
tions, cultural imaginaries, and culture of migration, are valuable in the study of 
refugee flows too. All these notions emphasize the symbolic value of migration in 
societies marked by long-term outflows of people, but they do not directly connect 
these symbolic dimensions with the moralities underpinning migration motives 
and practices. This is why the notion of cosmologies of destinations is of added 
value here. Unlike previous notions, the idea of cosmologies of destinations spe-
cifically refers to the distinctive sets of norms and prescriptions associated with the 
right/wrong destination that have been stratified in decades of exodus from the 
country. The web of moral obligations connecting families back home, refugees 
in transit, and kin in the diaspora is key to accounting for the persistent desire 
to move on, to grasping the complex negotiations over journey payment, and to 
appreciating emic perceptions of borders and smugglers. In sum, drawn from the 
classic understanding of cosmologies as cognitive and moral ways of categorizing 
the world and orienting subjects’ actions, this concept illustrates (1) how collective 
imaginaries of places entail moral views of what it means to reach them; (2) how 
deep-rooted images and moralities influence daily interactions between refugees 
and locals; and (3) how these moral and cognitive views shape further attempts 
to migrate. 
From the outset of their migration and through subsequent steps, the young 
men and women whom I met pictured a hierarchy of worlds, the top level of which 
can be reached only through migration. Specific destinations, such as northern 
Europe, US, or Canada, are perceived by them as well as by their families, their 
peers and their enlarged networks as sites with better prospects in terms of secu-
rity, work, and freedom. This collectively shared hierarchy is not simply an imagi-
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nary, but mirrors a moral understanding of the world, not unrelated to the amount 
and quality of remittances, that defined some places as suitable destinations and 
others as unsuitable. Thus, whereas Alazar’s brother in Canada was perceived by 
his family as brilliant and successful, Alazar, who was still stuck in Italy, was sub-
jected to their criticism.
My informants’ trajectories across Ethiopia, Sudan, and Italy were determined 
not only by limited integration prospects and legal constraints, but also by trans-
nationally reproduced family obligations, and common visions of the expected 
goal—and destination—of migration. Communication with compatriots around 
the world and with families back home feeds into what is perceived as the moral 
obligation to move on. On the one hand, information and images from those who 
had reached their final destinations elicit the desire to move there. On the other 
hand, the obligation to remit back home push those “in transit” to migrate no mat-
ter the risk. These considerations bear significant implications also for the study 
of secondary mobility, not only in Africa, but also within Europe, as I show in the 
case of Italy. The determination to migrate elsewhere, typically to northern Euro-
pean countries, in spite of repeated deportation back under the Dublin Regulation 
can only be understood by keeping in mind financial obligations to left-behind 
kin that cannot be met by people struggling with limited institutional assistance 
and poor labor market opportunities. Although the Eritrean case has its own his-
torical, cultural, and legal specificities, it is likely that similar conclusions could be 
drawn about the motivations and the trajectories of migrants stuck in transit areas 
such as Ventimiglia, Calais, or Dunkirk.
Historically developed moral assumptions about places and their inhabit-
ants significantly impacted the interaction between my informants and locals in 
different locations they inhabited after leaving Eritrea. Resulting from colonial 
legacies, historical conflicts, and long-term discrimination, a deep-rooted distrust 
of locals often influenced my informants’ limited contacts with locals. While liv-
ing together in camps or in shared housing in Addis Ababa and Khartoum, my 
informants nourished one another’s feelings of being stuck. When a migration 
corridor opens, the urban and camp areas become “effervescent” with an emo-
tional atmosphere that contagiously encourages even the undecided to depart. In 
a way, these forms of collective effervescence are the emotional manifestations of 
the shared worldviews and norms that constitute the cosmology of destinations. 
Similar mechanisms are visible in the areas where Eritrean refugees live in Italy.
Although most of the Eritreans whom I met across my research sites seemed to 
share similar preferences for certain destinations, different individuals may have 
different views according to what they seek, their possibilities, and changing cir-
cumstances in those locations and across their pathways. Refugees I met in Ethio-
pian camps seemed to pattern their preferences on the basis of their contacts and 
the structural openings of legal channels and migration corridors. Reaching cer-
tain destinations also had a different meaning for different informants according 
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to their gender, contacts, age, religion, and political orientation, among other 
things. Moreover, not all of the Eritreans I encountered in my research wanted 
to migrate. Although I have touched only briefly on Eritrean patriotism here, it is 
important to highlight that there are some Eritreans who believe in the national 
project followed by the government and are ready to stay there to contribute to 
it.7 Another instance of chosen immobility is the case of Eritrean Kunamas liv-
ing in Shimelba camp. As with many other refugees who strive for repatriation, 
their example shows that a cosmology can also be retrospective, projecting the 
future back into the homeland, rather than toward further destinations. In sum, 
the notion of cosmologies of destinations does not define a specific set of prefer-
ences, but rather refers to the shifting relationship between collective imaginaries, 
normative expectations, and personally felt moral obligations connected to certain 
migration destinations.
Cosmologies of destinations imply specific moral understandings of national 
borders and legitimate ways to cross them. While the international asylum regime 
and the visa policies of different Western states are unable to provide solutions to 
protracted displacement, unauthorized mobility and those who enable it assume 
a positive role in the eyes of many refugees. Contrary to the current claims of the 
international community, smugglers are not specifically blamed for fatalities at 
sea or in the desert. In my informants’ accounts, it is instead the lack of long-term 
solutions for refugees and those who restrict their access to regular migration who 
are responsible for them. Facilitators of unauthorized migration are no more than 
service providers, who can be judged by the quality of their services. Transnational 
marriages, either arranged or paid, represent ways to help each other out of the 
stasis young Eritreans experience at home and in Ethiopia and Sudan. 
The idea of cosmologies of destinations provides a framework to analyze per-
ceptions of risks as embedded in emic understanding of the world, and the sub-
ject’s views of his/her own position within it. However, to understand refugees’ 
determination to move on in spite of dangers, it is of key importance to consider 
the cumulative aspect of migrants’ efforts. Here is where the metaphor of The 
Big Gamble becomes an analytical tool to advance the understanding of high-
risk migration.
Drawing on studies of gamblers, I have advanced the idea of entrapment to 
make sense of my informants’ repeated attempts to move on. My informants 
“gambled”—often more than once—when they fled Eritrea, then when they left 
Ethiopia and Sudan, again when they journeyed through Libya, and finally when 
they sought to move forward from Italy. These attempts should be considered as 
cumulative. The sacrifices they had made to attain the migration goal increased 
the further they went from home. This leads to a sense of “entrapment” similar 
to what gamblers experience. To turn all the losses into gains, the goal of migra-
tion—be it a specific geographic destination or the social recognition of families 
and peers—has to be reached. 
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Migrants, thus, are trapped into trying again and again to overcome the obsta-
cles that separate them from their desired goal. When these obstacles are repre-
sented by migration policies, it is likely they will not produce the results expected 
by policy makers. This unexpected interaction between structural obstacles and 
migrants’ motivations to move on could be one factor explaining why migration 
policies often fail.8 With border controls becoming increasingly restrictive and 
European states doing their best to keep asylum seekers out, the above consider-
ations about perception of risks suggest that there is no easy way to stop the refugee 
flow. When what is at stake in migration is such a deep-rooted moral and socially 




I went back to Eritrea in October 2018. Many things had changed since my last 
visit. Many others had not. In July, the newly established Ethiopian president, 
Abyi Mohammed, had extended his hand to President Isaias Afwerqi. After 
twenty years of conflict and diplomatic silence, their peace agreement has led to 
what seems to be a new era of cooperation between the two countries. Now mer-
chandise and people freely move across the border. Separated families have man-
aged to see each other again after decades apart. Markets were flooded with cheap 
products produced by the booming Ethiopian economy. The cost of living went 
down—even if only for a few months—and local salaries increased just enough for 
families to breathe a sigh of relief. In December, the United Nations finally sus-
pended sanctions that had contributed to isolating Eritrea and made the everyday 
lives of its people even more complicated.
Revolution came to the market, but the political atmosphere remained un-
changed. Political and religious prisoners were still detained, and there was no 
sign of democratic evolution. Some people argued that change takes time, but 
others believed that no real change can come while the current ruling class is in 
power. National service was still obligatory. In December, young people eagerly 
watched a televised interview of the president looking for some hint of a possible 
change, but in vain. Many did not wait to hear what President Afwerqi had to say: 
they already knew Eritrea was not for them. Between July and December, it is es-
timated, over ten thousand Eritreans, mostly young people, crossed into Ethiopia 
seeking asylum.1 
Most of my friends in Asmara left, and their families continually struggle with 
separation and worry about the few prospects for their children in Ethiopia and 
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in Sudan, in a time of extreme instability for both countries. Ethiopia is strug-
gling with a revived ethnic conflict across the country, and the Sudanese dicta-
torship of Omar Al-Bashir has ended, leaving the place to a transitional military 
council. These political scenarios, unravelling as we speak, open a wide range of 
questions not only for the citizens of these countries, but for the security and long-
term prospects of their numerous refugee populations. Meanwhile, the European 
Union has made deals and established border enforcement measures that block 
aspiring asylum seekers in Libya or even prevent rescue ships from reaching Ital-
ian coasts. Many reports denounce systematic abuses and torture in detention 
centers in Libya,2 but European national governments boast of their successes in 
curbing migrants’ invasion.
Notwithstanding all these shifting geopolitical events, the fact remains, now 
as at the beginning of my research, that most Eritreans are trapped in protracted 
displacement, as 78 percent of the total refugee population—who now number 
twenty-six million. Not only is it impossible for them to return home, but it is also 
extremely difficult for them to migrate in a regular fashion from their first place of 
refuge, where they usually have little prospect of long-term integration. For those 
who can move on in irregular ways along the Libyan corridor, the risks remain 
huge, if not higher than before. 
These unchanged structural conditions demonstrate how wrong it is to talk 
about these phenomena as “crises” and “emergencies,” words that have been con-
tinually repeated by politicians, humanitarian actors, and the media over the past 
five years (the phrase “European refugee crisis” is the key example here).The nor-
malized aspect of migration, even in its most tragic implications, points to the 
importance of inscribing migrants’ histories in political and institutional contexts 
that reproduce the stratification of rights and the conditions for mobility and im-
mobility. It is my hope that The Big Gamble will contribute to orient the public 




Notes on Methodology and Ethics
There are three main problems for researchers of refugees and asylum seekers: how 
to access them and their settings; how to deal with the complex power dynamics 
produced within the discursive and political context of the international asylum 
regime; and how to address vulnerability and justify one’s research with respect 
to it. These three main issues intersect with a wide range of other methodological 
concerns that have long occupied social scientists and are by no means exclusive 
to refugee or forced-migration studies, such as the role of trust in qualitative re-
search, the influence of the researcher’s positionality on his/her data, the gendered 
nature of every encounter in the field, and personal distance and engagement in 
the lives of informants. In narrating obstacles, encounters, and dilemmas of my 
own fieldwork, this methodological note revisits these wider methodological dis-
cussions in relation to the specific challenges of doing research with refugees in 
environments characterized by authoritarian regimes, paternalistic humanitarian 
structures, widespread lack of trust, and irregularity. In particular, I discuss the 
unavoidably covert nature of research in authoritarian regimes, the choice among 
multiple loyalties in the field, as well as in writing, and the complex web of re-
ciprocal, and often unparalleled expectations that researchers need to navigate. 
Here, I account for the microphysics of participation, as Giorgia Donà called it,1 
that characterized my fieldwork. By describing the shifting power dynamics that 
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informed my fieldwork and the variable—more or less vulnerable—positions oc-
cupied by different actors, such as the researcher, my refugee informants, other 
participants, and helpers, this note works against essentialist methodological ac-
counts that reify refugees as the “vulnerable other.” In line with the rest of the 
book, this methodological note aims to overcome more or less explicit paternal-
istic attitudes that shape ways of thinking about and doing research with refu-
gees. Drawing on these considerations, I also advance some reflections on what 
research on refugees should ultimately aim for and the intrinsic importance of 
representation in it.
DANGEROUS,  REMOTE,  AND ENCLOSED:  AC CESSING THE FIELD
Researchers’ access to refugees can be hindered in many different ways. First of 
all, refugees’ contexts of departure have generally remained outside researchers’ 
scope. As refugees are by definition escaping from areas marked by violence, 
war, and lack of freedom, the possibilities of studying them are undoubtedly 
limited. Although social scientists have recently started debating the role of 
researchers in settings of war, and violence,2 it is hard to deny that, in some 
contexts, the risks for scholars and their informants can be too high. Dangers 
are not necessarily connected to open war, but can be even more present while 
doing research under authoritarian regimes,3 as the death of Giulio Regeni tragi-
cally proves.4
Yet those who fortuitously found themselves in the right place or were persis-
tent and bold enough to venture into the heart of the crisis managed to provide 
precious accounts. Among the most notable examples, Stephen C. Lubkemann’s 
ethnographic work during the civil war in Mozambique illustrates how differ-
ent localized social conflicts within the broader national war influenced specific 
groups’ perceptions of risks and mobility strategies.5 The importance of “being 
there” as ethnographers lies6 in making sense of how individuals, groups, and 
communities survive in conditions of protracted crisis, and what role mobility 
assumes in these contexts. Given the fact that most refugees come from areas of 
chronic crisis, the investigation of their everyday lives in the context of departure 
is crucial if we are to grasp the commonplace, but no less disrupting, dimension 
of violence.7
Research in refugees’ areas of origin is important for investigating, not only 
the root causes of their mobility/immobility, but also the social embeddedness of 
their migration projects.8 This entails exploring how refugees, as well as migrants, 
engage in transnational relationships with their home country, communities, and 
families. From this perspective it is possible to consider how these actors contrib-
ute to the emergence of migration desires at the outset of the journey, and in sub-
sequent steps. Acknowledging that in practice implies walking refugees’ pathways 
in the opposite direction.
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The second main problem in studying refugees involves their isolation from 
the general population. Not only they are often located in remote areas, but also 
they are institutionally separated. As Barbara Harrell-Bond and Eftihia Voutira 
put it, “refugees as persons are subsumed under elaborate bureaucratic structures 
which control them.”9 These bureaucratic structures can be camps, reception or 
detention centers. Here, international and national authorities responsible for 
protecting refugees are also the ones responsible for regulating the access of those 
who could expose their failing to do so (including but not limited to researchers). 
Within such paradoxical bureaucratic contexts, researchers are often denied ac-
cess to refugees and, even when they are allowed to do so, their work is closely 
monitored and restricted. These are the kinds of situations that I had to face in 
doing research among Eritreans in camps in Ethiopia. Even in urban areas, how-
ever, refugees may be “hidden” populations because they often have no permis-
sion to reside there.
Aside from these practical obstacles, one of the main challenges of doing re-
search with refugees is their deeply rooted distrust of strangers, officials, author-
ities, or anyone associated with authority figures. This is especially the case in 
communities—Eritreans and Ethiopians being cases in point—in whose home 
countries the regime maintains extensive espionage networks both at home and 
abroad.10 In these contexts, trust building between researcher and researched ac-
quires further theoretical facets and methodological implications. Lack of trust, 
secrecy, and lies were omnipresent ingredients of my fieldwork in Eritrea, Ethio-
pia, Sudan, and Italy. This leads us into the second main issue of doing research 
with refugees: the importance of considering the power dynamics inherent in the 
bureaucratic and discursive settings of the international asylum regime. However, 
before I move on to that, let me expand on the complications involved in access-
ing refugees, drawing from my fieldwork experience.
ERITREA AS TERR A NULLIUS:  LOW-PROFILING AND SECRECY
In 2000, Kjetil Tronvoll started one of his articles on highland land tenures by 
saying that Eritrea was terra incognita in terms of ethnographic research.11 Except 
for Italian and British colonial officers who did some ethnographic investigation,12 
Eritrea has rarely been a fieldwork site for anthropologists, especially over the 
past fifty years. Lack of freedom, violence, and war have not only caused refugee 
flows but been the reasons why ethnographers have had a hard time investigating 
Eritrean society.
Tronvoll’s ethnography of a highland Eritrean village (1998), David Bozzini’s 
study of the resistance of young Eritreans to unlimited conscription (2011), Mag-
nus Treiber’s research on young Eritreans’ coping strategies in Asmara (2009), 
David O’Kane’s research on the impact of war on peasants (2012), and Valen-
tina Fusari’s demographic study on postconflict Eritrea (2011) are some of the few 
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recent ethnographic studies available on the region. Many journalists, research-
ers, and employees of international agencies have long been prohibited from go-
ing back to Eritrea because the Eritrean government has considered their work 
not aligned to the regime’s values.13 Others, even if not blacklisted, would not go 
back for fear of government reprisals. All the stories I had been told by develop-
ment workers and other experienced researchers were on my mind when I ap-
plied for a tourist visa at the Eritrean consulate in Milan. However, after a month, 
I found out that against all odds my application had been accepted.
My decision not to officially declare that I was doing research in Eritrea was 
the result of numerous chats with more experienced scholars of Eritrea and my 
refugee friends. The extremely sensitive and politically charged nature of the 
subject I was investigating could have either led Eritrean authorities to reject 
my visa application, or to put me and the people I encountered under close 
scrutiny. My semi-covert research in Eritrea was certainly not a first; most of 
those who have written about the country were arguably there as university 
lecturers or employees of international organizations, not as declared research-
ers. However, there is little discussion of what such secrecy entails or of why it 
may be necessary.
The lack of discussion of this may be due to a general condemnation of covert 
research in the social sciences. Informed consent and transparency are generally 
held to be basic elements of any ethical research.14 However, some authors have 
remarked how undisclosed research in informal settings should be accepted as 
a normal practice, inasmuch as it does not breach any entitlement to privacy.15 
Others, such as those who have done “dangerous fieldwork” have contended that 
the circumstances faced by ethnographers in that context challenge ethical codes. 
As J. C. Kovats-Bernat argues, transparency implies, first, that the ethnographer 
is in control in the field; but this is often not the case, for example, with research-
ers working in dangerous circumstances, where risks cannot be anticipated and 
usual binary distinctions—a colonial legacy according to this author—between 
researcher and researched are subverted. Secondly, the calculation of risks and 
potential advantages—often mentioned as an important prerequisite for conduct-
ing research in dangerous fields—is based on the mistaken assumption that data 
exist independently of the surrounding violence.16
In my case, it was hard to separate the risks of the research from the relevance 
of the data which were embodied by my informants’ subtle but omnipresent ev-
eryday experience of structural violence. Dangerous fields are not only those in 
open war or among widespread violence, such as those explored by Kovats-Bernat 
and other scholars,17 but also those under authoritarian regimes where ethnog-
raphers are under the arbitrary discretion of authorities as much as the citizens. 
Openly talking about taboo research topics or presenting oneself as researcher 
in these contexts may not be in the best interest of the ethnographer and his/her 
informants, as discussed by Marlies Glasius and her colleagues.18
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I thus followed a rather localized ethic in my fieldwork in Eritrea. To quote 
Kovats-Bernat, “rather than guide my fieldwork with hegemonic assumptions 
about uneven power relationships between ethnographer and informants, I took 
stock of the good advice and recommendations of the local population in deciding 
what conversations (and silences) were important, .  .  . , the questions that were 
dangerous to ask, and the patterns of behavior that were important to follow for 
the safety and security of myself and those around me.”19
Even though I managed to enter the country, my movements there were quite 
limited. Foreigners are generally only allowed to visit certain areas in the coun-
try, such as Massawa, Keren, and Mendefera, and even then they need specific 
permission to do so.20 Other areas are forbidden. Non-nationals must carry their 
travel permission to move from one place to the other and show it at the frequent 
military check points on the way. This is also why most of my time in the country 
was spent in Asmara where I lived with Ester’s family, hung out with its young 
members and their friends, and connected with other families. However, thanks 
to some locals, I also managed to reach a few rural areas, where I was able to visit 
my friends’ relatives and observe the manifold effects of migration there. All this 
was done while trying to avoid institutional figures as much as possible and keep 
a low profile.
Secrecy and suspicion thus became part of everyday life while doing research 
in Eritrea. In the coffee shops I used to go to with my friends, it was usual to see 
someone sitting alone close to us listening in to our conversation. Was that simple 
curiosity or was he a spy? The country was full of spies, according to my infor-
mants. At the beginning of my fieldwork, when I used to go out in the evenings 
with Salam and her friends, I was surprised that they would order a tea or a soft 
drink from the car and consume it there. “We have privacy here . . . you know, 
people like to listen to what other people say,” Salam told me once.
Once I asked Lwam and Johanna how spies could be spotted. They told me that 
it is was hard, but, according to Lwam, some may pretend to hate the government 
and then will go to the police to denounce their neighbors and colleagues. After 
that discussion I started suspecting anyone expressing negative views about the 
government. Sometimes I even doubted my best informants and friends, thinking 
they might be government spies. I never conducted formal interviews and I never 
used a voice recorder; I just wrote up my field notes on my laptop every evening, 
while Ester, Saba, and the girls were watching TV.
For the same reasons, I did not often divulge that I was doing research there. 
Unless my informants were directly involved with me, I would not present myself 
as a researcher. Due to their significant contribution in the study and our close 
relationship, I spoke to Lwam, Sister Lethe Brahne, and Valentina about it, but all 
of them warmly advised me to keep my research topic to myself. Upon my return 
to Italy, Gabriel asked me to keep my mouth shut about the fact that I had lived 
with his family in Asmara: “You know people talk too much and they think too 
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far . . . they may think you are a spy . . . are you?” Although I had explained to him 
many times that I was a university student, Gabriel still had his doubts about me, 
and I guess he was not the only one, because most of my informants never really 
grasped the purpose of my stay. Many times, as I explained my role to them, their 
looks seemed to say: “How could someone possibly be willing to live as Eritreans 
live and face several dangers just for research purposes?” I understand it was quite 
hard for them to believe me.
The above ethnographic instances call into question the possibility of being 
transparent about our roles and our aims as researchers with our informants. Al-
though there is wide acknowledgement of the importance of being as open as 
possible with research participants about the scope, aims, and methods of the re-
search,21 little is said about the fact that in practice, ethnographic research often re-
mains incomprehensible or irrelevant from informants’ points of view. Although 
many of my informants were supportive, others were simply not interested but 
still helped me out. Their cooperation mostly emerged from personal friendship, 
sympathy for me, or hope of obtaining benefits unrelated to the research, ranging 
from financial support to some kind of access to Europe.
Without underestimating the importance of trying at least to make informants 
active participants in research, I see a need to rethink the possibility of engaging 
our informants in meaningful ways more humbly. Based on David Turton’s state-
ment that all research on human suffering ultimately needs to find justification in 
trying to alleviating the suffering itself,22 some authors have argued that research 
with refugees should be empowering, or even therapeutic.23 These considerations 
seem to me the wishful thinking of researchers more rather than what goes on in 
the field. I sympathize with the considerations that support a participatory ap-
proach, such as the need to consider refugees as more than mere sources of data; 
I likewise appreciate the criticism vis-à-vis the practice of informed consent as 
the ultimate proof of informants’ willingness to be part of a study. However, it 
seems to me naïve to think of most research as based “on a reciprocal relationship 
between researcher and participants in which there is a more equal exchange of 
ideas and of the benefits to be gained by being involved” in it.24 Although some 
research may have managed to bring equal benefits to refugee participants and 
researchers, it would be misleading to overemphasize their interest and gain from 
the research. In practice, refugees have many more important things to worry 
about. It seems equally naïve to me to justify research with the idea that it will 
eventually contribute to social change, since in practice nobody can realistically 
forecast what a particular study will bring about in terms of practical improve-
ment. Yet the study may still be worth doing not only from the researcher’s point 
of view.
Although some of my informants were not interested in the study, others un-
derstood it and enriched it with different meanings. Tsegay, the smuggler, for 
instance, decided to talk to me precisely because he saw my research as a way to 
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make Eritrean people’s suffering known. Likewise, Stephanos, one of the novice 
priests in Addis Ababa, encouraged me and helped me find key informants be-
cause he believed that I might perhaps “make the voice of the voiceless heard.” 
Their perceptions of my research motivated me and enlarged my own under-
standing of what my research aims should be. However, acknowledging research-
ers’ limited capabilities of sharing their plans with informants and of controlling 
how they represent “us” in the field is of crucial importance in analyzing data. This 
is especially vital while conducting research in highly sensitive and institutional-
ized contexts, such as reception centers and refugees camps, where researchers 
may be regarded by refugees as authorities, spies, or service providers.
HIDING AND AIDING:  AC CESSING REFUGEE CAMPS
Although my research mainly relied on informal and family refugee networks, I 
sometimes had no alternative but to ask for the help of humanitarian organiza-
tions or NGOs working with refugees. This was especially the case when investi-
gating secondary movements from refugee camps in northern Ethiopia to Sudan 
and Libya. Even here, I knew it would have been hard to get permission from 
ARRA, the national agency dealing with all refugee affairs, which was well known 
for being particularly diffident with researchers and journalists. To make things 
even more complicated, a few months before my arrival in the country, the camps 
had been the sites of large riots, which had been violently repressed. After those 
episodes, a sort of state of emergency was declared and all refugee issues suddenly 
became even more delicate.
I decided to try to get access to the camps anyway and contacted NGOs and 
international agencies such as the UNHCR, naïvely thinking that they might find 
the scope of my research interesting for their operations and would assist me in 
entering the camps. Instead, all of them kindly refused to help me, saying that 
the subject I wished to research was rather sensitive. Although I understood their 
concerns, I was also surprised to see how uninterested they were in the topic of 
the research—the same topic that, some months later, the European Union paid 
millions of euros to consultancy firms and other research institutions to investi-
gate.25 This defensive stance was even more surprising when I saw how eager many 
refugees were to participate in the research, thinking that I could expose their 
situation more to the world.
Without neglecting the possible ethical intricacies of doing research with 
refugees,26 I feel it is important to point out how closely the protective attitude 
of the humanitarian organizations I approached reflects the paternalistic stance 
that Michael Barnett identifies as a marker of international humanitarian actions 
in our contemporary world, defining paternalism as an “attempt by one actor to 
substitute his judgment for another’s on the ground that it is in the latter’s best 
interest or welfare.”27 In my case, the refugees were effectively prevented from 
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having the last say on their being actively involved in the research.28 Although 
it may be hard to judge whether paternalism is ethical or unethical, it can none-
theless be debated to what extent refusal to let refugees decide on their own was 
aimed at safeguarding their well-being, rather than protecting the delicate coop-
eration between international organizations and the Ethiopian authorities at the 
cost of transparency.
I then decided to address ARRA directly. Interestingly, the government agen-
cy proved less intimidated by my study than the humanitarian organizations in 
the field. Armed with a few letters of reference and a lot of patience, I went to 
the ARRA office almost every week for about two months before receiving an 
answer—ultimately a positive one. The Addis Ababa office apparently commu-
nicated my imminent arrival to the Shire office, but as I soon discovered, per-
mission to do research in the camps meant being under the constant control of 
the authorities.
T H R E AT S  A N D  LOYA LT I E S :  R E SE A RC H  I N  H IG H LY 
C ON T ROL L E D  SE T T I NG S
Although I had gained permission to go to the camps, my freedom to conduct re-
search had to be negotiated with authorities at each location. As soon as I arrived 
to the local office in Shire, the head officer carefully interrogated me. By that time 
I already knew that authorities mainly wanted to be reassured about the “nonpo-
litical nature” of my study. I had never quite understood what that meant, but, 
from the first moment, it seemed that my statement about the academic nature of 
my research was sufficient for them to provide me with a car to reach the camps.
However, logistical help was simply another way to keep me under scrutiny. In 
Shimelba, ARRA offered me a room in their operational compound adjacent to 
the camp for a week. Almost every day one of the protection officers would come 
to ask me if I had finished my research. As I quickly realized, in ARRA there was 
an almost undecipherable difference between a “protection officer” and a “secret 
security agent.”29 On my first day, I was given a first hurried tour by car around 
the camp, and I had to sit and listen to an organized meeting with members of 
the local Refugee Central Committee (RCC). This body, supposed to represent 
the residents in the camp, was used by authorities to keep informed regarding the 
underground atmosphere. I then tried to get in touch with my previously estab-
lished contacts among the refugees in the camp, but I soon gathered that I was not 
supposed to walk around asking questions. While I was conducting an interview 
with Noah, my Kunama translator, a protection officer, Philmon, and two of his 
colleagues suddenly walked in.
“You cannot go around the camp by yourself. It is a question of safety. Why 
aren’t you talking to RCC?”
“I am not alone. Noah is with me. I talked with RCC yesterday.”
Appendix    155
“Give me the list of the people you are going to talk to.”
“I won’t. Firstly, I don’t have a list, and even if I had I would not give it to you.”
“Well, from now on, I will follow you. I do not want to listen to your conversa-
tions, but I need to see who you are talking to.”
I did not notice anyone following me that day, but the following day Philmon 
summoned me alone. He took me to a small dark room adjacent to the clinic of 
the camp. There were only a desk, two chairs and a small window: alarmingly 
similar to the interrogation rooms I had only seen in movies.
“I want the list of the people you want to speak to,” he ordered. I was intimi-
dated by the circumstances, but my answer could not be any different:
“I already told you that I have no list. Subjects are randomly chosen and I guar-
anteed them anonymity.”
“I heard you want to talk to Mebrathu [the name of one of my friends’ con-
tacts]. Why do you want to talk to him?”
“He is a friend of a friend and I just thought to meet him for coffee, that’s it.”
“You know, he called me yesterday. He was very scared because he heard you 
were asking around about him. You know we’ve recently had riots in the camps 
surrounding Shimelba, and people are scared to be involved. Keep doing your 
research, but do not talk to Tigrinya people.”30 Understood?
The dangerous position ethnographers find themselves in when they have in-
formation of interest to the relevant authorities is stressed by B. A. Jacobs.31 Re-
searchers may run into serious trouble if they are dedicated to protecting their 
informants’ privacy. Since I was not supported by an international organization in 
the field, my position was even more fragile with respect to the requests of Ethio-
pian authorities. However, the aggressive nature of the pressure I experienced 
convinced me even more that the anonymity of my informants was of utmost 
importance and that I should be extremely careful while asking around. Again, 
recording seemed too risky for me and my informants, and I decided to write my 
field notes in private, away from the gaze of security officers and their associates.
Knowing what the right thing to do is rarely straightforward.32 Doing research 
in refugee settings often means entering a field of complex power dynamics in 
which researchers might feel stretched between conflicting loyalties: on the one 
hand, the predisposition to comply with regulations set by local and international 
authorities, on the other hand, the commitment to one’s own respondents. As 
Didier Fassin writes, “carrying on an ethnography is cumulating debts.”33 These 
debts are not only to those who respond to our questions, but also to those who fa-
cilitate or allow the research to happen. These debts carry different weights, how-
ever, and the ethnographer must often pick a side. In my case I felt indebted to the 
Ethiopian authorities for allowing me to conduct my research in the camps, but I 
had little doubt that my loyalty ultimately lay with my research participants, given 
their vulnerable position vis-à-vis the authorities.34 Their disadvantaged position 
and their risk of being questioned or harassed by camp security easily convinced 
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me that the least I could do to protect my research participants was to reject the 
authorities’ requests for their names.
Yet even loyalty to informants vis-à-vis the authorities can be a source of di-
lemmas when respondents are engaged in criminal activities. For example, in re-
searching people smugglers, was it my duty to report them? Was I making myself 
complicit by not denouncing Michael or Tsegay to the authorities? Reflecting on 
her own fieldwork on organ trafficking in Brazil, South Africa, and Israel and the 
decision to share her information with the U.S. government and other authori-
ties, Nancy Scheper-Hughes argues that at times it is necessary to collaborate. She 
writes: “Anthropologists are not detectives, and we are trained to hold anthropol-
ogist-informant relations as a sacred trust. But surely this does not mean that one 
has to be a bystander to international crimes against vulnerable populations.”35 In 
my case, however, the smugglers were not engaged in exploitative activities, as in 
the case of the organ traffickers interviewed by Scheper-Hughes. Even if ambiva-
lently judged, their actions could have liberating and emancipatory consequences 
for their customers. Their undertakings may have been seen as criminal by the state 
and international authorities, but were not intrinsically destructive. Although my 
informants’ activities could possibly entail violence, I neither witnessed nor knew 
of any violent actions that would have justified my collaboration with authorities. 
Again, these ethnographic engagements with diverse subjects push us to revisit 
commonly held ethics of fieldwork and consider the importance of reflecting con-
textually on the issues of privacy, responsibility, and morality.
My refusal to cooperate with camp authorities, however, had direct conse-
quences on my fieldwork. On the one hand, it hindered productive collaboration 
with the camp’s main managing body; on the other, it won me the trust of my 
refugee informants. As noted by Jacobs apropos of dangerous fieldwork, by resist-
ing institutional pressures, the ethnographer can increase his/her credibility in 
the eyes of informants.36 My unpleasant encounter with Philmon turned out to be 
positive inasmuch as Noah started seeing me as an enemy of ARRA and thus—
since the enemy of the enemy becomes an ally—we became closer and started 
speaking more freely about the tensions in the Kunama refugee community, 
threats of the Kunama liberation front to his family, and the corruption involved 
in Kunama resettlement (see chap. 2).
TRUST OF STR ANGERS AND SECRET S AMONG FRIENDS
Access to the field, not only as a physical place, but also as a bundle of relation-
ships,37 can also be substantially limited by difficulties in winning refugees’ trust. 
Mistrust lies at the heart of many refugees’ experience, as E. V. Daniel and J. C. 
Knudsen note in their edited volume Mistrusting Refugees.38 The conditions that 
surround their departures—be they ethnic conflicts, state persecution, or general-
ized violence—often shake the ordinary circumstances in which individuals have 
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some degree of control over their lives. After fleeing, refugees find themselves 
once again in precarious legal and material conditions and often under the scruti-
ny of authorities, or the gaze of international workers. In such contexts, research-
ers—with their looks and questions—can be easily associated with the authorities 
or with those agencies providing services. It is no wonder that trust is a rather rare 
and precious ingredient in research with refugees.39 Throughout my research, I 
observed the effects of my informants’ mistrust of foreigners, be they Ethiopians, 
Sudanese, or Italians. I have described how lack of trust in local society turned 
Eritrean squats in Rome into closed enclaves, and how Eritreans’ deep-rooted 
mistrust of Sudanese prevents collaboration with them in Khartoum even given 
promising openings.
Wariness, suspicion, and distrust characterize Eritreans’ everyday lives long 
before leaving their homeland. In this sense, their flight does not contravene ordi-
nary circumstances where trust is the norm. It rather prolongs their usual mistrust 
of strangers and insiders. The first question I was asked, not only by refugees in 
Ethiopia and Sudan before they spoke to me, but by NGO workers and national 
officialdom as well, was: “Is your research political?” I knew the answer had to be 
“no,” even though that way of articulating the question did not make sense to me. 
Yet it was clear that the question meant much more than it appeared at first. By 
posing it, refugees were actually asking: “Is your research going to put me in dan-
ger?” “Were you sent by the Eritrean or Ethiopian government or the UNHCR?” 
Their fears usually disappeared after meeting me in person. I seemed harmless, 
many told me.
However, it would be wrong to think that strangers were the only objects of 
my informants’ mistrust. I was always amazed to realize how many secrets self-
declared “good friends” were keeping from each other. Maria’s network of friends 
was a striking example of this. Seifu, one of Maria’s contact in Khartoum, had a 
son by a man who was not the one with whom she was reuniting in Sweden (no-
body seemed to know who the father of the baby was). Seifu’s housemate often 
dressed in revealing clothes, used to receive Sudanese men in her room, but no-
body spoke about it. Gebreyesus was a freelance journalist and anti-government 
blogger, but nobody in the group knew about his “political” activities. Michael 
was a semsari and everyone seemed to ignore it. This lack of openness may be due 
not only to distrust of fellow Eritreans, but also to a sort of respectful discretion in 
sharing delicate information about each other. Navigating mistrust and respectful 
discretion, for me, took time, some cultural learning, and a good dose of acquired 
mistrust in my informants’ narratives.
MEANINGFUL LIES :  REFUGEES’  REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SELF
Lying informants have a great significance in research, as F. A. Salamone noted 
over forty years ago.40 In particular, Salamone maintained that informants’ lies 
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should not be discarded as wrong information, but investigated as potentially re-
vealing tools for identifying crucial cultural values and underlying rules of social 
relationships where fieldworker and informants interact. The debate has remained 
open since then.41
In my own experience with Eritreans, I encountered several “lies” and misrep-
resentations of the self. My informants in Follonica reception center often nar-
rated invented or semi-invented biographies to me, thinking that I could help 
them in their Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedures; others, knowing 
that I was a single woman, hid the fact that they were married, perhaps hoping 
that an affair with me might develop into something advantageous to their cases. 
The refugees I interviewed in the Tigrayan camps often sought to conceal the fact 
that they received support from their relatives in the diaspora, probably think-
ing that this would make their cases for resettlement look more urgent. This was 
because I was often identified with UNHCR resettlement officers, even though I 
stated my independent role of researcher before every interview. Many Eritreans 
I met in Italy tended to hide their attempts to move to other European countries, 
or the fact that they had got married and were preparing their cases for the family 
reunification process.
Most of the above lies were connected to the refugees’ attempts to obtain legal 
status or present their cases in a way that would increase the likelihood of their 
being assisted or considered for resettlement. These responses are clearly influ-
enced by their position as vulnerable subjects who feel constantly under scruti-
ny.42 However, there is more to it than that. The identification of such fabrications 
and their examination are of great theoretical significance for analyzing refugees’ 
responses to certain political and humanitarian discourses.43 On the one hand, 
my informants’ deceits were reflexively aimed at complying with the categories 
of the international asylum regime, which builds on the distinction between the 
deserving refugee—the victim and eligible recipient of humanitarian and welfare 
aid44—and the many undeserving migrants. On the other hand, their lies were ac-
tive manipulations to circumvent what they saw as “unfair rules”.
I am not arguing that there is a truth out there that the ethnographer can dis-
cover by overcoming the untruths of his/her informants. However, if these nar-
ratives are not duly interpreted based on structural relationships in the field, the 
understanding of migration strategies, motivations, and trajectories may become 
biased. I believe that identifying what informants themselves recognize as “lies” 
may enable the researcher to get closer to his informants’ point of view and his/
her own positionality in the field, by detecting the webs of power, roles, and re-
lated expectations embedded in fieldwork. Ethnography based on long-term en-
gagement with informants and with their living environment is particularly well 
placed, to do that.45
Nevertheless, as Karen Jacobsen and Loren Landau remark,46 it is common to 
read studies based on interviews originating from extemporaneous encounters 
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with refugees in asylum centers or in structured contexts. This is particularly the 
case in Europe, where respondents are likely to lie in order to reinforce their asy-
lum case or to construct an image of themselves that helps justify their presence 
there. If the scope of the study is to analyze refugees’ narratives, in-depth inter-
views may be an important technique, but if the aim of the investigation is to 
reconstruct real trajectories and the motivations behind the migration decision, 
interviews may not be enough.
It was by observing and participating in the everyday lives of my informants 
in the most significant sites of their journeys that I was able to perceive the gap 
between their narratives and their practices. For instance, observant participation 
with refugees in Italy and with their families in Eritrea enabled me to grasp the 
multifaceted relationships between migrants and left-behind kin. Likewise, trian-
gulation and familiarity with different social actors, such as authorities, refugees 
in different countries, families at home, relatives abroad, and the professionals 
of unauthorized migration were key in gaining a deeper understanding of trans-
national marriages and of smuggling among refugees, smugglers, and relatives 
abroad. Moreover, the more I knew Eritreans, and the more I became acquainted 
with their tricks and their mind-sets, the easier it was to navigate the varied con-
stellation of images they had of me.
BEYOND VULNER ABILIT Y:  ON THE BLURRED B OUNDARIES OF 
“US”  AND “ THEM” IN REFUGEE RESEARCH
Refugees are often extremely vulnerable populations.47 Precarious legal and mate-
rial circumstances as well as the traumas they experience before and as a result of 
their flight from home undeniably mark the lives of many of them. Yet the vul-
nerable condition of refugees should not be essentialized. Throughout this book, I 
have illustrated prospective refugees’ abilities to cope with present adversities and 
plan the future even in extreme conditions. Even when discussing methodological 
approaches to refugee studies, it is important to go beyond a crystallization of in-
formants as vulnerable subjects. As a result of this crystallization, the researcher’s 
relationship with his/her informants is typically conceived as an unbalanced one 
between individuals with incommensurably distant lives, power stances, and pos-
sibilities. Without underplaying the difficult conditions most of my informants 
were facing and the multiple power imbalances that characterized my relationship 
with them, I attempt here to provide a more nuanced understanding of the shift-
ing power dynamics I experienced in the field.
Here I would stress, paraphrasing Karsten Pærregaard, how often it was my 
own vulnerability that allowed me to “slip through the native gaze.”48 As Pær-
regaard convincingly argues, the researcher is caught in a web of overlapping 
representations by her/his informants. Seen variously as intruders, tourists, and 
government agents, researchers often have to overcome all these images gain the 
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necessary recognition before their respondents feel ready to share their experi-
ences. As noted earlier, refugees often perceived me as a journalist or a UNHCR 
official, or feared me as a spy. This was the case, not only with those with whom I 
had chance encounters in institutional settings, but also with others with whom I 
had long-term relationships.
There was no standard rapport with my informants. Every meaningful rela-
tionship I had in the field was characterized by different levels of indeterminacy, 
divergent expectations, and misunderstandings on both sides. As opposed to 
romanticized accounts of fieldwork as an unproblematic terrain,49 the following 
sections describe the ambivalent relationships of friendship, care, and desire that 
marked my fieldwork and the resulting ethical dilemmas.
FRIENDS .   .   . 
Ethnographic literature is rich in examples of friendships between ethnographers 
and their informants.50 Some authors highlight how friendship can be a valuable 
resource insofar as it provides insights based on trust, inside perspective, and 
depth—especially when doing research in critical situations;51 others emphasize 
the possible negative implications of a friendship with informants,52 such as the 
deceptive mechanisms it can lead to53 and the differential power relation that it 
may mask.54 Marina de Regt, for instance, gives a poignant account of her long-
term relations with her informant Noura and critically discusses what friendship 
means when it involves continual financial support. Caught in the web of expecta-
tions and crucial needs expressed by Noura, de Regt reflects how their relation-
ship became more similar to a fictive kinship rather than a reciprocal friendship.55
Equally, my friendships with my informants were imbued with unparalleled 
expectations and marked by different economic and life possibilities. My relation-
ship with Maria discussed in chapter 2 became more and more unbalanced due 
to the her continual requests for money and was progressively eroded by different 
ideas of long-term solutions for her and her child. In other circumstances, what 
I perceived as friendship was instead romantic interest on the part of my male 
informants. Nevertheless, among all these ambiguities, friendship—intended as a 
reciprocal involvement in each other’s life beyond the time and the scope of my 
research—remained a crucial ingredient and unavoidable, natural result of many 
of my relationships in the field.
In spite of (socioeconomic, citizenship, gender, and racial) differences among 
us, my relationships with Violetta, with Johanna, and with Alazar were also char-
acterized by reciprocal caring, mutual understanding, and resemblances. Violetta 
and Johanna were my age-mates, highly educated and unmarried like me. We 
had similar ways of feeling and understanding things. They were the ones who 
supported me when things were going wrong in the field, such as when Violetta 
took care of me for two weeks when I fell sick in Ethiopia. Sharing the everyday 
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lives of our informants not only reveals their vulnerabilities, but also our own. As 
Cynthia Mahmood observes,56 every ethnographic encounter, especially in critical 
contexts, entails a risk for those who let the researcher into their lives, and for the 
researchers who put their lives in their informants’ hands. Power imbalances are 
shifting and contextual, and do not ultimately prevent us from bridging the gaps 
with our informants.
Mutual involvement in each other’s lives has resulted, in my case, not only in 
meaningful insights into how Eritreans cope with exile, but with access to social 
networks that would have been impossible to enter otherwise. It was thanks to my 
long-term friendship with Alazar, for instance, that I gained entry to buildings 
occupied by Eritreans at the beginning of my fieldwork in Rome. It was thanks to 
Gabriel’s willingness to help me that I found a family ready to host me for over 
two months in Asmara. This is not a roundabout way to acknowledge my infor-
mants’ help. Rather, it is a statement about the unavoidably personal nature of 
doing ethnographic research.
Involvement, however, implies neither credulity nor lack of reflexivity about 
the potential impact of our research on the lives of our interlocutors. My involve-
ment in my informants’ lives was often complicated with a range of asymmetric 
and ambivalent expectations, over which I had limited control.
.   .   .  CAREGIVERS .   .   . 
Contrary to the stereotypical power imbalance between a strong researcher and 
his/her vulnerable subjects, my informants perceived me as vulnerable—as an 
outsider without family in a unfamiliar setting—and thus felt responsible for my 
well-being.57 This sense of responsibility was enhanced by the fact that it was usu-
ally a dear friend or relative who had sent me to them. Before going to a site, I 
would usually ask my informants if they had relatives or friends living there. If 
they agreed to give me their contacts, it usually meant that the person on the site 
was going to take care of me. It was a question of respect for the person who had 
sent me.
For example, in Asmara, Lwam took good care of me because I had been sent 
to her by her brother. By the same token, she was very surprised that Samuel, Ala-
zar’s brother, was avoiding me against his brother’s request: “It is not respectful to 
his brother. If my brother sends you to me, I help you, because I love my brother.” 
This comment was unexpected, since I had not realized that Lwam was sticking 
around me mostly as a moral obligation to her brother.
This is probably also why my informants have rarely accepted money from me. 
Gabriel’s family did not want me to pay rent in Asmara. Likewise, my informants 
in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan wanted to invite more than be invited for dinner 
or lunch. They mostly felt they had to take care of me as a guest and somebody 
who had been sent by a loved one. I was rarely left alone, always accompanied 
162    Appendix
everywhere and treated like someone needing protection/guidance rather than 
the independent researcher I liked to see myself to be.
As the one being taken care of, I also often found myself playing the role of 
the child. This is because, as an outsider, the researcher has to be acculturated, 
as Chiara Pussetti points out.58 He/she has to be warned about possible dangers 
unknown to him/her, and also taught how to behave properly with others. Due 
to my role as student and my relatively young age at the time of the fieldwork, I 
was perceived as especially vulnerable to the often unsafe circumstances we were 
living in. In their eyes I was to be educated, to be protected, and also to be proud 
of when I behaved well in front of other members of the group. Maria, for ex-
ample, often scolded me because I was hesitant to take a shower twice a day due to 
water shortages, and often forgot to dust my shoes before walking into the room 
as a good Habesha woman would do. Violetta tried to teach me to speak better 
Tigrinya, how to cook shiro, a typical Eritrean dish, and how to deal with guests 
politely. Violetta’s guests often complimented me on my newly acquired Tigrinya 
manners, ability to speak a bit of the language, and knowledge of Eritrean history 
and culture, saying: “She is a real Habesha!”
This does not mean that the differences between them and me could be avoid-
ed. As a middle-class white woman with a European passport, I was there by my 
own choice. I could take a flight anytime to go back to my home and my family. 
My informants could not say the same. However, my efforts to live like “one of 
them,” eschewing comforts available to me and trying to understand their prob-
lems, and the simple fact that I knew the places where they had been, led my 
informants to trust me more and recognize me as a self-defined subject rather 
than a “researcher,” a “European,” or a potential source of benefits. Moreover, 
my familiarity with their home back in Eritrea and the daily shared experience of 
difficulties allowed me to achieve more recognition among my informants. Once I 
had seen their houses, met their beloved parents, and lived the way they had lived 
before, my informants started to treat me less and less as an external observer and 
more as part of their clique.
.   .   .  AND SUITORS
Being a relatively young woman conducting fieldwork on my own with mostly 
male young informants, I sometimes realized that my interlocutors, most of them 
young single men, were developing romantic interests in me. As noted in chapter 
4, I received several marriage proposals while in Ethiopia. Most of them were sim-
ply mirroring a desire to reach Europe. Other times, instead, the desire to migrate 
and romantic feelings seemed to mingle in a way that made me wonder to what 
extent my presence in the field was influencing their geographic imagination. My 
“field,” configured as a bundle of relationships, was also as a site of emerging de-
sires and flowing imaginaries. I was part of it in one way or another.
Appendix    163
Although the issue of the researcher’s sexuality in fieldwork has for long time 
been a taboo, recently scholars have started debating the complex ethical and 
epistemological implications that sexual encounters, untold desires, and intimate 
connections can have on research.59 Some authors have highlighted the value of 
intimate experiences as sources of knowledge and insights, but Jill Dubisch for 
one warns against breaching intimate interpersonal boundaries.60 It is in any case 
certain that the researcher’s sexuality is part of ethnographic fieldwork, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, and, as such, should be rightly acknowledged and reflec-
tively examined. My ethnography was no exception. Although I have never been 
romantically involved with any of my informants, their expectations and desires 
have certainly had an impact in allowing me to be part of their lives or in assisting 
me throughout my fieldwork. No matter how much I tried to be clear with them, 
stating that my interest in their stories had nothing to do with romance, I had 
little control over what they expected of me. For example, it became progressively 
clear that Gabriel, my informant in Milan, did not see me only as a friend. Once I 
came back from fieldwork in Eritrea, and he asked me whether he could visit me 
in my hometown, where I was spending some time with family. I naturally ac-
cepted, bearing in mind all the generosity and trust he and his family had shown 
me. However, I did not foresee his expectations. He came to stay with us, and it 
soon became clear that he wanted me to be his girlfriend. I again had to clarify 
my position, which led to a small drama: Gabriel drank too much and got lost 
somewhere in my town. My family became alarmed by our guest’s behavior, and 
I drove around my hometown trying to find him. I finally found him on a bench 
of the park at 3 a.m. and took him back home. Although he apologized for his 
conduct in the morning, our friendship was compromised.
That episode left me wondering whether I had unknowingly taken advantage of 
Gabriel’s feelings by involving him in my research, and conversely, what I risked 
by trusting my male informants. Close relationship with them may have indirectly 
enabled me to gain insights that would have been hard to attain otherwise, but on 
other occasions, this has also exposed me to potential harm. This never translated 
in my case to anything more than dodging sexual advances and enduring sexist 
proposals by refugees, local gatekeepers, and more or less institutional male fig-
ures whom I met throughout my fieldwork.61
This brings us back again to the shifting power dynamics in the field and the 
idea that the researched are exclusively vulnerable. Rather than conceiving re-
search with refugees as ineluctably shaped by an unbalanced relationship between 
an authoritative researcher and vulnerable refugees, I argue that one’s relation-
ships with refugee informants assume many different meanings, according to 
gender, emotional attitudes, age, and the power dynamics and social ties that 
inform our presence in the field. All these aspects shape fieldwork relationships 
well beyond crystallized categories built around the assumption of the “vulner-
able other.” Nevertheless, in a field of close, but often unbalanced relationships, 
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researchers may face dilemmas regarding reciprocity and responsibility to infor-
mants, with no easy solution.62
ETHICAL GUIDELINES?  SOME UNSOLVED DILEMMAS IN 
REFUGEE RESEARCH
Managing the expectations of my informants was and still is the hardest part of 
my fieldwork. After I had already finished my fieldwork, I kept receiving calls 
from refugees in Libya who wanted my financial support for their journey over 
the Mediterranean; Michael called me to ask me if he could transfer fifty thousand 
euros into my account so as to save some of his earnings; and Gabriel came to 
visit me in my hometown thinking that, after what his family had done for me, he 
could become my boyfriend.
All these situations have put me in a continuous ethical dilemma in the months 
since my fieldwork. The hospitality and availability that many of my informants 
showed me during the research was priceless; it was not only material, but also 
emotional support. For this reason, my emotional engagement with them has 
transcended the research site and the ordinary forms of rapport between re-
searcher and informants. Nevertheless, my part in the relationship was not always 
easy, because of the power imbalance, geographic distance, and discrepancy in 
expected roles.
Sometimes, a “no” was not a big deal: Michael was not offended, for example, 
when I explained that it would be hard to answer questions from my bank about 
a sudden massive transfer of money from a Sudanese account. But in other cases, 
a “no” could mean a lot: refusing to pay for the journey of someone held by the 
smugglers in Libya may have significant implications for his/her life. Once, Jacob, 
one of the refugees I met in Ethiopian camps, called me from Libya to ask for 
money for continuing his journey to Italy. Although this confronted me with a 
severe conundrum, my inability to actually raise that money on the spot gave 
me some time to look for alternatives. I tried to call Jacob’s sister in Sweden to 
consult with her on how to help Jacob, and kept checking on him via phone calls. 
Jacob’s sister did not respond, however, and communication with Jacob became 
harder due to network failures. After a month Jacob called me to say that he had 
safely arrived in Italy. The positive epilogue to this story luckily solved my practi-
cal doubts, but did not answer my ethical riddles about the role of the researcher 
in such a case. It is easily understandable how helpless, angry, and worried I felt 
when something similar happened again with Maria. As I already narrated, a few 
months after I left Sudan Maria called, asking me for money to pay for her and 
Anna to get to Libya and then to Italy. Fortunately, in that case I was still in time 
to discourage her from leaving.
These episodes exemplify the possible tensions between ethically required in-
tervention,63 and not encouraging actions that would be harmful for informants.64 
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Not paying for some of my interlocutors’ trips (assuming I had the money to do 
so) might put them in danger; paying for them might create a fatal precedent 
for other informants, motivating them to embark on dangerous journeys in the 
belief that I could support them. Moreover, by paying their smugglers, I would 
have contributed to an illegal activity. As yet I have no solution for these ethi-
cal dilemmas, which suggest the unavoidable moral and ethical indeterminacy of 
ethnographic fieldwork.
BEYOND GAZE AND ADVO CACY:  REPRESENTING REFUGEES’  LIVES
Once I came back from my fieldwork, I started thinking about what my respon-
sibility was as an ethnographer who had been able to share the lives of my infor-
mants and to collect their stories. The end of my fieldwork overlapped with the 
explosion of the “European refugee crisis” across 2014 and 2015, focusing the atten-
tion of the whole world precisely on the people and the routes I had been studying 
for over two years. Although I was not a public intellectual but a mere PhD stu-
dent, I was often asked how the crisis could be solved. This often left me with little 
more than superficial policy suggestions about the need for increased resettlement 
quotas, the unproductive implications of border enforcement, and the importance 
of acknowledging the legal rights of those who seek asylum in Europe. However, 
I was left dissatisfied with my own responses. Certainly, these were useful circum-
stantial solutions to specific issues, but they did not fundamentally address the 
paradox that lies at the foundation of the asylum crisis: the need of the welfare state 
to protect the security and social rights of its citizens and the ethical imperative to 
guarantee prospects to those who seek safety and a decent life.
If my research was not providing solutions and probably had little short-term 
policy relevance, what was it for? Without overemphasizing the potential impact 
of research in the “real world,” I still needed to be aware of the possible con-
sequences of my writing on the lives of those with whom I worked.65 Sensitive 
to the positions of those who argue for a militant role on the part of research-
ers—including but not limited to migration studies66—and to refugee scholars 
who claim that all work should ultimately aim to promote social justice,67 I began 
wondering how I could balance realistic depiction of the social realities I encoun-
tered and the safeguarding of the rights of those I studied with a critical stance 
toward the overall asylum regime. In my case, it seemed especially hard to rec-
oncile these ethical imperatives, since I often felt that protecting Eritrean asylum 
seekers was somehow in contradiction with the need to criticize the asylum re-
gime and its categories, which protect and exclude at the same time. How could I 
escape the categories that protected as well as oppressed my informants? How to 
account for the bravery, the determination, and the dreams of my informants, if I 
had to keep reproducing the image of the victim so that they could be recognized 
as legitimate refugees?
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These considerations have also led me to think about who I was ultimately 
accountable to while writing. My informants, the Eritrean people, refugees, mi-
grants, the academic community, truth, or all of them? Even if my debts to my 
informants made me especially accountable to them, the divides among them still 
made it hard to decide what perspective to privilege.68 Eritreans are deeply divided 
along generational, political, and regional lines. Even if my loyalty mostly lay with 
those who participated in my research—which does not equate with Eritreans or 
Eritrean refugees in general—this still meant facing a deeply ambivalent audi-
ence divided between appreciation of the actions of the Eritrean government and 
denunciation of its violence, to mention only one of the many issues dividing 
them. But even among the closest circle of my informants, perspectives differed: 
some thought that the manuscript—which I shared with them—should have de-
nounced the human rights violations of the Eritrean government more strongly; 
some thought I should stay out of political debates; some wanted me to highlight 
the daily challenges that make refugees’ lives so hard in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Italy 
even more than I did; some thought I should focus on more eminent refugee per-
sonalities, rather than on ordinary refugees nobody would be interested in.
The conversations I had with my informants and with the texts of those schol-
ars who had addressed these issues before me left me alone with my own au-
thority, its related responsibilities, and a lot of choices still to make. Although I 
acknowledge the impossibility of remaining neutral in a deeply political debate 
such as the one on migration and asylum, I started recognizing that my main 
responsibility as a researcher was neither militancy nor advocacy. For me, both of 
these stances betray a paternalism on the part of the researcher, who purports to 
know what is best for others and to speak on their behalf.
I decided to let my informants’ stories largely speak for themselves, but I am 
not naïve about the choices involved in how I represent my informants and their 
lives. The rationale that oriented my writing can be summarized by rephrasing 
Didier Fassin’s reflections on the difference between fiction and ethnography: “If 
the fictional imagination lies in the power to invent a world with its characters, 
the ethnographic imagination implies the power to make sense of the world that 
subjects create by relating it to larger structures and events.”69 In this perspective, 
the researcher’s most important responsibility is to provide nuanced representa-
tions of the stories, the people, and the situations he/she encountered, making 
sense of his/her informants’ points of view, while explaining the structures of 
power that shape them. I certainly did not want to serve institutional attempts to 
map my informants’ trajectories; rather, I intended to contribute to understand-
ing the implicit political stance expressed by my informants’ ways of counter-
mapping by crossing borders at all costs. The depiction of their aspirations and 
possibilities, along with the representation of the challenges they faced in differ-
ent contexts, also aimed at overcoming the depersonalization of forced migra-
tion widely criticized by scholars from varied theoretical backgrounds, such as 
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Thomas Faist and Sandro Mezzadra.70 The focus on migrants’ social, imaginative, 
and emotional worlds meant restoring their subjectivity beyond stereotypical 
media portraits and policy categories. Herein lies the most revolutionary con-
tribution that a researcher can bring to the public debate, I believe; it is neither 
by advocating on behalf of his or her informants nor by attempting to produce 
research that is directly policy-relevant or primarily aimed at social change. Our 






1. The concept of “cosmology” has a long-standing history in anthropology (see Bar-
nard and Spencer 1996). Derived from the ancient Greek cosmos (order, harmony, world) 
and logos (discourse), cosmology was historically intended as the knowledge of the struc-
ture and shape of the world, entailing not only cognitive classifications of the world but 
“evaluations and moral premises and emotional attitudes translated into taboos, prefer-
ences, prescriptions and proscriptions” (Tambiah 1985, 3–4). Much of the relevant literature 
has focused on religious beliefs and aimed to reconstruct the “traditional” and “original” 
worldviews of a people. Nevertheless, cosmologies are not necessarily static traditional sys-
tems (Powers 1987; Prins and Lewis 1992), but rather continuous elaborations that reflect 
structural circumstances, social conflicts, and events historically crucial for social groups. 
In Douglas and Wildavsky 1983, cosmological beliefs encompass the realm of the sacred 
and inform the classification of natural objects, moral conduct, and behavior toward risk in 
contemporary technological societies.
2. Abramson and Holbraad (2012) argue that the concept of cosmology is a relevant 
tool to analyze contemporary globalized societies. In particular, a cosmological approach is 
useful for understanding the perceived spatiotemporal relocation of contemporary subjects 




6. Malkki 1995. As Malkki explains, the emergence of this mythical history is partly the 
result of cultural and historical elaboration allowed by the structural separation between 
refugees living in camps and locals. In fact, other Hutu refugees in town had different 
attitudes about pure identity, as well as different attitudes to the future.
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7. Monsutti (2007, 2008).
8. Carling 2002; De Haas 2011; Bal and Willems 2014.
9. Carling and Collins 2018, 915.
10. The idea of a “culture of migration” has been used by anthropologists and sociolo-
gists in different ways: the former use it to illustrate the fact that mobility has been an 
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CHAPTER 1 .  WHEN MIGR ATION BEC OMES THE NORM
1. Vigh 2008, 10.
2. This reluctance was often due to the fact that many of my informants had not kept 
in touch with their families (Belloni 2019b). In other cases, they did not want to attract the 
attention of neighbors or officials. Alazar’s family were refused to accommodate me in As-
mara because they planned to escape the country.
3. Cf. Wilson 1998.
4. See Bernal 2014; Hirt 2015.
5. Eritrean women working in Italy, for instance, were called “mothers of Eritrea,” since 
they offered much of their income to support the struggle (S. Marchetti 2011) See also Kifl-
eyesus 2012 for female migration to the Gulf and the Middle East.
6. Even speaking about one’s own desire to leave the country can be sufficient reason to 
be jailed. “The first time I was arrested, it was because I was trying to collect some informa-
tion about the possible ways to leave Eritrea through my Yahoo,” Kudus, a thirty-year-old 
Eritrean whom I met in Addis Ababa in 2014, explained. “Even the thought of escaping the 
country is a crime over there.” He was subsequently incarcerated twice for attempting to 
flee Eritrea illegally. He spent eight years in prison and then finally managed to cross over 
to Ethiopia.
7. The consequences of their failed flight can be different depending on their individual 
circumstances. Military officers and soldiers run the highest risks—if caught trying to cross 
the border, especially into Ethiopia, they can be shot, or otherwise imprisoned for at least a 
year, and even tortured, depending on the head of their original military unit.
8. If the family cannot pay (fines were around 50,000 nakfa per escapee), a member 
of the household who is held “responsible” for the deserter’s conduct is imprisoned. These 
measures are not systematic and can vary from place to place, and from case to case. See 
also HRW 2009.
9. The song “Zemen” was released in 1985, when the independence struggle was 
more furious than ever and Yemane was an exile in Sudan. The song’s title, “Time,” refers 
to the period under the Ethiopian oppressor. On Eritrean art and theater, see Matzke 2002, 
2004.
10. Ambivalence about migration is a specific characteristic of the Eritrean migration 
context as observed by Belloni 2018b and Riggan 2013.This ambivalence is multifaceted. 
First, while condemning current generations of migrants and labeling them traitors, the 
government cultivated a strong connection with its historic diaspora. Second, although it 
tries to prevent the outflow of young people at all costs, the Eritrean nation-state heavily 
depends on migrant remittances. Not only family survival but also the Eritrean state’s ex-
istence would not be possible without the contribution of Eritreans abroad (A. Poole 2013; 
Woldemikael 2009), which may approach 40 percent of the national GDP. Eritrean citizens 
abroad (more or less willingly) in fact contribute to the development of their homeland 
by paying the 2 percent of their annual income to the government. This tax is practically 
compulsory for those who want to preserve their right to visit and own property in the 
country (A. Poole 2013). This suggests that the current political status quo relies on the 
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fact that Eritreans keep migrating, circumventing the rules established by those in power. 
This leads us to the another major aspect of government’s ambivalence. Although it pub-
licly denounces the refugees as deserters and traitors, the state allows those who leave the 
country illicitly to recover their passports and rights provided they officially admit guilt and 
promise to support the development of the homeland economically (Hirt and Mohammad 
2017). Emigrants given rights as external citizens and residents denied their basic citizen-
ship rights by reason of compulsory national service are thus treated differentially. 
11. Eritrea’s currency is the nakfa. The exchange rate between nakfa and euro set by the 
Eritrean government was 20 to 1, but this was far above the rate on the international money 
market. A U.S. dollar was worth 50 nakfa on the black market when I was in Eritrea, and 
I have used that rate in the book.
12. Remittance architecture is one of the marks of a “culture of migration,” where migra-
tion has become the most desired channel for social mobility, according to the literature 
(e.g., Timmermann 2008; Lopez 2010).
13. Remittance houses and their manifold meanings have been studied e.g. in Ghana 
(Smith and Mazzucato 2009), Mexico (Lopez 2010, 20), and Somaliland (Ciabarri 2011).
14. “Absences are a necessary precondition for migrants to realise their dream houses” 
(Lopez 2010, 34). 
15. As scholars have observed in other contexts, memories of migrants are often 
reified in things like photograph albums, underlining both the absence of the migrant and 
his/her continued presence in the life of the family (Tolia-Kelly 2004; Rose 2003; Boccagni 
2014).
16. Comparing the cost of living and official salaries in Eritrea clearly indicates that 
the majority of families depend on remittances from abroad for their survival. In 2013, 
the highest salary in the public sector was around 2,500 nakfa—around 50 U.S.$, which is 
what specialized doctors earn. However, the majority of people working in the public sec-
tor earned 700 nakfa (about 14 U.S.$) a month at most. In the poor area where I was living, 
houses rented for around 5,000 nakfa (about 100 U.S.$); a pair of jeans in the market near 
our house cost around 1,000 nakfa (about 20 U.S.$); a shirt, or a chicken, 500; a kilo of cof-
fee beans, around 200; and a kilo of bananas, the cheapest produce, sold for 25 nakfa. Unless 
families had someone abroad to help them or had their own private business, survival was 
a daily challenge.
17. T. M. Woldemikael 2009, 3; Brahne Tewolde, 2008; Fessehatzion 2005.
18. Kandel and Massey 2002; Ali 2007.
19. Migration has been widely portrayed as a rite of passage to adulthood in the litera-
ture (see Aguilar 1999; Ali 2007; Monsutti 2007).
20. Van Gennep 1960; Turner 1969.
21. Treiber 2009.
22. Patterson 1982.
23. Mauss [1926] 1950.
24. Peter 2010.
25. Vigh 2006.
26. See, e.g., Stark and Bloom 1985. Recently, FitzGerald and Arar (2018) argued that 
the new economics of labor migration be also be applied in the context of refugee move-
ments. By taking a household perspective, researchers may be able to by analyzing how 
families collectively manage different kinds of risks related to war, displacement and migra-
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tion. These considerations partly apply to the case of the Eritrean families I met, even if, as 
I show elsewhere (Belloni 2019), migration is rarely a collective decision.
27. In general, the parents I met assumed three main attitudes to their children’s plans to 
migrate: some promoted them and helped finance them; some indirectly endorsed them, 
without being actively involved; others opposed them out of patriotic loyalty (see Belloni 
2019a).
28. Belloni 2016b; Belloni 2019a.
29. See http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/demographics.
30. Muller 2008; O’Kane and Hepner 2009.
31. For more information about Eritrean national service, see Human Rights Watch 
2009; Kibreab 2009; Bozzini 2011.
32. There used to be another, even harder training camp, called Ueah, for those unable 
to reach eleventh grade. Many young men died there because of the lack of food, the heat, 
and the workload, which pushed the government to close the center some years ago and 
replace it with other training centers across the country.
33. This year used to be divided into six months of intensive military training and six 
months of teaching. Today, military training is mostly been limited to three months, with 
the exception of the students of the Italian school, who after finishing school in Asmara go 
to Sa’wa for up to four months’ training.
34. By means of the “experiment of social engineering” (Bereketeab 2002) that Sa’wa 
represents, the government seeks to mold the diverse Eritrean population into one people 
sharing a sense of belonging to the same nation and a spirit of self-sacrifice for the com-
mon good. Minority groups are thus obliged to contribute to a national project they do not 
necessarily share.
35. Riggan 2009; Muller 2008.
36. In 2016, public sector salaries were upgraded. Even if most Eritreans have still not 
been released from their public duties, their became as those of civilians. Today (2018), 
those with a degree, depending on their specialization, may earn between 2,000 and 4,000 
nakfa a month. Those with lower education earn around 1,000–1,500 nakfa a month.
37. The upper middle class in Eritrea is mainly represented by older generations—usu-
ally the generation of the freedom fighters—or by those who have a release document, often 
thanks to their family connections with high-up government officials. These Eritreans can 
open private businesses and travel to import goods and foreign exchange into the country.
38. On Eritrean political humor, see Bozzini 2013 and Bernal 2013.
39. Lubkemann 2008.
40. See Belloni 2018b.
41. Draft-dodging is well documented in the literature on Eritrea; see Bozzini 2011; 
Treiber 2009; Hirt and Mohammad 2013.
42. Treiber 2009; Bozzini 2011.
43. Goffman 2014.
44. Bozzini 2011.
45. This sense of “immobility” is also documented in other African contexts where 
many young people have been left with limited socioeconomic prospects and often in a 
position of economic dependence on older generations (Ferguson 2006; Christiansen 2006; 
Vigh 2006; Cutolo 2015)
46 E.g. Hirt and Mohammad 2013; Treiber 2009
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47. Madianou and Miller 2013; Vacchiano 2012; Bal and Willems 2014.
48. “Modernity” has come to be part of African local traditions, reproduced in new 
alternative, parallel forms, widely discussed by anthropologists (Larkin 1997; Fabian 1983, 
1998; Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; Ferguson 2006, 2002; Piot 1999; Bal and Willems 
2014). As Piot puts it (1999, 22), African societies can no longer be represented as “small, 
bounded, static .  .  . at some remove from the tumult of global history”. This literature 
has positively contributed to overcoming the idea of a primitive, ahistorical Africa, al-
though perhaps partly neglecting existing global socioeconomic hierarchies (Ferguson 
2006; Castells 2000). When an ethnographer eventually goes into the field, possibly aim-
ing to showcase Africa’s alternative modernity, he/she may face informants’ disenchant-
ment about their own “backwardness,” together with their claim to a conventional form of 
“modernity.” My informants’ desires for modernity were also in a way quite conventional 
(see Belloni 2018a). Their aspirations to be part of the modern world directly emerge from 
their daily experience of deprivation and inequalities between them and their peers in the 
outside world.
49. Appadurai 2013.
50. Aspirations have recently become central in migration theories, as one of the sub-
jective factors that affect the individual decision to migrate (Carling 2002). Desires to mi-
grate “are not simply generated by rationalist choices based on economic calculations,” but 
are embedded in “translocal processes that concern people’s ideas about the good and the 
right life” (Åkesson 2008, 269). De Haas 2011 outlines an analytical framework of migration 
as a function of aspirations and capabilities, the first being subjective desires and the second 
being the (structure-affected) possibility of achieving them. More recently, on aspirations 
and desire, see Carling and Collins, 2018
51. Miller 1995.
52. Appadurai 1996; Larkin 1997.
53. On gender and media in Eritrea, see Indira and Vijayalakshmi, 2015.
54. Arnone 2011.
55. About the impact of social remittances on local aspirations and life styles see Levitt 
1998; Sayad 2000; Åkesson 2008.
56. On the shifting, negotiable character of migrants’ journeys, see Schapendonk 2012b.
57. Although the young Eritreans who were often thinking of leaving the country were 
at times well informed about life in different destination countries, my older interlocutors 
had a more blurred image of life in Europe. Even if they were in touch with close relatives 
abroad, they rarely knew the exact city where they lived, what work they did, or their hous-
ing conditions (see chap. 3).
58. Pajo 2007.
59. Vigh 2009, 93.
60. Ferguson (2006, 183) writes that “underdeveloped” countries were expected to 
move progressively closer to the level of the First World, but as stages of the developmental 
hierarchy have become permanent statuses, this model has lost credibility. The only way 
forward that Africans can see is “not by ‘patience’ and the progress of national or societal 
development, but by leaving, going elsewhere, even in face of terrible danger”.
61. This does not mean that First Worlders are esteemed in every respect. Europeans’ 
lack of care for the elderly, coldness, and attitude to homosexuality were sometimes con-
demned by my interlocutors.
180    Notes
62. On stereotypes of Ethiopians, see, e.g., Sorenson 1990; Bereketeab 2010. On the 
complex interethnic relations between Eritreans and Sudaneses and the challenges faced 
by Eritrean refugee women in Khartoum, see Kibreab 1995. On the legacy of colonial cat-
egories of dirty/clean and developed/underdeveloped, see S. Marchetti 2014 (labor relation-
ships), Treiber 2010 (urban development in Asmara) and Andall and Duncan 2005. See 
discussion on ethnic stereotypes in chap. 2.
63. See, e.g. Palumbo, 2003.
64. On Eritrean women and how their aspirations for migration are connected to their 
desire of emancipation, see Belloni 2019a and Grabska et al. 2018.
CHAPTER 2 .  HYPERMOBILE AND IMMOBILE
1. See, e.g., the following statement by the UNHCR in 2014 “Eritrean refugees, includ-
ing unaccompanied minors who continue to arrive in increasing numbers, tend to move on 
from Ethiopia to a third country, a situation which presents a major challenge in providing 
protection” (accessed 2014, page discontinued).
2. Among the most notable exceptions among studies on refugees, see Zimmermann 
2009 and Moret et al. 2006. Besides the studies exclusively focusing on refugees, it is im-
portant to highlight a growing number of studies addressing migrants’ journeys (Schapen-
donk et al. 2018; Khosravi, 2010). These studies highlight that migrants’ trajectories are far 
from being linear; they are often multi-directional and characterized by complex tempo-
ralities. Schapendonk (2012, 2008), for instance, examines the trajectories of West Africans 
on their way to Europe, and shows how these are continually reshaped by migrants’ volatile 
networks and shifting aspirations.
3. Sudan and Ethiopia are, today, the largest recipients of Eritrean refugees worldwide 
(UNHCR 2016; UNHCR 2019). They respectively host 121,000 and 170,000 Eritrean refu-
gees (http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern), but both countries provide shel-
ter for many other nationalities as well. In Sudan, the refugee population totals 160,000, not 
counting 1,873,300 internally displaced people. Ethiopia hosts about half a million refugees. 
Sudan has historically been the first refuge for Eritreans, whereas Ethiopia has also for-
mally become a shelter for many Eritreans only in the past decade. Walter Kok reported in 
1989 that Eritreans in Sudan had mostly self-settled in Kassala state. Only a small portion 
of them were assisted by the UNHCR in camps. All the others have been living outside 
camps for decades and are usually locally integrated with the local Sudanese population 
given their ethnic and religious homogeneity. Self-settled Eritrean refugees were usually 
Muslim lowlanders and belong to the Beni Amer and the Nara ethnic groups. However, 
many Christian highlanders also settled in Kassala town and others moved to cities, mainly 
Khartoum and Port Sudan (Weaver 1985). From the 1960s to the 1990s, Eritreans were fight-
ing against Ethiopia in order to secede from it, and they tended to flee to Sudan, the Middle 
East, and European countries. However, after the 1998–2000 border conflict with Ethiopia, 
the situation changed, and Eritreans have progressively started to seek asylum in Ethiopia. 
Both countries actively cooperate with the UNHCR for the assessment of refugee status and 
the assistance and protection of refugees. Although refugees receive formal protection in 
Sudan and Ethiopia, these two countries have severely limited their freedom of movement. 
This means that refugees tend to be kept in camps; local integration in rural and urban en-
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vironment is officially not facilitated (Crisp 2003; Kibreab 1996). Nevertheless, in practice, 
refugees have long circumvented these policies and settled in urban and rural areas, often 
in significant numbers.
4. To my knowledge, there is no reliable estimate of the rate of secondary movement 
from Ethiopian camps, but it is hard to keep track of refugees there. However, around 2015, 
IOM and UNHCR declared that some 80 percent of Eritreans in Sudanese camps, many 
of whom had previously been in Ethiopian camps, moved on within the first few months. 
This gives an idea of their hypermobility. https://sudan.iom.int/sites/default/files/docs/
FINAL%20Joint%20Anti-trafficking%20smuggling%20strategy%20UNHCR_IOM.pdf.
5. I spent most of my time in Shimelba and Adi Harush because I was subject to less 
control by the Ethiopian authorities and could spend the night there.
6. Refugees slept in tents and communal shelters in Hintstas, but those in Adi Harush 
and Mai Aini, respectively established in 2010 and 2008, had houses, which they built on 
their own or were provided by NGOs. Being the last of the camps established in Tigray 
(2013), Hintstas lacked most of the facilities of other camps, such as schools, clinics, and 
proper housing. Not only was there no NGO presence there, but the UNHCR also had no 
stable basis there. Housing areas were still under construction. Nevertheless, refugees were 
quickly organizing and had already established barber shops and small food stores.
7. In 2017, the total population of these camps was stated to be around 38,000 (www.
refworld.org/country,,UNHCR,,ETH,,59e5aae94,0.html). Shimelba was the least populous 
in 2013, with 6,000 refugees. The other camps ranged between 10,000 to 15,000 inhabitants. 
On the idea of city camps, see Agier 2002. See also Crisp and Jacobsen 1998 on the different 
policy and academic debates on refugee camps.
8. Eritrean security could not easily infiltrate into Ethiopia, though it was known that 
Eritrean security agents could wander undisturbed across the Sudanese border to arrest 
individuals of interest to the government. Moreover, whereas bandits were not operating 
in Ethiopian territory, camps in Eastern Sudan were known among refugees for frequent 
kidnappings by traffickers.
9. At that time Israel had already become almost inaccessible because of its no-toler-
ance approach at the Sinai border. Other African countries instead started to emerge as 
possible destinations among my informants. Some, for instance, thought to reach Angola 
or Juba in South Sudan, which seemed to offer some prospect for business opportunities in 
spite of the high level of insecurity.
10. Since the camps are mostly in remote and dry areas, firewood has become a rarity 
there. Refugees travel long distances to fetch it, even if this is formally forbidden by the lo-
cal authorities.
11. Samuel Hall Consulting 2014.
12. For specific demographic data on refugee population in the camps, see the UNHCR 
statistical database at http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/demographics.
13. See “UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs” (2018), www.unhcr.org/protec-
tion/resettlement/593a88f27/unhcr-projected-global-resettlement-needs-2018.html.
14. See the 2018 UNHCR resettlement handbook, www.unhcr.org/protection 
/resettlement/4a2ccf4c6/unhcr-resettlement-handbook-country-chapters.html.
15. On the complex interactions between refugees and their relatives in the diaspora, 
see Belloni 2016b; 2018.
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16. Three refugees—forty-year-old Jeremiah; Jacob, a young engineer from Asmara; 
and fifty-year-old Tekeste—assisted me throughout the survey, translating and providing 
me with useful insights about life in the camp. The main questions concerned the size of the 
household, mobility, desired destinations, and the support received from abroad. 
17. This partly conflicts with the MEDMIG project’s finding that “when the migrants 
and refugees on the Central Mediterranean route initially set out from their place of origin 
they often did not have very clear plans about where their final destination would be. Only 
one third (37.5%) of the interviewees [500 in all] who spoke about their intentions said that 
they had been intending to move to Europe when they set out, and even then they often 
had little specific knowledge about a particular European country” (McMahon and Sigona 
2016, 8). The differences between my observations and what was found by the MEDMIG 
researchers mainly emerge from the variety of national groups interviewed as part of that 
project. Different national groups of migrants often have different migration histories, aspi-
rations, and also different prospects of legalization in Europe, making it hard to generalize.
18. On the feminization of the refugee population in the camps in protracted displace-
ment, see Hyndman and Giles 2011.
19. Black and Collyer 2014.
20. Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014.
21. Noah, Bartholomeus, and their families were resettled to Texas just two months after 
I met them in the camp.
22. Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014, 130.
23. First settled in Wallanabi, the first refugee camp ever established in Tigray, Kunama 
refugees were moved for security reasons—Wallanabi was apparently too close to the Er-
itrean border—to Shimelba in 2004. Many families came right after the Ethiopian army 
evacuated Barentu in northwestern Eritrea and brought their camels, cows, and goats with 
them.
24. One instance of this strong relationship with the land is represented by the care 
for the dead. Although monotheistic religions have become prevalent among Kunamas, 
traditional beliefs are still widespread and syncretically practiced in wedding ceremonies, 
baptisms, funerals, and initiation rituals. Once a loved one dies in the camp and is buried 
there, the family is somehow bound to be in the same place so as not to betray the spirit of 
the dead person (Dore 2012).
25. Naty 2002a and b.
26. Although I cannot go into detail, there is a long-standing debate in refugee studies 
(see, e.g., Malkki 1992; Kibreab 1999; Brun 2001; Hammond 2004; Turton 2005) critically 
reflecting on the relationship between people, place, and identity. Some argue that roots 
and identity should not be thought as anchored in only one place (Malkki 1992; Hammond 
2004); others stress the importance of territory and place for refugees’ self-understanding 
(Brun 2001) and realistic prospects for the future (Kibreab 1999).
27. Malkki 1994.
28. For a reflection on the terminology surrounding illegal/irregular/undocumented/
unauthorized migration see Paspalanova 2008.
29. As mentioned in the introduction, not all sectors of Eritrean society have partici-
pated equally in international migration throughout over the past fifty years (see Kibreab 
1987; Getahun 2007).
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30. Urban refugees can be generally said to be better off than the stable population of 
camps. Those who can afford to live outside the camp without UNHCR assistance usually 
count on remittances of relatives from abroad. Moreover, if they are allowed to live in Addis 
Ababa, they typically have some kind of “process” (family reunification procedure, sponsor 
visa, etc.) that requires their presence in the city and therefore also have potential access to a 
“regular” or “almost regular” migration option. Nevertheless, urban life also has its challenges.
31. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Ethiopia: Refugees and Asylum-
seekers in Ethiopia, 31 December 2014, 31 December 2014. available at: https://www.ref-
world.org/docid/54b4e2784.html [accessed 19 September 2019]. Estimates of urban popula-
tion have hugely shifted in recent times. In September 2018, Eritreans in Addis Ababa were 
over 18,000 accounting for about 79% of urban refugee population of the Ethiopian capital. 
Of these, 17,217 are beneficiaries of the Government’s Out-Of-Camp Policy (https://relief-
web.int/report/ethiopia/unhcr-ethiopia-urban-refugees-factsheet-september-2018).
32. The “out-of-camp” policy, implemented since 2011, allows Eritrean refugees to study 
at different universities in Ethiopia or to live outside a camp if an Ethiopian sponsor will take 
responsibility for supporting him/her. (Samuel Hall Consulting 2014).
33. Over 73,000 Eritrean refugees who previously lived in camps have settled in 
urban areas in Ethiopia, according to recent UNHCR estimates, www.refworld.org 
/country,COI,,,ETH,,59e5aae94,0.html.
34. Karadawi 1987. At that time Ethiopians and Eritreans could hardly be differentiated 
in statistics, because Eritrea was not an independent state yet.
35. There are around 64,000 refugees and displaced people in Khartoum, according 
to the latest UNHCR estimates (www.refworld.org/country,,,,SDN,,573ad3274,0.html), but 
figures on distribution by nationality are not available.
36. COR, a branch of the Ministry of Interior and the Security Department, is the main 
Sudanese government agency dealing with legal status determination, security service, is-
sue of travel permit, and management of refugee camps, with the collaboration and full 
economic support of UNHCR.
37. See, e.g., www.ibtimes.co.uk/eritrea-ethiopia-lampedusa-dead-refugee-camps-511960.
38. The long-term participation of Eritrean women and men in the Sudanese labor mar-
ket is documented by Kibreab 1995, 1994.
39. Gaonkar 2002; Salazar 2011.
40. On the role of the mall in Africans’ imagination, see Mbembe and Nuttall 2004; 
Jackson et al. 2005; Dolby 2006. Such spaces can simultaneously be “material sites for com-




44. This does not mean that all Eritreans I met thought the same way about Sudanese. 
Some also praised their generosity and affability. However, that attitude was less widespread 
among the refugees I encountered.
45. For a more detailed account of the impact of colonial categories and distinctions 
on Eritrean societal understanding and political discourse, see Treiber 2010 and Marchetti 
2014.
46. Massa 2016; Kibreab 1995, 1996; Kok 1989.
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47. Kibreab 1991 observes that the strict gender segregation of Sudanese society is not 
common in Eritrean society. This among other factors (Kibreab 1995) has led Sudanese to 
think of Eritrean women as more accessible and sexually available than Sudanese women 
and has increased the risk of sexual harassment.
48. There is a rich literature on the topic of collective emotions ranging from anthro-
pology to sociology and psychology (see, e.g., Maffesoli [1988] 1995; Collins 2014), which 
I am not able to fully address here. However, it is important here to observe that the role 
of emotions in migration has rarely been taken into account. About this see Boccagni and 
Balsassar 2015.
49. Eritreans use the term “process” to refer to a legal procedure for regular migration.
50. This sense of longing is somehow akin to the feeling of buufi that Cindy Horst 
(2006) encountered in Somali refugee camps in Kenya. Buufis is the term used by Somali 
refugees not only to refer to ‘resettlement’ in general, but also to indicate the longing and 
desire for it. This longing, at times, becomes almost like an illness or possession. Horst de-
fines it as ‘a new phenomenon’ emerging from the transnational flow of information, desires 
and money which connects refugees in camps and their co-nationals in diaspora reinforc-
ing their relative sense of deprivation and their desire for resettlement.
51. Van Hear 2006; Belloni 2016b.
52. Seare was referring to the Italian “Mare Nostrum” operation in 2014–15, in which 
the Italian Navy patrolled the Mediterranean to find and assist endangered migrant vessels 
headed for Italy.
CHAPTER 3 .  AN ENDLESS JOURNEY
1. Southern European countries such as Spain, Greece, and Italy are usually the first safe 
places in Europe where asylum seekers can formalize their asylum requests. Italy was the first 
European country reached by African and other asylum seekers, by way of the Libyan corri-
dor, until 2017, when Italy signed a memorandum of understanding with Libya on develop-
ment cooperation, illegal immigration, human trafficking, fuel smuggling and reinforcement 
of border security (http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-italy-libya-memorandum-of-under-
standing-the-baseline-of-a-policy-approach-aimed-at-closing-all-doors-to-europe). This 
has been endorsed by the EU. (See Palm 2017 for a critical review of the memorandum.) 
This agreement has not stopped the flow of people trying to reach Europe. Some of it has 
been redirected to Spain and Greece. Many migrants are trapped in prisons and detention 
centers in Libya, where it is reported migrants live in inhuman conditions (www.dw.com 
/en/widespread-torture-and-rape-documented-in-libyas-refugee-camps/a-48070588).
2. International acknowledgement that Eritrean applicants could face torture and per-
secution if sent home has led Italy, as well as most European countries, to grant legal pro-
tection (mostly in a “‘subsidiary” form) to the great majority of them. According to the 
data of the Italian Ministry of Interior Affairs (http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.
interno.gov.it/it/documentazione/statistica/i-numeri-dellasilo), Eritreans have one of the 
highest rates of recognition among applicants (around 95–98 percent). Those not granted 
protection are usually identified as “fake Eritreans”—Tigrayan Ethiopians pretending to be 
Eritreans to gain asylum. For a critical analysis of asylum claims based on nationality, see 
Campbell 2011, 679.
Notes    185
3. See Papadimitriou and Papageorgiou 2005; Sidorenko 2007; Schuster 2011. The so-
called Dublin Regulation governs refugees’ movements in Europe, requiring them to apply 
for asylum in the first European country they reach, which is responsible for processing the 
application. Refugees who seek asylum in another European country after being identified 
in Italy are to be returned there. The first Dublin Convention, which aimed to prevent mul-
tiple applications from the same individuals in different European countries and to ensure 
that countries take responsibility for processing asylum seekers’ cases, was signed on June 
15, 1990, and came into force on September 1, 1997. An amended regulation, Dublin II, was 
adopted in 2003 and updated in 2013 (Dublin III).
4. These estimates are calculated on the basis of the data from the Italian Ministry of the 
Interior available at www.ismu.org/irregolari-e-sbarchi-presenze. Since the 2000s, Eritre-
ans have progressively become one of the most numerous national groups in asylum flows 
to Italy. A drop in arrivals was registered only in 2009 and 2010 after the signing of a “Treaty 
of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation” between Italy and Libya in August 2008 and 
related push-back policies (Paoletti 2011; Cuttitta 2014).
5. In sociological literature on migration (e.g., Bryce-Laporte 1972; Carter 2010; Pug-
gioni 2005), “invisibility” usually refers to institutional lack of recognition and neglect, but 
in the case of Eritrean refugees in Italy, it is an actively pursued survival strategy rather than 
a handicap. More on invisibility as a tactic can be found in Tazzioli 2015.
6. The fingerprinting policy has changed frequently over the past ten years. Asylum 
seekers are sometimes forced to provide their fingerprints upon arrival, sometimes only 
later. In the latter case, which was what happened more systematically in 2014, many in-
dividuals actively try to avoid the procedure in order to seek asylum in other European 
countries. Fingerprinting has been a very thorny issue. Asylum seekers have often refused 
to cooperate with police officers in the procedure and have been forced to do so. This has 
attracted media and NGO attention and Italian police were accused of degrading treat-
ment of the asylum seekers. However, in 2013, several informants told me that the police 
had often turned a blind eye and let them go. When the fingerprinting policy became 
more relaxed in 2014, other European countries criticized Italy’s neglect of the Dublin 
directives.
7. See Belloni 2016a
8. Irregular secondary migration by Eritreans in Europe usually does not involve physi-
cal risks comparable to those the refugees have had to face earlier. However, some journeys 
can be extremely dangerous, such as the one from France (Calais) to England (Dover). Al-
exander, a young Eritrean refugee in Rome, told me that the Channel crossing was the worst 
he had ever experienced (and he had traveled illicitly from Eritrea into Sudan, then crossed 
the Sahara desert to Libya, and reached Italy from there in a rubber boat). Moreover, even if 
refugees do not risk much in legal terms, their failed attempts generate psychological stress, 
a significant waste of time, and, to a lesser extent, loss of money. On the pitfalls of the Dub-
lin Regulation, see European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2013; Association for Juridical 
Studies on Immigration 2012; and Schuster 2011.
9. Comparative studies about reception systems, refugee integration policies, and wel-
fare regimes include Brekke and Brochmann 2014 and Korac 2003.
10. On several occasions, the official Sistema protezione richiedenti asilo e rifiugiati, 
or SPRAR (System for the Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees) has been supple-
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mented by initiatives that involve humanitarian agents, like the Red Cross and Protezione 
Civile as well as private individuals like hotel owners providing basic assistance to asylum 
seekers, such as in the North African Emergency system (2011). Civil society associations 
and especially religious organizations, such as Caritas and the Jesuit Refugees Service, also 
play an important role in providing legal and practical help.
11. On the complexities of the Italian refugee reception system, see Hein 2001 and Am-
brosini 2014; Campomori 2018.
12. See, e.g., Andall 1999; Schuster 2005; Lindley and van Hear 2007; van Liempt 2011; 
Toma and Castagnone 2015.
13. Established social networks, colonial linkages, common language, political dis-
course, welfare arrangements, and asylum policies in destination countries are factors of-
ten cited in studies of refugees’ choices (Robinson and Segrott 2002; Koser and Pinkerton 
2002; Neumayer 2005; Thielemann 2004 ; Havinga and Bocker 1999). These studies—typi-
cally policy-oriented—are concerned less with the distinction between primary and sec-
ondary mobility. They highlight that that policies have a limited effect on asylum flows, 
since refugees’ choices are often constrained. Even when they do make a choice, this seems 
to depend essentially on long-term social links and perceived economic prospects in the 
country of destination. However, secondary movement occurs to countries without sig-
nificantly different employment rates or policies on refugees. Van Liempt 2011 notes, for 
example, that Somali refugees in Denmark and Sweden continued to aspire to move on to 
the United Kingdom 
14. Explanations based on historical and cultural linkages appear inadequate in other 
cases. It seems improbable that Eritreans, Iraqis, and Somalis would choose to go to Scandi-
navian countries on linguistic or cultural grounds. Collyer 2004 cites Algerians who refused 
to go to France because of the historically negative relationship between the two countries 
but turned to the United Kingdom as an alternative notwithstanding the language barrier. 
15. On refugees and transnationalism, see Al-Ali et al. 2001; Cheran 2006; Horst 2006; 
Brees 2010. 
16. Horst 2006.
17. Koser and Pinkerton, 2002.
18. Brekke and Brochmann,2014.
19. See Capalbo 1982; Melotti 1988; Scalzo 1984.
20. Under the original Geneva Convention, states can choose whether to apply it only 
to European citizens (geographic limitation) or extend it to all individuals in need of pro-
tection, no matter what their origin. Italy accepted the Geneva Convention in 1951, but 
the geographic limitation was retained until 1990, when it was removed by the so-called 
Martelli law (Hein 2001).
21. On the history of Eritrean migration to Italy, see Marchetti 2014; Mottura and Altieri 
1992; Caputo 1983; Melotti 1988; Capalbo 1982.
22. On generational and political divisions in the Eritrean diaspora, see Arnone 2008; 
Hirt and Mohammad 2017; Hepner 2015. 
23. A lively debate on the old and new Eritrean diasporas in the literature highlights the 
contradictory attitudes of Eritreans, divided by their loyalty to the government, their fear 
of reprisal, and their desire for change. See, e.g., Hirt and Mohammad 2017; Muller 2012; 
Riggan 2016; Belloni 2018b.
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24. See also Al-Ali et al. 2001.
25. Cf. SPRAR 2012–13, 17.




29. Since the late 1960s, Rome has been interested by a grassroots political movement 
that proclaims the universal right to have a house and has actively occupied buildings that 
were abandoned or had not been used yet (Daolio 1974). Initially, the movement was close 
to workers’ unions and mainly comprised Italian migrants from Southern Italy. Progres-
sively, the movement has included more and more foreigners, mainly from Africa and Latin 
America; recently, refugees have become a consistent part of it (Vereni 2016).
30. This squat became the focus of international media attention in 2017 when au-
thorities decided to clear the settlement. This decision produced clashes between refugees 
and local police and resulted in many refugees being homeless, stranded on the streets of 
Rome for several weeks. See, e.g., the analysis by Aurora Massa https://homing.soc.unitn.it 
/2017/09/29/aurora-massa-homemaking-of-eritreans-and-ethiopians-after-eviction-in-
rome/. In international media: www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-italy-refugees-crack-
down-20170824-story.html and www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/24/italian-police-
water-cannon-refugees-rome-square.
31. Winchester and White 1988; Squats are also common in other Italian cities. See e.g. 
Manocchi 2012; Quassoli 2004.
32. To some extent, the informal settlements and squats that I investigated in Italy cor-
respond to M. Z. Bookman’s definition (2002) of an “encampment” and have similar char-
acteristics: their involuntary nature, since inhabitants of encampments “would rather be 
elsewhere”; the fact that encampments are meant to be temporary (as seen by institutions 
and by their inhabitants), but tend to become permanent; the ethnic concentration of mi-
nority groups; and the scarcity of economic resources.
33. Brekke and Brochmann 2014; Schapendonk 2012a; Mathews 2011; Zijlstra 2014; Pa-
padopoulou 2003.
34. For a conceptual analysis of precariousness see Grabska and Fanjoy 2015.
35. Schapendonk 2012a, 579.
36. Hage 2009, 97.
37. Mathews 2011; Papadopoulou 2003; Grabska and Fanjoy 2015.
38. Panagakos and Horst 2006; Opas 2012; Harney 2013; Madianou and Miller 2013.
39. Parry and Bloch 1989; Carling 2008; McKenzy and Menjivar 2011; Baldassar and 
Merla 2014; Tazanu 2015.
40. Lindley 2010. Akuei 2005 notes that the inability to meet the economic obligations 
to kin and friends back home may lead to social exclusion. These studies are relevant in the 
case of Eritrean refugees in Italy, who often find it impossible to fulfil their family expecta-
tions (Belloni 2019b).
41. See, e.g., Hannaford 2015; Lindley 2009; Tazanu 2015; Akuei 2005.
42. See, e.g., Akesson 2011; Addo and Besnier 2008.
43. Malinowski 1920.
44. Small 2012.
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4 .  MOR ALITIES OF B ORDER CROSSING
1. For a critical review of state responses and media images on people smuggling see 
Sharma 2003; Mountz 2004; Van Liempt and Sersli 2013; Zhang et al. 2018.
2. De Genova et al. 2015.
3. Ryo 2013.
4. In their investigation of the conditions underpinning mistrust among refugees and 
aid workers, Eftihia Voutira and Barbara Harrel-Bond (1995, 216), for instance, report one 
of their refugee informants’ saying, “To be a refugee means to learn to lie.”
5. Kibreab 2004.
6. For theoretical attempts to define the concept of “moralities,” see Howell 2005; Zigon 
2007.
7. As Samson A. Bezabeh (2017) illustrates, border crossing entails huge ethical 
challenges for the individual and his/her community. Witnessing women prostitut-
ing themselves to cross the border or waiting in vain for a relative to send money can 
weaken one’s trust in romantic relations, as well as in relations with other community 
members.
8. For a critical appraisal of the Ethiopian out-of-camp policy, see Samuel Hall Consult-
ing 2014.
9. Hagos referred to a sinking on October 3, 2013, when 366 migrants died just a few 
hundred meters from the Italian island of Lampedusa, most of them Eritreans, many of 
whom had come from Ethiopian camps in Tigray.
10. The term “process” is often used by Eritreans to refer to different legal ways to 
mi grate. A “process” is usually a family reunification visa procedure or a resettlement 
process.
11. On migrants’ right to escape, see Mezzadra 2015.
12. Sharma 2003 and Spener 2008 illustrate how the portrait of smugglers as inhuman 
exploiters has been used to endorse more restrictive border controls and restrictive migra-
tion policies. The criminalization of the informal agents of irregular migration often leads 
to worse traveling conditions for smuggled migrants, who have to pay more, embark on 
more dangerous routes, and rely on smugglers with whom they have no relationship nor 
trust. As both authors emphasize, the criminalization of smugglers does not hinder irregu-
lar migration and does not address the root causes of the problem itself. For these reasons, 
decriminalizing smuggling has been suggested (see Zhang et al. 2019 and Gerver 2015). 
For a critical review of EU criminalization of human smuggling, see also van Liempt and 
Doomernik 2006.




15. On the protests, see http://asmarino.com/press-releases/1878-ethiopian-authorities-
shoot-at-refugees-at-mai-ayni-and-adiharush.
16. More considerations on the postcolonial aspect of Eritrean migration can be found 
in Triulzi 2006.
17. Salt and Stein 1997; Salt 2000; Kyle and Dale 2001; Pastore et al. 2006; Triandafylli-
dou 2012; Iselin and Adams 2003.
18. Spener 2004; Sanchez 2017. On the concept of embeddedness see Polanyi 1968.
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19. Zhang et al. 2018; Majidi 2018; Achilli 2018.
20. Tekalign Ayalew 2018, 58
21. For a review see Getahun 2007.
22. Avraham and Kushner 1986.
23. E.g. Spener 2004.
24. Punishment of “pilots” is especially harsh in Eritrea. If the pilot is a soldier, and thus 
a “deserter” and “traitor” in the eyes of the authorities, he may be executed on the spot or 
imprisoned and tortured.
25. For a more detailed report on smuggling along the central Mediterranean route, see 
and Aziz, Monzini, and Pastore 2015.
26. About this see also my intervention on RMMS website at http://regionalmms.org 
/index.php/research-publications/feature-articles/item/2-anything-new-under-the-sun-
analysing-the-shifting-flow
27. This system is called xawi laad in Somalia, fei-ch’ien in China, hund in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, hawala in India and the Middle East. About it see Ismail 2007; El Qorchi et al. 
2003; Maimbo and Passas 2004.
28. Schaeffer 2008; Lindley 2010; Ballard 2005.
29. Lindley 2009a and b.
30. Lindley 2010, 2.
31. To counter the currency black market, the Eritrean government issued a new cur-
rency in 2015. As the issuance of new notes rendered the old ones valueless, the population 
had no other option than to deposit their cash savings in national banks. The government 
then stipulated that monthly bank withdrawals cannot surpass 20,000 nakfa (U.S.$1,000 at 
the official exchange rate). This has not only led to a contraction of the currency black mar-
ket, but has also decreased the purchasing power of most of the population, making basic 
products less accessible. Moreover, the withdrawal limit forms an obstacle for the hawalas 
who used to manage most remittances from the diaspora.
32. Delalai and semsari are the singular forms of delelti and senserti.
33. The middleman I met in Khartoum had rented a small house in the city to “host” his 
customers while they waited to proceed to Libya. However, I was told that in Libya Eritrean 
brokers were in touch with Libyans who owned or rented big warehouses, where migrants 
were kept while waiting for payments and the preparation of their journey to be finalized. In 
these warehouses, migrants could be victims of violence and threats, especially if payments 
had not been successful.
34. Article 3a of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Per-
sons, Especially Women and Children defines trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a posi-
tion of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the 
consent of a person having control over another person for the purposes of exploitation.” 
Exploitation may include sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, and organ harvesting. 
Article of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air defines smug-
gling differently as “procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person 
is not a national or a permanent resident.” www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC 
/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf.
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35. See, e.g., Gallagher 2001; Aronowitz 2001; Baird 2014.
36. See Spener 2004 and 2009; Achilli 2018.
37. Humphris 2013. Such kidnapping has to some extent decreased owing to the 
restriction of the Egypt–Israel migration corridor and combined actions by UNHCR-
IOM and national police in Sudan and Egypt. https://sudan.iom.int/sites/default/files 
/docs/FINAL%20Joint%20Anti-trafficking%20smuggling%20strategy%20UNHCR_
IOM.pdf.
38. Lijnders and Robinson 2013; van Reisen et al. 2012.
39. About the estimation of smuggling business see International Organization for Mi-
gration (IOM), https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/smuggling-migrants. UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime 2010; and Frontex data at http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes. For 
general review see McAuliffe and Laczko (2016).
40. On the potlatch concept, see Barnett 1938.
41. About Eritreans’ complex relations with homeland politics see Hepner 2013; Treiber 
2015 and Belloni 2018b.
42. Zhang and Chin 2002 and Webb and Burrows 2009 also note that people smugglers 
express little sense of wrongdoing.
43. E.g., Chin 1999; Charrière and Frésia 2008.
44. See, e.g., Içduygu and Toktas 2002; Pastore et al. 2006; Sanchez 2017.
45. See appendix.
46. Constable 2003; see also Del Rosario, 2005; Mai and King 2009.
47. On family-arranged marriages, see, e.g., Shaw 2001; Shaw and Charsley 2006. 
On transnational marriages in the context of forced migration see Grabska 2010. On the 
commodifica tion of marriage, see Wang and Chang 2002.
48. Beck‐Gernsheim 2007.
49. European Council Directive 2003/86/EC, Article 16(2b).
50. Modernity produced the idea of the “pure relationship” in which partners are bound 
together by love and sexual intimacy, Giddens (2013) argues, but Lindholm (2006) shows 
that the concept of romantic love is by no means exclusive to the Western world.
51. See Eggebø 2013 in the Norwegian context; Zampagni 2016.
52. Infantino 2014.
53. Ibid.; Charsley and Benson 2012.
54. About the cultural relativity of romantic love see Jankowiak and Fisher 1992; Lind-
holm 2006.
55. Organized criminal networks are more a fantasy than a reality; people smuggling 
and related services are usually performed by small-scale, individual enterprises or loose 
networks (see, e.g., Zhang and Chin 2002; Pastore et al. 2008).
56. On the shifting representation of migration in the Italian context, see Marchetti 
2014 and Colombo 2013.
57. Moral preconceptions about who the deserving refugee is and how he/she should 
behave influence juridical proceedings (Walaardt 2013), bureaucratic procedures (Zampag-
ni 2016; Infantino 2016), the organization of assistance (Casati 2018), and the overall politi-
cal atmosphere surrounding refugee reception and rejection (Holmes and Castaneda 2016).
58. Moreover, while most states grant recognized refugees and other beneficiaries of 
protection the right to reunite with already existing spouses through a facilitated pro-
cedure, those who arrive in Europe as single individuals are usually required to provide 
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evidence of sufficient income, a stable work contract, and housing. These requirements 
are extremely difficult to meet for newly arrived refugees and make transnational mar-
riages almost impossible for them. This makes it hard for many young Eritrean men to 
achieve one of their main aspirations—to have a family and become respected family 
providers. However, this is not the case in Italy, where refugees are allowed to reunite 
with new spouses too.
59. Most of the money would go to the spouse, with a percentage for the broker who 
facilitated the transaction.
60. As far as I know, this has since changed, and fingerprinting is now done at the 
consulate.
CHAPTER 5 .  ENTR APPED
1. See inter alia UNHCR 2017.
2. The definition of risk has been at the center of a complex and interesting theoretical 
debate between social scientists and philosophers. I understand risk here as exposure to 
a potential danger. The crucial implicit counterpart of the negative idea of risk as danger 
is the notion of risk as opportunity. Both these dimensions are fundamental in migrants’ 
decision-making. The adjective “high” refers to the magnitude of the possible danger more 
than to the likelihood of it happening.
3. Hernández-Carretero and Carling 2012.
4. Hernández-Carretero 2008. Once the busiest entryway to Europe, the West African 
route from Senegal to the Canary Islands has progressively lost its centrality over the past 
ten years owing to bilateral agreements between Spain and Senegal in 2007 and the emer-
gence of the central Mediterranean route.
5. Koser and Pinkerton, 2002; Hernández-Carretero 2008. For a critical assessment of 
information campaigns to deter irregular migration see e.g. Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud 2007 
and Andrijasevic and Anderson 2009.
6. Douglas 2003 and 2013; Luhmann 1987; Lupton 1999. Larger debates on risk percep-
tion and risk attitudes at individual and societal levels are relevant here. Constructivist ap-
proaches have been key in understanding how certain risks become acceptable to migrants 
depending on social contexts and living conditions. Common misperceptions in risk evalu-
ation include suspicion and the tendency to overestimate the significance of striking but 
rare events (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1974).
7. E.g., Carling 2008; Hernández-Carretero 2008; Sheridan 2009.
8. Slovic 1987.
9. Sheridan 2009.
10. The idea of migration as a rite of passage has been extensively discussed in the lit-
erature (e.g., Aguilar 1999). In the context of forced migration studies, see Monsutti 2007.
11. Hayenhjelm 2006, 190.
12. Hernández-Carretero and Carling 2012; Massey and Kandel 2002; Christensen et al. 
2006; Vigh 2006.
13. Belloni 2016a.
14. About the dynamic of structure and agency along the complex pathways of contem-
porary migrants see the work by Schapendonk et al. 2018; Schapendonk 2012b; Brigden and 
Maiwaring 2016.
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15. About trafficking in the Sinai see Van Reisen et al. 2012.
16. When investigating the determination of refugees to leave Ethiopia and Sudan, I 
was often faced with a similar fatalistic attitude: “What is written will happen.” So there is 
no reason to worry, many of my informants seemed to imply. However, it would be wrong 
to interpret this as a passive acceptance of one’s own destiny. As Gaibazzi 2012 argues in the 
context of Gambian high-risk migration, fatalistic statements are used instead to justify a 
proactive attitude to risk in a culturally accepted way.
17. Sheridan 2009.
18. See, e.g., Connell 2005 on eminent political prisoners of the Eritrean government.
19. It is calculated that over 150,000 migrants were saved by Mare Nostrum, an Italian 
rescue operation in the Mediterranean in 2013–14 that searched for all migrant boats in 
trouble, even if they were still in Libyan waters. However, owing to the cost and limited fi-
nancial collaboration between EU and Italy, the operation was concluded at the end of 2014 
and replaced by more limited Frontex interventions. The result of this was a surge in fatali-
ties at sea. For a precise assessment of the relationship between search and rescue perations 
and mortality rates at sea, see Steinhilper and Gruijters 2017.
20. Belloni 2016a.
21. Collyer 2010. In his work on the trajectories of West African migrants to Europe, 
Joris Schapendonk (2012) defines these journeys as turbulent. According to this author, the 
idea of turbulence highlights “the multi-causality and multi-directionality of contemporary 
migration” and can then be seen as a welcome alternative to the often-used migration meta-
phors of flows and waves that suggest that migration patterns are unidirectional, possibly 
invasive, and encounter little resistance from supra-state and state authorities (Schapen-
donk, 2012, 29).
22. See Belloni 2016b, 2019; Achtnich 2016.
23. As the narratives of the Eritreans I met in Italy suggest, many of them are caught 
while trying to embark by Libyan police patrolling the beaches. Sometimes the boat’s en-
gine cuts out and they have no choice but to go back into the hands of the police, who will 
imprison them until they can bribe someone to let them out. One of the Eritrean refugees I 
met in Genoa had tried four times before succeeding. This was the situation in Libya before 
the ongoing civil war. On post-Gadhafi Libya, see also Achtnich 2016.
24. However, as much scholarship has shown, gambling is more pervasive among so-
cioeconomically marginalized populations, who see it as their only hope of escaping from 
poverty. Thus, in a number of cases, the inclinations both to gamble and to engage in high-
risk migration can be seen as the result of constrained agency.
25. Judging by unauthorized border crossings in the United States and Europe, mi-
grants have better odds than gamblers do. In 2016, the “deadliest year of all,” over 5,000 
migrants died in the Mediterranean, out of 362,000 arrivals, a 98 percent success rate. The 
percentage is lower for the route through Libya to Italy, by far the most dangerous (see 
Steinhilper and Gruijters 2017 on death rates by year and route), and even lower if one 
estimates the number who die in the Sahara, but such a high success rate would nonethe-
less be unthinkable in gambling. Success at blackjack, considered the game with the best 
odds, does not exceed 48 percent, and other games offer dramatically lower odds (Chau 
and Phillips 1995).
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26. Like high-risk migration, gambling has always attracted attention not only for its 
social and human costs, but also for the difficulties in grasping the rationale driving gam-
blers’ choices. Innumerable books and articles have tried to solve the puzzle of why people 
would gamble at all, considering the expected negative returns and the mounting losses. 
Philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and economists have been de-
bating the motivations of gambling for centuries. In one of his most famous passages, 
Pascal ([1670] 1999) wrote that people gamble to escape existential ennui. Some authors 
have argued that individuals gamble for a variety of motives, ranging from the desire to 
hurt oneself (Bergler 1936), to attaining higher self-esteem (Martinez 1983). Although 
some scholars have argued that gambling is perfectly rational behavior in line with utility 
maximization (Becker and Murphy 1988), most authors would rather compare gambling 
with some kind of addiction characterized by weakness of the will (Elster and Skog 1999). 
A number of authors (Smith 1984; Rosecrance 1988) have in turn highlighted that gam-
bling is deeply social—its main motivations are rooted in the social environment where 
gamblers live. Other authors have instead focused on cognitive mechanisms leading gam-
blers to keep betting despite expected losses, unrealistic optimism, perceived luckiness, 
the illusion of control, and superstitious thinking among them (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Wagenaar 1988; Rogers 1998). Research on Senegalese pirogue migration also men-
tions these as factors perhaps contributing to migrants’ risk-prone attitudes (Hernández- 
Carretero 2008, 57).
27. Rogers 1998; Griffiths and Wood 2001.
28. Elster 2003.
29. Jansen 2009.
30. Núñez and Heyman 2007.
31. Stoll 2010; O’ Connel Davidson 2013.
32. Brigden and Mainwaring 2016.
C ONCLUSION
1. On the importance of overcoming an emergency/humanitarian paradigm in refugee 
studies, see, e.g., Nyers 2006; Brun 2016; Hyndman and Giles 2017.
2. Brigden and Mainwaring 2016, 408.
3. On the tension between refugee deservingness victimhood and agency, see Sales 
2002; Walaardt 2013; Holmes and Castaneda 2015; Lems et al. 2019.
4. Carling 2002; Lubkemann 2008.
5. Cf. Bauman 1998. 
6. On the tension between geographic mobility and immobility in migrants’ journeys, 
see Schapendonk et al. 2018; Brigden and Mainwaring 2016.
7. On Eritrean patriotism and migration, see Bernal 2014; Belloni 2018b; Hirt and 
Mohammad 2017.
8. I refer here to the factors analyzed in Castles 2004, which emphasizes three kinds of 
factor that lead to policy failures: those emerging from the social dynamics of the migratory 
process, those linked to increasing global inequalities, and those emerging from the politi-
cal system of the receiving state. My considerations mostly refer to the first range of causes.
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POST SCRIPT
1. See, e.g., The Migrant Project, www.themigrantproject.org/eritrean-ethiopia.






2. Boyden and de Berry 2004; Nordstrom and Robben 1995.
3. On doing research in authoritarian regimes, see Glasius et al. 2017.
4. Giulio Regeni, a Cambridge PhD student doing research on independent trade unions 
in Egypt, was tortured and killed by secret service agents in Egypt in 2015. See www.nytimes.
com/2017/08/15/magazine/giulio-regeni-italian-graduate-student-tortured-murdered-egypt.html.
5. Lubkemann 2005.
6. Borneman and Hammoudi 2009.
7. For an analysis of different forms of violence see Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes 2004.
8. Sayad 2000.
9. Harrell-Bond and Voutira 2007, 284.
10. Massa 2016; Bozzini 2013; Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003.
11. Tronvoll 2000
12. Conti-Rossini 1916, Pollera 1935, and Nadel 1946 are among the most notable colo-
nial studies.
13. A BBC team was allowed into the country again in 2015, but their movements were 
strictly controlled during their stay.
14. On the pros and cons of covert research, see Calvey 2008.
15. Spicker 2011.
16. Kovats-Bernat 2002.
17. Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Lubkemann 2010; Waterstone 2008.
18. Glasius et al. 2017.
19. Kovats-Bernat 2002, 214.
20. In general, all foreigners must apply for a permit, at the ministry that facilitated 
their entry, to travel outside Asmara. The permit is often limited in time (only a couple of 
days depending on the site), aside from travel to Massawa.
21. See, e.g., McLaughlin and Alfaro-Velcamp 2015; Pittaway et al 2010.
22. Turton 1996, 96.
23. See Doná 2007; Harrell-Bond and Voutira 2007; Block et al. 2012.
24. Hugman, Pittaway, and Bartolomei 2011 , 1279.
25. See, e.g., https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/horn-africa/regional/research- 
and-evidence-facility_en.
26. Leaning 2001; Jacobsen and Landau 2002.
27. Barnett 2017, 13.
28. For a critical account of institutional protective attitudes, see Lange et al. 2007.
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29. For more about Ethiopian policing strategies under the EPRDF led the government, 
see Di Nunzio 2014.
30. Tigrinya refugees were especially feared by the Ethiopian authorities because they 
were deemed to be more politicized and more easily assailable to spies of the Eritrean gov-
ernment sent to trigger turmoil in Ethiopia.
31. Jacobs 2006.
32. On the complications of being ethical in research, see Robins and Scheper-Hughes 
1996.
33. Fassin 2013, 640. In his study on the work of police in Parisian banlieus, Fassin re-
ports having felt incompatibly both loyal to the police, with whom he spent significant 
amounts of time, and to the youth of the banlieues who were the target of the police inter-
ventions.
34. My position, here does not differ from those who argue that researchers are most ac-
countable to those who are most oppressed and are in line with the mainstream ethical guide-
lines set by the American Anthropological Association. See inter alia Scheper-Hughes 1995.
35. Scheper-Hughes 2009, 14.
36. Jacobs 2006.
37. See, e.g., Cook et al. 2009.
38. Daniel and Knudsen 1995.
39. See also Miller 2004 and Massa 2016 on the difficulty of gaining trust in research 
with refugees.
40. Salamone 1977.
41. Bleek 1987; Obligacio 1994; Fujii 2010.
42. See also, e.g., Shuman and Bohmer 2004; Hynes 2003.
43. The paternalism of humanitarian regimes does not function through coercion 
but through dominance, reproduced in a convergence of the interests of the dominant 
and the dominated (Fassin 2017). The process of selecting legitimate refugees based on 
proof of victimhood satisfies both parties. In seeking protection, the asylum seeker often 
performs a role implying the cultural and moral inferiority of the society he comes from 
in order to gain the benevolence of hospitality. See also Ticktin 2006 and Fassin and 
Rechtman 2009.
44. De Voe 1981; Zetter 1991, Holmes and Castaneda 2016.
45. See Goffman 1959 and, with reference to refugee studies, Miller 2004. 
46. Jacobsen and Landau 2003.
47. E.g., Hugman et al. 2011; Pittaway and Bartolomei 2013. 
48. Pærregaard 2002, 329.
49. See Falzon 2009 and, in particular, Gallo 2009.
50. See Gay y Blasco and de La Cruz Hernández 2012 for one of the most interesting 
essays on friendship between anthropological researchers and participants.




55. De Regt 2015.
56. Mahmood 2002. 
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57. This relationship is not uncommon in ethnographic studies. Pærregaard reports, 
e.g., being treated by informants as an “orphan” who was unable to count on anyone for care 
when in need (Pærregaard 2002, 328).
58. E.g., Pussetti 2005.
59. Newton 1993; Kulick and Wilson 2003.
60. See Dubisch 1995.
61. Scholars who fear for their own reputations or the credibility of their studies often 
avoid mentioning sexual harassment and implicit violence inflicted on female researchers 
by male interlocutors. See, e.g., Green et al. 1993; Sharp and Kremer 2006; Kloß 2017.
62. E.g. Pearson and Paige 2012.
63. Hugman et al. 2011.
64. Jacobsen and Landau 2003; Mackenzie et al. 2007.
65. Cf. Fassin 2017; Hodgson 1999.
66. De Genova 2013, Scheper-Hughes 1995.
67. See, e.g., Turton 1996; Doná 2007.
68. As Dorothy Hodgson 1999, 202, argues, we can “no longer presume . . . that ‘com-
munities’, however isolated or subsistence-oriented, are homogenous, undifferentiated col-
lectivities, but recognize the possibility of conflicting structural positions, interests, and 
perspectives.”
69. Fassin 2014, 53.
70. Faist 2018; Mezzadra 2004.
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